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ABSTRACT 
THE UNITARY CONSCIOUSNESS: TOWARD A SOLUTION FOR THE ONTOLOGICAL 
CRISIS IN MODERN THEORIES OF THE SELF 
By: Mahmoud Khatami 
The overall aim of this research project that is done in the field of 
Phenomenology and Ontogenetic Epistemology, is to investigate the possibility of 
employing the Illuminative elements for solving the Ontological Crisis in Western 
epistemology of the self. 
Descartes, the father of modern western thought, gave through his Meditations 
a priority to Cogito over Sum, and this historically became a turning point for the 
movement that crystallised in Kant's Copernican Revolution by which metaphysics 
was identified with epistemology indicating that epistemology can thereafter be 
considered without any need for ontology. One of the immediate consequences of 
detaching epistemology from ontology in this history has in the main been the 
dismissal of the 'being' of the self in modern theories. 
In parallel to the existential phenomenology's purport to supply this lack in 
modern epistemology of the self, this research attempts in its own way to achieve a 
solution by delving into the Persian Illuminative school and by seeking even to assign 
a new role to its philosophical system to gain a new vision of the self and 
consciousness. 
To remedy, first a reconstruction of the Illuminative Method is introduced. This 
embodies the claim that although legitimate in itself, epistemology that is based upon 
the theory of essence cannot be detached from ontology. This method ultimately 
appeals to a very subtle and special field, the Ontetic Field, under which everything is 
reduced to Being and is grounded by it. 
Applying of this method provides an entry to considering the problematic of the 
self in the ontetic field in which the being of the self is encountered as an epiphany of 
Being that is immersed in and, at the same time, present to Being. The keen relation 
of 'Being' and the 'being' of the self is exposed as a performative, existential 
experience called the unitary consciousness. This moment implies that there is no 
subject (mind, etc.) in modern subjectivistic sense; the subject is only a self as unitary 
consciousness. 
In this context, the Illuminative philosophy is also directed to answering some 
major problems that arise from modern subjectivism, including our consciousness of 
private states (esp. senses and body), reflective (ISubject-Objectlive) knowledge and 
our grasping of the reality of objects. 
On this basis, some immediate conclusions are set forth, including (i) a 
refutation of a triple trap which follows from the ontological crisis: skepticism, solipsism 
and idealism; (ii) the agreement of the Illuminative theory with common sense; and (iii) 
a suggestion as to how one could read the authors of modern theories of the self in 
an Illuminative context. 
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tholl shalt behold all the universe lhe dawning-place of 
lights. 
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Preface 
In the pages that follow, I have originally proposed to examine in a comparative 
way whether the Persian school of Illuminative philosophy could contribute to remove 
the ontological crisis in modern epistemology of the self. In carrying out this, I felt it was 
imperative to step beyond the traditional confines as well as Orientalistic boundaries of 
reading IslamiclPersian philosophy. I tried, therefore, to redirect the II1uminative school 
to examine its ability to contribute. To remedy this, I attempted first to reconstruct the 
illuminative method: Though in the practical trend of the illuminative literature, this 
method is actually applied here and there, a theoritical formulation of it has not as yet 
been found. The philosophical introducing of this method here appears to be the first. 
Through this introducing, I disclosed in a comparative way that the Illuminative method 
already employed some sorts of modern philosophical methods such as 
Phenomenological Reductions and Deconstruction. However, the main aim was to 
introduce the OllIe tic Field in which the subtle relation of consciousness with the "being" 
of the selfis realised as the "Unitary Consciousness." 
The notion of the unitary consciousness which I am presenting was born from my 
analysis of the Illuminative philosophy, on one hand, and, on the other, from rethinking 
of my M.A dissertationll! in which I tried to read Husserlian-Schelerian version of 
transcendentalism in an Illuminative context. I think that this notion, when exactly 
elaborated, could have its appropriate applications in the related fields We will see some 
of its applications in this research (Ch. 6-8); I ha\'e also examined it in a separate work(2) 
to justify the Mystical Consciollsness, and am now thinking of its 'moral application. 
It is perhaps obvious without saying that reconstnlcting and redirecting of an old 
and sophisticated philosophy with its hugely widespread traditional literature, to bring 
out from it something new to solve a fundamental problem in modern thought, could not 
be simple and easy~ specially when it is the first step in a new field of comparartive 
philosophy that has not as yet been pursued at all. I hope that the main idea of the 
present research will open a window to a non-Western but rich philosophy and will help 
to stimulate some thinking in a constructive direction toward the solution of a 
fundamental problem that is vital for modern philosophy. 
CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
The problematic of the self in the modern thought is hidden in an ontological 
gap in the epistemology of the self. In this introduction, we present a delineation of 
this gap; then we elucidate it by retracing selectively three main movements in western 
thought concerning the self, through a rapid study of Descartes, Hume, Kant and 
HusserI. At the end of this chapter, we briefly draw the aims and design of this 
research. 
1. 1. Primary Considerations: 
Among several interpretations of the nature of modern western philosophy, 
there is one in particular that considers it as a history of subjectivism. There are, of 
course, different versions of this standpoint. It seems enough here to mention, for 
example, those of Geunon,(l) Schoun/') Gilson{3J and HeideggerJ./) We are not 
concerned in this research with these interpretations and their critical remarks on the 
nature of modern thought and its probably dramatic implications. What concerns us 
here is to see a general point on which these critics agree despite their different 
outlooks: that there is a crisis in the basis of modern thoughtJ51 What is of significance 
for our study is this crisis so far as the nature of the self is concerned. Seen from this 
particular angle, the crisis is rooted in an ontological gap in the epistemology of the 
self What is this gap? Let us provide a brief answer. 
Descartes, the father of modern western thought, gave through his Meditations 
a priority to Cogito over S1/I11, and this became a turning point for the movement that 
crystallised in Kant's Copernican Revolution by which metaphysics was identified 
with epistemology -- the official neglecting of 'S1/I11' which detached epistemology 
from ontology indicating that it can be considered without any need for the latter, and 
f 
finally dismissed. As a whole, existence became a calegOlY of our understanding along 
with and among the others. It is ultimately a copula picked up from judgementJ5+J) 
True, it has somehow been understood often thereafter in a nominalistic way through 
western thought. ( aside from the existentialist movement.) 
2 
One of the immediate consequences of detaching epistemology from ontology in 
this history has in the main been the dismissal of the 'being' of the self In such 
context, the dramatic destiny of the self depicts a divergent line of thought in the 
West; since the history of modern western thought was established on the Cartesian 
Cogito whose ego, at least as its historical fate testifies/6) was uprooted from its being 
even in the same well-known phrase: Cogito ergo SlIl11. The profound ontological gap 
felt in the basis of modern thought is hidden in this uprooted ego, in this Cogito 
detached from SlIl11: the beingless self, or in Heidegger's term the worldless subject. 
The Cartesian Cogito dismissed the realm of existence and reduced the self to a res 
cogitans that implicitly erased all properties traditionally assigned to the self as soul;(7) 
and put it in contrast to res ex/ell.\·a. Contemporary thought has suffered from the 
weight of difficulties raised by such a dualism: Cogi/o, the turning point of western 
thought, plunged into the maze of the subject-object dualism in which, as these critics 
say, modern thought has been involvedJ81 
Looking from this standpoint, and relying on the authority of these thinkers 
here, we can depict since Descartes, from Cal1esian Meditations to Husserlian 
Meditations, the following dialectical line of reasoning invoked by western 
philosophers (who remained in the Cartesian maze) so far as the nature of the self is 
concerned: (i) A thesis indicating that the self is a positive conscious thing, a res 
cogitans. To this thesis all rationalists give credence. (ii) An anti-thesis indicating that 
such a self can not logically be found (Hume) and is void (Rorty)~ it is psychologically 
(Rume) or verbally (Rorty)(91 supposed. (iii) A synthesis indicating that such a self 
should be supposed over or beyond our thought and actions, although we are not able 
to found it; it is transcendentally a logical conditionfot our thought and actions (Kant, 
Kantians and Husserl). These three positions can be classified as the major lines of the 
subjectivistic theories of the self in modern thought. All three have become trapped in 
that ontological gap we mentioned above~ that is to say, all of them have neglected the 
'being' of the self, the SUI11, and devoted themselves to the order of conceptual 
reflective knowledge, the Cogilo, presupposing the distinction between epistemology 
I 
and ontology, and the priority of the former to the latter. 
Thus considered, one may see the modern epistemology of the self as a 
continual challenge over the same problem: Descartes posited an isolated substance, a 
beingless subject, as'!'; and the epistemologists after him challenged for or against 
3 
this'!,. In this research we consider Husserl, whose Cartesian Meditations end up 
with a radical idealism on the self, as characteristic of this subjectivistic movement. 
Our purpose is to fill the ontological gap in the modern theories of the self using 
insights from the Illuminative tradition in Persian philosophy. Before expounding an 
Illuminative account of the self, we offer in this introduction a brief analysis of the 
three major lines of western subjectivism identified above. For convenience we term 
these the substantialising of the setf, the p.\ychologising of the self and the 
transcendentalising of the self They will be explored through the writings of 
Descartes, Hume, Kant and Husser!' The first aim of this analysis is to clarify the 
problematic within diverse and conflicting modern thoughts about the self The 
second aim ·is to prepare a proper context for our later proposal (eh.8) that many of 
these apparently conflicts can be integrated and brought to completion on the basis of 
the apparently widespread experience of the self identified in the Illuminative 
philosophy. We will suggest that these apparent conflicts can be resolved by 
underpinning them with an Illuminative account of the self. 
1. 2. ,,\'uhstllnt;a!;s;ng (~l The Se({:' 
The substantialisation of the self has a history as old as that of philosophy firstly 
presented by Plato, then systematised by Aristotle. However in modern times it has 
gained fresh significance through/since Descartes methodological meditations. In the 
Meditation Descartes engaged in a search for knowledge that might prove absolutely 
certain. He employed skepticism as a method, doubting everything he could in order 
to see if anything remained as certain and stable. 
"Archimedes asked only for one fixed and immovable point so as to 
move the whole eal1h from its place~ so I may have great hopes if I 
find even the least thing that is unshakeably certain." (10) 
Using his method, Descartes felt that he discovered an absolute, unshakeable 
foundation for knowledge in the knowledge of his own self-existence. 
He doubted everything, and then noticed that the very act of doubting was his 
act, and that even doubting his own non-existence would therefore prove his 
existence. For "if I did convince myself of anything, I must have existed," and 
similarly, if anyone else convinced him of anything, he must also still exist. 
'Thus I. .. mllst at length conclude that this. proposition 'I am', '1 
exist', whenever 1 utter it or conceive it in my mind. is necessarily 
tmc." (/1) 
On this argument, then, "{ exist" is a necessary truth whenever thought or 
uttered. It is true whenever conceived, and its contradiction "I do not exist" is false 
whenever conceived (for the very act of conceiving it implies its falsity). 
Having established self-existence as indubitable, Descartes asked "what is this 
'1' that necessarily exists"?(i':) He noted that his body and even the entire physical 
universe might conceivably be mere dreams, "nonentities" in themselves. As such they 
stand in sharp contrast to the cel1ainty of his own consciousness. For while these 
possibly illusory objects of awareness might disappear from his consciousness, his 
own consciousness itself could not. Thus: 
"At this point I come to the fact that there is consciousness ... of this 
and this only I cannot be deprived." (13) "\Vhat then am I? A consciolls 
being. "(1-1) 
'That is, a being that doubts, asscrts, denies, understands a fcw things, 
is ignorant of many, is willing or unwilling; and that has also 
imagination and sense ... In these few words I have given a list of all 
the things I really know. or at least have so far observed that I know .. 
. I am ccrtain that I am a conscious being. "(15) 
Thus, Descartes argued that. his own existence as a conscIous being IS 
necessarily indubitable. From this beginning Descartes attempted to derive a 
knowledge about knowledge, God, and the world. Our concern here, however, is only 
with his theory of self Let us turn to three major corollaries about the self which 
Descartes felt the above line of reasoning established: 
(i) 1 am a thing that thinks, an "intelligent substance" that can exist "as a whole" 
being, independently of any of the various faculties of thinking or consciousness (e.g., 
imagination, perception, etc.) which I find in me. 
(ii) I am "one and the same mind that wills, feels ... understands," etcJJ6) That 
is, I am the same person, the same "consciolls being" throughout all of my activities 
and experiences, "a single and complete thing, "non-exteDded, without parts, and 
I 
"wholly indivisible. "(J"') 
(iii) 1 am non-picturable and non-imaginable, and "nothing I can comprehend by 
the help 0f imagination belongs to my conception of myself" For, Descartes argued, 
one's nature as a conscious self is radically different and logically distinct from all the 
contents of perception and imagination/IS) and 
"The mind's attention must be carefully diverted from these things, so 
that she may discem her own nature as distinctly as possible." (/9) 
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These conclusions about the self have proven very troublesome. From 
Descartes' time onwards philosophers have questioned them, asking: 
(i) What reason do we have to infer the existence of some conscious thing or 
substance existing above and beyond the various contents of consciousness displayed 
by introspection? 
(ii) What is meant by the "sameness" of self existing throughout its various 
activities, and what evidence (other than ordinary common-sense intuition) do we 
have that there is one selfsame thing that persists? 
(iii) What concept can we have of something absolutely unimaginable and 
unpicturable? 
These three questions, about the self as a conscious thing, the same conscious 
thing, and unimaginable conscious thing, have dominated discussions of self for over 
three hundred years. Descal1es' meditations on the self, however plausible they might 
at first seem, have raised more questions than they settled, and his Archimedes' point 
is not yet at all secure and immovable. 
We will later see if the Illuminative theory we will be discussing provides us with 
a useful perspective for re-evaluating these difficult questions about the nature of the 
self. Rather than attempting to apply this Illuminative knowledge here, however, let us 
continue our examination of modern philosophical theories and problems of self as 
they developed after Descal1es. 
1. 3. P!'i)'ch%gising of the Se(f:' 
The substantialisation of the self was accepted not only by Cartesians, but also 
by some philosophers who objected to his philosophical system (e.g. Berekley). Only 
Hume who pushed empiricism to its extreme, rejected the nature of the self as a 
I 
substance. Due to his empiricist principles, he ultimately described the self as a 
psychological' 1'. It does not mean that by such a position, he refused to consider the 
knowledge of the self; rather, like Descartes, he regarded knowledge of the self to be 
of supreme importance. In the introduction to his Treatise 011 Human Nature he 
declared 
Here then is the only expedient, from which \\'e can hope for success in 
our philosophical researches, to. . . march directly to the capital or 
centre of these [i.e., all thej sciences, to human nature itself, which 
being masters of we may every where else hope for an easy \ictory PO) 
6 
It is obvious that Hume was concerned with developing philosophical 
knowledge that was scientific. He subtitled his Treatise "An attempt to introduce the 
experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects, " that is, into subjects dealing 
with mind, knowledge, and human nature. By "experimental method of reasoning" he 
meant reasoning that was experiential in orientation. All concepts that could not be 
derived from experience, that is from our "impressions" (or perceptions) and the 
relations observed to hold among them, were to be discarded as unscientific; only 
those the meanings of which could be fully explicated in terms of experience were to 
be accepted as significant and useful for gaining knowledge.I.?1i Let us now see how 
Hume applied his "experimental method" of analysis to the self. 
Hume, responding to Descal1es' analysis/n ) noted that it is supposed certain 
that the self has a "perfect identity and simplicity," is "invariably the same through the 
whole course of our lives," and is neither an impression nor perception but rather 
"that to which our several impressions and ideas are supposed to relate.' '(.?3) 
According to Hume, however, this notion of self, which at first seems to appear 
commonsensical, is not supported by the facts of our actual experience. For we have 
no impression that is constant and invariableJ.?./) and no experience of self (or anything 
else) as distinct from perceptions or impressionsJ.?5) Therefore, Hume argued, we 
have no experiential basis for any concept of self as single, simple, or continuing. This 
commonsensical concept of self that is supposed, therefore, according to Hume, is 
simply' 'fictitious.' '(.?6) 
Thus, on the basis of Hume's analysis, if we remain true to our experience we 
are forced to acknowledge that the self in reality "is nothing but a bundle or collection 
of different perceptions which. . . are in perpetual flux or movement. "(27) For 
introspection only displays collections of such perceptions, and no perception or 
collection is perceived as constant. This observation, and its apparent conflict with 
our sense of self as constant and abiding naturally prompted Hume to ask 
"\Vhat then gives so great a propension to ascribe an identity to these 
successive perceptions l constituting one's self], and to suppose 
ourselves possess of an invariable and unintermpted existence through 
the whole of our lives?,,(.?8) 
7 
Hume's answer is that our various perceptions are so closely connected by two 
relations, "contiguity" (being "next to") and "resemblance," that our attention 
naturally passes among them so smoothly that we generally do not notice their 
separateness and distinctness, and that as a result we simply take them unreflectingly 
to be aspects of a single thing, namely, one's self-identical mind or self Self-identity 
is only a (naturally occurring) fiction. (!9J 
Hume at first considered this "relational" account of the genesis of our concept 
of the self"perfectly decisive. "(30) He asserted: 
"When I tum my reflection on myself, I never can percei\'(: this self 
without some one or more perceptions. It is the composition of these, 
therefore, which fonns the self. (3lJ \Ve have no notion of it distinct 
from particular perceptions,rJ':J And we have no impression of self or 
substance as something simpk and individual. We haw, therefore, no 
idea of them in this scnse.·' (33) 
Thus, Hume reasserted, there can be no sense to the idea of 8 single, abiding self 
to which our various individual perceptions and thoughts are related or connected. 
"So far I seem to be attended with sufficient evidence. But having thus 
loosened all our pal1icular perceptions, when I proceed to explain the 
principle of conncction. which binds them together and makes liS 
attribute to them a J'L\11 simplicity and identity: I am sensible. that my 
account is vcr" dcfectin:." (J./) 
That is, Hume's earlier attempt to unify the "loosened perceptions" and account 
for the "felt" unity of self by means of relations observed to hold between them is now 
explicitly rejected as "very defective."(35J 
The logic of Hume's difficulty may perhaps requIre some explanation. Hume 
argued that each of our "perceptions" or "impressions" (that is, each component of 
our inner and outer experience) is a logically "distinct existence. " For each of them, 
in logic if not in actual fact, can be had independently of any and all of the others. 
That is, there is nothing in any of our perceptions which necessarily connects it with 
any other. By recognising this we have, in Hume's terms, (conceptually) "loosened" 
t 
each of our perceptions from all the others. Thus if we reflect on the set of 
perceptions that comprise the experiences of our own lives we see that there is 
nothing within these "loosened" perceptions that can account for their connectedness. 
This means that there is nothing in them that can account for the fact that each of us 
"feels" that they are connected by being "bound together" as one's own. 
8 
Hume's argument here, of course, is only about perceptions as perceptions. 
Taken by itself it does not imply anything about what we naturally take to be objects 
of and causal processes underlying the perceptions themselves. For example, the fact 
that the contents of the left and right portions of one's visual (or auditory, etc.) field 
exist and are related in the way that they presently are (as left and right, being 
experienced now by oneself, etc.) presumably is the result of a long causal sequence 
of events. Given that objective causal sequence, what is experienced on the left must 
be experienced there. But on the basis of Hume' s analysis,r3~) if we consider the 
perceptions just as perceptions, we can readily imagine, for example, seeing the left 
portion somewhere else, in a different context, or even entirely by itself. For each 
portion is 
"distinguishable, and separable. and may be conceived as separately 
existent, and may exist separately, without an\' contradiction or 
absurdit\'. "(.1 7 ) 
One might have dreamed of having perceptions that are connected, or 
disconnected, in the ways that are different from the ways that they actually are. But 
recognising that (considered purely as perceptions) there is nothing in them that 
requires them to be connected in the ways that they are, or even to be connected at 
all, makes it apparent that there is nothing in them which can account for the fact that 
they are connected together as one's own. Hume accordingly felt constrained to 
conclude that 
"all my hopes \'anish, ''''len I come to explain the principles. that unite 
our sllccessivc perccptions in ollr thought or consciollsness. I cannot 
discover any theory. \\"hich gives me satisfaction on this head."(j~) 
Hume's introspective analysis and conclusion that he could find neither any 
constant perception nor anything distinct from perceptions, and therefore nothing 
which could correspond to the notion of a single, abiding self, has proven very 
influential since his time. His analyses of the varieties of perceptions and their 
r~lations and his attempt to constmct a theory of self in terms of relations and 
collections of perceptions accordingly have prompted philosophers and psychologists 
alike to offer a variety of theories of the self as a bundle, collection or other 
association of perceptions related in various ways (e.g., by continuity, similarity, 
memory-connectedness, etc.). Hume himself, however, not only rejected his own 
"". 
..... , .. ,. 
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collection theory of self, but also apparently felt that no such theory could succeed. 
For his rejection, as we saw, was formulated entirely in general terms, without even 
mentioning any of the specifics of his own earlier theory. 
Hume's rejection of bundle or collection theories of self was based on his 
observation that our perceptions, considered purely as perceptions, are separable and 
fe-combinable. This observation also provides the basis for an explicit general 
argument against the possibility of any adequate "collection" or "relational" theory of 
self (see also eh. 4). The idea behind the argument seems to be simple. When we 
recognise, as Hume did, that any imaginable perception (logically) could be had 
independently of its relationships to other perceptions, it becomes apparent that any 
such perception (logically, if not in fact) could be had by anyone, including oneself. 
Perhaps the world would have to be \elY different (as in a dream, "science fiction," 
etc.) for one to actually have some particular very unlikely experience, but if one can 
imagine anyone's having it, one can imagine (without logical contradiction) having it 
oneself. To this extent, then, it appears that we naturally conceive of ourselves as 
experiencers somehow independent of the restrictions imposed by particular 
experiences and their relationships. It seems obvious that neither collections of such 
experiences nor their relations can be expected to capture this independent aspect of 
our ordinary concept of self. 
The full general argument, intended to cover all possible cases, naturally is 
highly abstractJ39) Its basic idea, however, is simply that when a relation R between 
perceptions is defined, it will be incapable of grasping the nature of one's selfJ40) This 
is because in attempting to specify the collection of perceptions -- that , suppose, 
constitute one~s self -- the relation will always imply that it is (logically) impossible for 
one to have perceptions that he (logically) could have. The following examples serve 
to make the significance of this general argument clear. 
Suppose, as a variation of Hume's original "contiguity" and "resemblance" 
theory, that for any thing to be a perception it must be experienced as associated with 
oyr own body, and in a place connected with those of our prior experiences. If the 
relation R is defined in this way, then any perception that is not experienced as (a) 
associated with our body and (b) in a place connected with those of our earlier 
experiences will be a perception that R excludes. This means that it is a perception 
which we cannot have. It is easy to see, however, that people not only can but 
actually do have such excluded perceptions. If our body is moved to a completely 
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unfamiliar place while we are unconscious, our perceptions of surroundings upon 
waking will not be connected w~th those of our prior experiences. Furthermore it is 
obviously possible to have experiences where ollr body is not noticed at all, and in 
dreams we can not only not notice ollr body but even have experiences which are 
associated to all appearances with a different body, or even with no body at all. These 
are all common kinds of experiences. Yet the relation R defined above implies that we 
could not have any of them. Thus each of them shows that the relation being 
evaluated is incapable of defining the collection of perceptions that we can have. 
The relation evaluated and rejected above was defined, in the spirit of Hume's 
original suggestion, in terms of relationships between our perceptions. But the general 
argument against collection theories implies that relations which are expanded to refer 
to physical objects (such as oLir body) as well will still always have counter examples. 
For example, it is often held that an experience must be had by means of (or at least in 
association with) oLir body, whether or not we notice this fact. Thus the relation R 
could require our body as a condition for a perception. Then, any experience, had 
before our body existed or after it ceases to exist, cannot be one had by ourselves. 
Now consider some (logically) possible experience occurring after ollr body ceases to 
exist. Then the relation R now being examined implies that one cannot have this 
experience. While it may well be true in fact that we cannot have any experiences after 
our bodies cease to exist, the majority of the people in the world not only appear 
capable of imagining that they have such experiences, but are often even very 
concerned about having and/or not having them, as the history of the world's religions 
(not to mention the texts of Plato and other philosophers) shows. Since this concern, 
held so deeply by so many ordinary people, is about their having such experiences 
themselves, it is clear that this relation (R) is incapable of capturing, and indeed is 
contradicted by, our ordinalY concept of self as it is reflected in these widespread 
religious fears and aspirationsJ.//) 
The relations used in the above examples could of course be refined and revised 
tq accommodate any given counter-examples. The general argument, however, 
implies that every empirically significant relation will have such counter-examples. It 
rejects all such relations at once, and implies that whatever relations may hold 
between our various perceptions, these relations are unable either to define the self by 
specifying the collection of perceptions proper to it, or to express what is involved in 
our perceptions being, for each of us, our own. Thus they cannot serve as the 
11 
"principle of connection" uniting perceptions into a collection adequate to defining the 
self. Hume's skepticism about the possibility of developing a bundle -- or 
collection-theory of the self was thus well-founded. 
"Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual, 
or did the mind perceive some real connection among them, there 
would be no difficulty in the case. For my part, I must plead the 
privilege of a sceptic, and confess, that this difficulty is too hard for 
my understanding. "(42) • 
The "capital or centre" of knowledge clearly has not yet been captured. 
1. 4. Transcendentalising (~l tile Se(l: 
Descartes' and Hume's theories posited a third possibility in the history of· 
modern thought: transcendentalisation of the self. This possibility is firstly examined 
by Kant and followed by the majority of philosophers in post-Kantian period. Here we 
summarise two outstanding figures in this line: Kant and Husserl whose positions on 
transcendentalisation seem to arise ditferently from a tension between Cartesian and 
Humean trends. 
a) Kant: Hume's critical analyses had a profound impact on Kant. Reading 
Hume, Kant wrote, woke him from his "dogmatic slumber"(.J3) and caused him to re-
evaluate the foundations of what he had formerly taken to be knowledge. Hume's 
analyses convinced Kant that the relationships we observe in experience are always 
contingent (that is, dependent on various factors and conditions), and that experience 
therefore cannot display necessary, universal truthJ44) This forced Kant to question his 
earlier dogmatic convictions radically, and ask how, and even whether, knowledge 
which is certain and universal could even be possible. In his C,.itique of PlIre Reason 
he responded that we can in fact have knowledge which is certain and universal, and 
that universal certainty is a reflection of the invariant aspects of the nature of the 
knower, rather than of the changing contents of whatever one may know or 
experienceJ45) 
Kant offered an analysis of the self as "the original synthetic unity" of all 
knowledge and experience, a unity which serves as "the Supreme Principle of all 
Employment of the Understanding."(.f6) Kant's analyses of these concepts are detailed 
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and quite sophisticated, but a few basic observations can usefully be made here. Kant 
noted that our experience is always in space and/or time, and, furthermore, it is 
always of extensions in space and/or time, never of isolated pointsJ..f7) (Any isolated 
point, having no extension, would, of course, be too (infinitely) small ever to be 
perceived. ) Every experience, then, is composed of a synthesis of parts. And all the 
parts must be experienced by a single experiencer. (48) Otherwise they would not be 
parts of an experience, and the original experience itself would simply not exist. For 
example, in order for the letter "F" at the beginning of this sentence to be seen, 
various parts must be seen together in specific relations .. If each different part was 
seen in isolation by a different person, the letter would be seen by no one. Thus the 
very existence of seeing the letter implies that various parts are seen together 
(synthesised) by a single experiencer. Similarly, for any thought to be thought, its 
parts, too, must be synthesised in the experience of a single thinker.(.J~) Thus, Kant 
concluded, for any thought or experience to exist, its parts must already have been 
synthesised and presented to a single conscious self. The individual self according to 
Kant thus represents "the original synthetic unity" underlying all thought and 
experience, and, as underlying all thought and experience, its unity is the "supreme 
principle of all employment of the understanding." In Kant's terminology the "identity 
of the self, "(50) the . unity of "transcendental apperception" or "pure original 
unchanging consciousness,"(51J is thus the universal condition presupposed by all 
experience and thought. Being presupposed by experience it is not given by it~ it 
represents the supreme unifying contribution of the self. Furthermore, Kant argues, 
since our analysis has shown that this must be true of all experience, independent of 
all particulars of content, we know it with "a priori" certainty, that is, with a certainty 
which is logically prior to and independent of all the changing contents of experience. 
Kant thus appears here to have located a fundamental truth about the self and its 
relation to experience, namely that the self must be a unitary, synthesising referent for 
all of one's experiences . 
.. It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my 
representations: for otherwise something would be represented in me 
which could not be thought at aiL and that is equivalent to saying that 
the representation would be impossible, or at least nothing to mc."(5]) 
But, Kant adds, there is an important way in which even this knowledge gives 
no knowledge about the self itself, for 
"the perception of self. .. this inner perception is nothing more than 
the merc appcrccption 'I think' ... in which no special distinction or 
cmpirical determination is given. "(53) 
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Our concept of the self thus appears to be "empty," for we seem to know 
nothing about the self other than that it plays the role of the conscious synthesising or 
unifying pole of our experiences. As Kant puts it: 
"thc simple, and in itself completely empty, representation ''1'' ... we 
cannot cven say that this is a concept, but only that it is a bare 
consciousness which accompanies all concepts. Through this 1 or he or 
it (the thing) \\"hich thinks, nothing further is represented than a 
transcendcntal subject of the thought = X. It is knO\m only through the 
thoughts. which are its predicates, and of it. apart from them, we 
cannot havc any concept \\·hatsocvcr. "(5./) 
Kant's conception of self thus raises two important, related Cluestions: 
(a) Why according to Kant, must the "I" be a completely empty representation? 
And (b) why is it that the self cannot be known as it is in itself? 
We can readily extract answers to these two Cluestions from within Kant's 
system. The answer to the first Cluestion emphasises the relation of the self to 
experience, and the second emphasises the nature of the self in itself. I say "extract" 
two answers because while Kant's conclusions are clear, his reasoning here seems to 
be not spelled out.!55) 'v-./e can nevel1heless fairly see how his conclusions follow from 
his general position. 
(a) First let us see why Kant would hold that the "}" is in itself simple and 
empty, and that it is obvious that in attaching 'I' to our thoughts we designate the 
subject of inherence transcendentally, without noticing in it any Cluality whatsoever. 
(56) 
Kant's point is not that we simply do not notice any Cluality, but that there is no 
quality to be noticed. Whether or not this is "obvious," it can readily be shown to 
follow within Kant's system: My having an experience implies that it is my experience 
that is already subject, in Kant's terminology, to the "transcendental unity of 
apperception." Therefore if we add "I" it doesn't mean that we add what was not 
there already. Since this is true for every possible experience, there is no quality the 
"I" can ever add to any experience; therefore it has no quality of its own to add, that 
is, "no special distinction or empirical determination" which can serve to distinguish it 
within the field of experience. We thus see how Kant could reasonably maintain that 
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the universal applicability of the "I" (of "1 think," "I experience," "I am," etc.) 
precludes it from having "any admixture of experience,"(j7} from being characterised 
by any "empirical data"1581 or "special designation,"!')';) and from being "accompanied 
by any further representation. "(60) 
(b) Now let us see what the representation of "I", empty as it may be, is 
supposed to be of (namely the self which combines or synthesises experiences and 
thoughts into its own unified whole). In the first place, it is clear that Kant thought of 
the self as (somehow) outside the whole field of experience. For insofar as the self is 
that which combines or synthesises experiences, it must lie outside of them, for 
"combination does not lie in objects [that are combined], and cannot be borrowed 
from them. "(6lJ 
The self as the unity of appelception IS thus, In Kant's terminology, 
"transcendental," ever associated with, yet never to be found in, the field of 
appearances. FUl1hermore, Kant) s anaiysis of experience and the unifying activity of 
the self leads necessarily, according to his arguments, to the concept of the self as a 
self-identical thing-in-itself independent of space and time -- in Kant's terminology a 
"noumenon." For the self, using space and time as its matrices to integrate all of its 
experiences, must somehow be independent of these matrices it uses (as well as of 
objects it integrates).(0':) But, Kant argued, if the self (as noumenon) must be outside 
of time, there can be absolutely no possibility of experiencing the self as it is in itself, 
for it is a given (although unexplainable) fact of human nature that absolutely all of 
our experience is of appearances in space and/or timeJ631 
In short, for Kant (a) the ''1'' (of "I think, " "{ am conscious; " etc. ) is an 
empirically empty concept precisely because it is necessarily compatible with and 
presupposed by every possible experience, and (b) we can have no knowledge of the 
self (the "I") as it is in itself: because it is (necessarily thought of as) outside of 
appearances in space and time, and our experience, the basis of knowledge of 
particular things, is always and only of appearances in the field of time. 
This, for Kant, results in a highly unsatisfactory situation: (i) reasoning about 
thought and experience leads to the conclusion that a simple, self identical, absolutely 
unconditioned({i.jl self, a thing-in-itself beyond the field of appearances, must be 
presupposed, yet (ii) reasoning about this concept shows that it is vacuous and gives 
us no factual knowledge, for it has no empirical content, and there is no possibility of 
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experiencing any object corresponding to it. While logical coherence requires thinking 
of the self as the simple, self-identical subject(65J of our experiences, 
"such a \\ay of speaking has no sort of application to real objects, and 
therefore cannot in the least extend our knowledge. "(66) 
And in particular it yields "nothing whatsoever towards the knowledge of myself 
as an obj ect. "(67) We thus are here involved in what Kant calls a "transcendental 
illusion," an "inevitable illusion ... [springing] from the very nature of reason. "(68) 
"I think myself on behalf of a possible experience, at the same time 
abstracting from all actual experience; and 1 conclude therefrom that I 
can be consciolls of my existence even apal1 from experience and its 
empirical conditions."(69) 
But this is an error, for 
"In so doing I am confusing the possible abstraction from my 
cmpirically determined existencc with the supposed consciousness of a 
possible separate existence of my thinking self," eO) 
and inner awareness can 
"furnish nothing to the object of pure consciollsness for the knowledge 
of its separate existence. "(7 /) 
This dilemma, according to Kant, is inescapable. 
"Even the wisest of men cannot free himself from [this] illusion which 
unceasingly mocks and torments him."(7.?) 
The unity of the self, the ·"supreme principle of all employment of 
understanding," thus, according to Kant, inevitably involves us in illusion. 
b)H usserl: Descartes discovered the self as the indubitable subject of all 
thinking. He clearly saw that the self is not a person but only that which did the 
thinking which he then called the self a res cogilOIlS. Hume denied that there was any 
such self to be discovered through experience or reason~ but he could not avoid 
referring to himself while writing to explain this theory. Kant tried to reply to both 
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Hume and Descartes. He suggested a "self' which is non-empirical but which captures 
the insight of the COKi/o, a transcendental self(73) Husser! once again tries to 
introduce a transc@ndental self, a non-psychological 'I'. He says that Descartes falls 
into an inconsistency in regard to establishing his own ego as transcendenta1J74) The 
transcendental which is as a pre-condition for the object of enquiry to exist 
(perception in this case), Husserl thinks, is what escapes from the field of 
conscIOusness: 
"As a natural man, can I ask seriously and transccndcntally how I get 
outside of my island of consciousness. "(-5) 
The answer to this question ., according to him, is positive: 
"B,· the mcthod of transcendental reduction each of us, as Cartesian 
mcdi:ator, \\';15 led back to his transcendental ego."(-6) 
:'If I put myself above all this life and refrain from doing any believing 
... I thereby acquire myself as the pure ego. "(;7) 
This is indeed so because: 
and finally: 
"The transcendcntal ego emerged by virtue of my parantht:sing of the 
entire Objectivc world and all other (including all ideal) Objectivities. 
In consequence of this paranthcsizing, I have become aware of myself 
as the transcendcntal ego. ""( -:'8) 
"In sllch lsclf-] experience the ego is accessible to himself originaliter. 
But at any particular time this experience offers only a core that is 
experienced with strict adequacy, namely the ego's living present."(79) 
Since Husser! insists that phenomenology should be restricted to pure 
description, we can easily see why the notion of a transcendental self puts him in a 
tr~)Uble. This is because the transcendental self who is the subject of all experiences 
cannot be the object of any possible experience~ if so, then there is nothing which can 
be described. 
In his early works,,8m thanks to his faithfulness to the idea of pure description, 
Husser! reject the notion of the pure or transcendental self. In this stage he, following 
Hume, identifies consciousness simply as a bundle of acts; there is no need of a 
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"referential centre". Later, in Ideas he speaks of Cogilo somehow in Cartesian manner 
and regards it as "necessary". Applying the epoche, the method of withdrawing, the 
Cogilo remains unbracketable, and he says that this CogilO is the self. In thi~ stage 
Husserl still maintains that we can not describe the self With Descartes Husserl , 
argues that the self remains after any doubting or reduction and that it is the pure ego 
which performs the acts of constitution which yield the world. 
"The experiencing ego is still nothing that might be taken for itself 
and made into an object of inquiry on its OWI1 account. Apart from its' 
way of being related' or ways of behaving', it is completely empty of 
essential components, it has no content that could be unravelled . it is 
in and for itscIf indescribable. "(8/) 
Later/8.?i Husserl ignores the notion of the self in the form of "Ego" and 
describes it as "soul" which is passive for the most part. The self here is described as 
a functional centre. and as a polarity to which intuition happens. Thus understood, 
Husserl says, the self constitutes itself The idea that the self is a centre and mostly 
passive which constitutes itself puts Husser!'s thesis in line with Kant's thesis of 
CogilO. This self is not a substance, not describable apaI1 from its necessary role in 
perception, and it is as necessary for the existence of (its) objects as its objects are 
necessary for it. In formulating the self here, Husser! seems to follow Kant in his 
"Refutation of idealism" in the first CritiqueJ83) The self and its objects are polarities 
each necessary to the other. The self is active so far as it provides the forms of 
intuition and categories of understanding within which objects can be known. The 
self, however, is passive so far as intuition is concerned and can not be said to create 
its objects. 
In his later works, relying on Descartes, Husser! seems to regard the self as an 
Archemidian point. He speaks of the self as 'absolute' meaning that all objects exist 
only by relation to it but not vice versa. He introduces the transcendental reduction 
which reduces all objects of intuition to products of this self Ultimately, Husser! 
describes this self as a "monad," an absolute ego, a total self which "includes also the 
I 
whole of actual and potential conscious life" .£8-1) It is for this monad that all things 
exist: 
"objects exist for me . and arc for me what they arc. only as objects 
of actual and possible consciousness. "(85) 
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This ultimate result , of course, leads Husserl to a kind of solipsism(86) and 
idealism(87) -- as accepted by him in Cal1esian Meditation: 
"Phenomcnology is co ipso 'transccndcnt~lI ideal ism'. "~ISS) 
and, 
"Without doubt ... [phenomcnology] condemns us to a solipsism." (89) 
Husserl's theory of self also leads to a radical subjectivism, instead of a 
transcendental empiricismJ9{J) What Husserl builds in his later works is a castle for the 
transcendental subjectivity to which all true knowledge belongsJ9}) The idea of an 
absolute self, a monad, also threatens Husser! with skepticism, for the idea that 
everything is relative to the self and all knowledge is !,;powledge of the transcendental 
subjectivity entails this consequence that we can not knO\\ anything except our own 
subjectivity. 
1.5. On The I¥ay To Fill The Gap: 
The analyses of Descartes, Hume, Kant and Husserl have raised senous 
problems for our ordinal), notion of self. Descartes, reflecting common sense, argued 
that the self is single, simple, abiding, and different from its varying perceptions. 
Hume rejected this characterisation on the grounds that we have no corresponding 
experience. Yet he concluded that this rejection, along with the consequent attempt to 
account for our· concept of self by means of collections of perceptions, leads to a 
"labyrinth" of inconsistenciesJ9':) Kant on the other hand argued that we necessarily 
have to think of the self as single, simple and abiding, but he also argued that the fact 
that we have no corresponding experience necessarily renders this concept 
. 
problematic. The result is a concept of self which, as vacuous, "unceasingly mocks 
and torments" even "the wisest of men." 
To make our difficulty even worse, the above discussion of Kant led to the 
ccmclusion that the sel( the "I" that we necessarily think of as present throughout all 
of our experiences, cannot properly be characterised by any empirical quality. And the 
above discussion of Hume led to the related conclusion that the self cannot be 
properly characterised even by collections of or relations between ollr perceptions. It 
thus appears that it is not possible to characterise the self in terms of empirical 
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qualities, their collections, or their relations. Our analysis so far thus seems to imply 
that our concept of self is, as Hume suggested and Kant insisted, meaningless. 
Husserl seems to remain in a continuous tension between Humean and Kantian 
demands, from one side, and Cartesian demand from the other side, and ultimately 
ends up in a radical subjectivism. 
It could be said, on the basis of the above discussion that it is the ontological 
gap in the epistemology of the self in modern thought that raises the lack of any 
expenence corresponding to oLir ordinary concept of self as single, simple, and 
abiding. This lack appears to make it impossible to develop any philosophically 
satisfactory notion of self. And if epistemology of the self is the" Archimedes' point," 
the "capital or centre" of all knowledge, and the "supreme principle of all employment 
of the understanding", as De3cartes, Husser!, Hume, and Kant respectively indicate, 
then the absence of a satisfactory ontology of self points to a profound gap at the 
basis of modern thought. That is to say, the 'betng' of the self is repeatedly ignored 
from Cartesian meditations to Husserlian meditations. This is what we mean by the 
'ontological gap'. 
Now, if there is such a gap in the basis of modern theories of the self, how could 
we fill it? There are, of course, a few suggestions offered by western critics to fill this 
gap -- either by appealing to the far eastern schools, as we see in early Geunon who 
detected a moral self in Hinduism, or by reconsidering the western traditional 
'philosophy, as we see in Existentialism. We wil! consider Existentialism as an example 
of such an efforts throughout this research. 
~ . 
Though all these eftorts to fill the gap are praiseworthy, however, in this 
research we are about to test a new way by exel1ing it from an old tradition in Persian 
philosophy: the Illuminative tradition. As we depicted the problematic of the modern 
notion of the self as an ontological gap, it will, then, be supposed that we need a 
return to the 'being' of the self to fill theJ9-1) This is needed simply because if we want 
to remove the gap we should consider the self s being anew; that is, its ontology. It 
Il1eans that instead of reflectively, epistemologicaly theorising the nature of the self as 
a concept, we need a live, perfonnative, factual and existential notion to indicate the 
experience of the self. Such a notion is exactly what will be built up in this research. 
We suggest that the Illuminative theory can fill the ontological gap in the 
epistemology of the self because it assigns to the self a special kind of "being", one 
which, to my knowledge, has no corresponding notion in Western thought since 
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Socrates. This kind of being, as we shall see in Chapter 3, remains apart from (and 
prior to) any distinction between ontology and epistemology, and so automatically 
fills the gap. 
1. 6 Aims (~f Tld.\' Research 
This research has one principle, and several subsidiary aims. 
J) The principle aim is to present a theory of the self which draws upon the 
Illuminative tradition, in order to fill the ontological gap in modern theories of the 
self 
II) The subsidiary a1IllS divide into two ranks, compnsll1g attendant topics 
which are (a) exclusively discLlssed and (b) only outlined. 
(a) 77?e explicit .'nlhsidim)J disclIssions cover applications of the Illuminative 
theory to the following: 
(i) Our conscioLlsness of private states. Here the Illuminative theory offers 
insights upon private states in general, and draws us into an encounter with body-
consciosness as well as sense-consciousness. The aim here is to show that our private 
states, existentialised in general, provide evidence in sLlppor1 of the Illuminative 
approach. 
(ii) The root of reflective knowledge and our knowledge of the external world. 
Here the aim is to show how an Illuminative theory yields an account of the Subject-
Object relationship, by providing an existential explanation of the root of the reflective 
knowledge. 
(b) lhe olltline slIhsidiol}' di .... ·Cllssiolls have three aims: 
(i) To draw an introductory comparison between the Illuminative philosophy 
and the continental European philosophy. Though limited in scope, this is the first 
such comparison to be made, in Persian, Arabic, English or French scholarship~ 
(ii) To reveal some novel aspects of an old method and tradition through this 
cqmpanson~ 
(iii) To suggest that this tradition of the Illuminative school, with its 
. philosophical and mystical aspects, can suggest solutions to modern problems and 
offer valuable services to modern thought. 
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1.7 Design qr The Research 
Since the aim is to reveal how the illuminative school fills the ontological gap in 
the epistemology of the self, we shall begin, in Chapter 2, with a general introduction 
to the Illuminative Method. This embodies the claim that epistemology which is based 
upon the theory of essence cannot be detached from ontology. Rather, the former is 
grounded by the latter: epistemology (which belongs to the eidetic field) can never be 
a starting point. Their method ultimately appeals to a very subtle and special 
reduction, under which everything is reduced to existence and is grounded by it. 
Applying this method of reduction, this school reached a sOl1 of existentialism. 
Their specific theory of being provides an entry to considering philosophical 
problems in general, and the problematic of the self in particular. We shall follow this 
procedure and study the "being" of the self according to this school. For convenience 
we divide this study into two principal discussions: one concerning the ontology of 
the self, in Chapters 3, 4 and 5; and one concerning some applications of the theory, 
in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. 
In chapter 3 we encounter some general principles of the illuminative theory of 
Being which yield an interpretation of the "being" of the self. This interpretation, 
considered in Chapter 4, opens into (i) an elucidation of the special kind of existence 
the self possesses, and thereby (ii) the seWs access to the reality of beings through a 
"purely existential touch." The latter is exposed as a performative experienc~: that of 
a unitary consciousness. Chapter 5 discusses the major characteristics of this unitary 
consciousness. 
Chapters 6 and 7 consider some applications of the theory. In Chapter 6 private 
states are accounted for as cases of the unitary consciousness. In Chapter 7, the 
relation between the unitary consciousness and reflective knowledge is discussed. 
Finally, in Chapter 8, we draw some conclusions and make a suggestion about the 
pqssibility of reading the authors of modern theories of the self in an Illuminative 
context. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Introducing the Illuminative Method 
In this chapter we would introduce a general overview of the outline of the 
Illuminative method on the basis of the doctrine of AI-Say,. wa al-sllluk to put 
together the elements of the Illuminative method that are diversely developed through 
the Illuminative literature and somehow often hidden from the eyes of modern 
investigators and orientalists. The chief aim of this introduction, however, is to 
present, through a comparative description of the Illuminative method, a special 
notion of reduction. This notion is crucial for our discussion of the nature of the self, 
because it is through this reduction that the Illuminative philosophy brings· the 
ontology and epistemology of the self together; and this is what we ·need to fill the gap 
in the basis of modern notion of the self. We will discuss this reduction as the ultimate 
application of the Illuminative method. This will concern us in detail. However, before 
starting our description of its method, it will be useful to have a brief remark on the 
emergence of the Illuminative school -- though it is not, of course, our intention here 
to study the history of this school or to evaluate its various historical aspects. 
2. 1. Primary Considerations: 
The Illuminative school is the name of a philosophical movement founded and 
fulfilled by Persian philosophers in response to a historical need: a return to the 
original elements of wisdom (actually the pre-Islamic Persian wisdom), in contrast to 
the Greek philosophy. 
In the preface of his last, but unfortunately uncompleted, work, The Philosophy 
of the Illumillated OrieJltalisls (Hekmat al-Mashreqyyin),fn Avicenna has hinted that 
he wishes to establish a philosophy to be purely orientalised in principle. This is 
understood by his commentators as a clue to a philosophy based on the ancient 
Persian wisdom. Because of his death, he could not elaborate such a philosophy 
however. This task fulfilled later by another Persian philosopher Shihab aI-Din 
Suhrawardi entitled Shaykh Ishragh( master of Illumination) [myr. 1191 ]m, who 
despite a shO[1 life of thirty-eight lunar years established a new philosophical system 
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on the notion of Illumination and LiglltlJJ based on the ancient Persian wisdom and 
terminology. He created an isthmus between discursive thought and mystical intuition. 
The school founded by Suhrawardi soon found its capable followers and 
commentators who delivered many different versions of the Illuminative philosophy 
but remained faithful to the Illuminative elements, method and goals. 
The best and most systematic among the versions, belongs to Sadr ai-Din 
Muhammad Shirazi, entitled Sadra (b. 1640, Shiraz)(-I) who presented in an absolutely 
different manner a new description of the Illuminative philosophy interpreting Light as 
Being. His version of the Illuminative philosophy is identified today as the Illuminative 
existentialism. Sadra himself called his philosophy the Transcendent Philosophy -- a 
name that is the title of his major book the ii·ollscendelll j)hi/osopi7y ('oJ/cerning the 
Four JOllrneys (?/Ihe Set/ (5 ) The phrase "four journeys of the self' is symbolically 
, 
used here in reference to the four ecstases of the self undel1aken by Gnostics and 
Mystics in the Islamic mysticism. He, however uses this symbolism to depict the 
intellectual process whereby the self gains the pure knowledge (1/1 'are/oh) following 
his existential transformation. Since Sadra's time onward, his philosophy has 
influenced all aspect of Persian philosophical and theological thought. Though his 
philosophy has had this great impression, it is a common belief in Persian scholars 
today(~) that the fruitful season of his special existentialism has still not arrived. He has 
set forth a lot of discussions to some of which the modern philosophy reached later 
and of course in different manner. It seems to be enough to mention here only the 
titles of some of his theories in which modern philosophy is involved: his special 
theory of Being; his interpretation of human existence; his theory of self; his theory of 
the corporeal emergence of the self (soul); his theory of consciousness and 
knowledge; his theory of the unity of the knower, known and knowledge; his theory 
of creative imagination; his theory of the existential (substantial) movement; his theory 
of time and space and his theory of world -- among the many others. Hidden over 
centuries and remaining beyond the grasp of those who work not in theology or 
m>,sticism, hold Sadraeans, those aspects of his philosophy that can contribute to our 
living issues in modern philosophy and human sciences are not explored at all or, at 
least, not presented enough in such a modern language that helps us, if at all, to revise 
this or that problem in modern philosophy. 
Today, in living Persian philosophy, Sadra's transcendent philosophy dominated 
over all philosophies, and is identified as the perfect form of the Islamic philosophy 
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whatsoever. Unf0l1unately, we can not speak here of Sadra's philosophy in full; nor 
can we speak here of his epistemology in detail. All what we would do here in the 
present research is to present anew, in our own turn and to some limited extent, some 
aspects of his philosophy that seem to contribute to till the gap that we mentioned in 
modern subjectivism (see eh.I). Nevel1heless, it does not bafile us to refer sometimes 
to Suhrawardi as well -- a philosopher who has elaborated an epistemology of 
presence and to whom Sadra has a great debt as a whole. However before attempting 
to discuss those aspects, let us "extract"(7J a descriptive illustration of the Illuminative 
method on which the Illuminative epistemology of presence is based. 
2. 2. The Illuminative iHetllOd: 
The Illuminative philosophy has different philosophicaL theological and mystical 
aims. As for these aims the Illuminative school has chosen a synthetic method. This is 
so, because for thiS school, philosophy, as investigating and interpreting every kind of 
phenomena, natural, inward-human, and metaphysical, seeks the profound 
foundations of these phenomena. Therefore, as can be inferred from the Illuminative 
tradition as a \vhole, philosophy should conduct its search by having at its disposal all 
methods of obtaining knowledge. This philosophical activity implies the presence of a 
problem or a variety of problems in need of a solution; and since a method is "a device 
or a procedure, to solve a problem or answer a question"/8i and since problems or 
questions vary in kind, the methods for soiving them will also vary. The free manner 
in which the Illuminative philosophy utilises these methods compels LIS to believe that 
this school does not consider that philosophy has only one distinct method of its own. 
On this point the Illuminative philosophy completely agrees with M. Farber who 
writes in this respect: 
"rThe plurality of methods 1 signifies that no one type of procedure is 
to be regarded as the correct method exclusively .... An unlimited 
number of methods restricted at a given time only by human ingenuity 
and the extent of knowledge, is the response to an unlimited number of 
types of problem. The principle of the co-operation of methods applies, 
whether the methods be objectivistic or subjectivistic, 'longitudinal' 
Ihistorical or e"olutionaryl or 'cross-sectional' [conceptual and 
formal I. "('}) 
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Such is the Illuminative point of view as well;- specially when the world 
'historical' in Farber's text can be replaced by 'existential'. 
Let us now read this in the context of the Illuminative terminology: The 
Illuminative literature that covers the meditative as well as the speculative aspects of 
the Illuminative school, is full of dissertations and epistles discussing the method to 
achieve the truth. A general title for such a methodological discussion is in their 
words aI-SoyI' wa al-slIllIk (literary meaning: sightseeing and conduct). There are two 
interrelated kinds of aI-SoyI' 1t'(1 al-slIllIk in general: Afaqi that belongs to the horizon 
of Being, and A,!!lIsi that is vel1ically directed toward the purest point (or the source) 
of Being ( see Ch.3). These two kinds of cd-Say,. 11'0 al-slIllIk realised for a Truth-
seeker (talih al haqq) in four stages of an existential experience that indicates four 
eCstases of the self to achieve tilt' unitary consciousness.(1m Generally considered, 
however, we may sLlmmarise their wide discLlssions on these stages by 
philosophically depicting them in the following form: 
Each stage implies a reduction: (a) Reduction from appearances (dhawaher) to 
their essences (mall i) yol); (b) Reduction from essences to the knowing self (nafs 01 
'are./); (c) Reduction from the knowing self to the self as unital)I consciousness (al 
nafs 'ayn 0 111 'are/aleh); (d) Reduction of the unitary consciousness to Being which 
implies a new return to the things (the phenomenal world) through Being itself, with a 
different outlook; considering neither their appearance (as Phenomenalism says) nor 
their essence (as Phenomenology says); rather, their reality as the emanative entities. 
The reductions (a) and (b) belong, in their terminology, to the horizontal lines in 
the structure of Being (belo\\', 3. 2); and we can classify them as the eidetic reduction 
(in Husserlian sense) because they beiong to essences, to the eidetic field. The 
reductions (c) and (d), on the other hand, belong to the vertical line in the structure of 
Being and we can classify them as the ol1/elic(llJ reduction because they concern only 
with the pure being. This eidetic-ontetic distinction we suggested, is based on 
Sadraean special understanding of essence-existence distinction of which we speak 
later in this and in following chapters. In the eidetic field, in which we are reflectively 
I 
seek for the essences and their interrelations as they appear in our reflective 
constituting consciousness, the Illuminative school employs a plurality of methods: 
induction, deduction and other logical methods, while in the ontetic field, in which 
there is no reflection but a pure presence in the mystical symphony of Being, it 
employs method of the ontetic touch and contact. 
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Such the Illuminative philosophy, methodologically speaking, has intended to 
bestow objectivity, inevitableness, freedom from presuppositions, and a radical 
beginning for its philosophy. It is this that is of significance for us in this inquiry. 
By such a method, and so far as the Illuminative epistemology of presence is 
concerned, the Illuminative school suggests a radical beginning in which the Truth-
seeker (talih al haqq) return to freshly know himself, world and God and the whole 
system of Being anew. Such a starting implies to pass from appearances or 
phenomena (dhmvaher) to their real truth. However their real truths are conceptually 
constituted as essences through our mind. This is because \ve remained on the 
horizontal line of Being, that is, in the eidetic field in which we reflectively journey (al 
say,. al ql(fqi). Though this is one dimension of Being constituted as essences for us, 
one can not claim that he rCclched the reality in this level, that is by reducing the 
appearances to their essences; simply because their realities, Sadra argues, equal their 
beings (not their essence) and this is crucial for him to reduce essence to existence as 
we will see later in this chapter: l\1eanwhile, \ve are on the vertical lines of Being, that 
is, in the ontetic field in which we are non-reflectively immersedly melted and 
existentially experience ourselves, beings and God -- in one word, Being. This brief 
description of the Illuminative method suggests to us a triple discussion on it in this 
chapter: We start with the ideal of a radical beginning, then continue with the eidetic 
reduction in which the logical and reflective rules and methods are employed, and end 
with the ontetic reduction by which the existential aspects of Sadraean discussion are 
revealed. On this, then, we would now describe the Illuminative idea of a radical 
beginning. 
2. 3. The Radical Beginning: 
As hinted above, the Illuminative method starts with an ideal for a beginningless 
commencement. This can easily be seen in its emphasis on 1([l1'hah meaning return as 
suggested by the Illuminative doctrine of lahdhih alll(tji,·, meaning purification of the 
s~lf. This means for them to be released from what is done as yet; and to start again 
with a hope to achieve the truth. To this Sadra points when writing: " Oh, my friend! 
begin [to philosophise]. .. first of all by purifying your' self"(l'?} 
The Illuminative philosophy suggests that in order to catch the truth and to 
identify with being, the Truth-seeker (talih 01 haqq) should practically purify himself 
27 
from what has occupied him through the personal, environmental and social 
historyJJ3J The mystical aspect of the Illuminative epistemology is hidden in this point, 
because there are systematic rules and norms for practice to achieve the ultimate truth 
and to identify with Being. The tirst step is to give up all educated and learned issues , 
to purify from what occupied the self, to abandon the past and the future and to pick 
up the present moment. \Ve would be, in this mystical outlook, alone on our 
existential site to have a new look. Unmolded by human conventions or by the social 
values, manner and philosophical system of long-lasting history, we would then be 
free of all prejudice, misconceptions, and assumptions of characteristics of the socially 
born humans. This implies to disembody the human personality of the entire cultural, 
social, and political complex of traditional society. 
This doctrine philosophically indicates for Sadra a radical beginning and a 
presuppositionless commencement. This is so because this doctrine has direct bearing 
on the method of philosophising, the beginning of a fresh outlook on philosophical 
problems, and the explanation of man's encounter with his environment. Let us read 
these words here from Sadra: 
"No body c~n catch it Ithe truth 1 except those who have been ~lone, 
isolated from the others, \'~riollsly meditating, and ~bsolutely 
withdrawn frol11 their ordinarily culture, social customs, habits and 
worldly bch~viollrs and concems, suspending the tradition~l believes 
and the public morals in full" (1./) 
We must ,lvoid to '"take the traditionally accepted thoughts, because" he argues 
"such taking is imitation and formal, keeping the way to the truth closed up" (151 
By such a removing of man fi-om the social situation, Sadra had done what 
Descartes, Hume and Husserl did. Of course resemblances to these thinkers should 
not be overstretehed; for to render the Illuminative philosophy in modern garb more 
than its thought really permits leads to a methodological blunder. When done within 
legitimate limits, however, a comparison between this school and certain moderns 
would show that what some consider to be the revolutionary attempts of the latter are 
, 
not entirely new, and that previous masters were aware of the importance of such 
attempts though in outline and not in detail or conscious elaboration. 
Moreover, we may see that the Illuminative school invokes a raising sense of 
doubt (maqam al h(~)!"(fh) which is just prior or along with "return" (tml'bah). This 
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doubt (hayrah) can be encountered here to complete the ideal of beginningness. For 
this school this doubt implies to attempt a hypothetical destruction of the surrounding 
world of tradition and early education. It was shattering the mold that captures the 
very fabric of the self at the moment of birth and fashions it according to the patterns 
of the past and the present. Tn this, the Illuminative school was trying to give a fresh 
and radical beginning to its philosophy. By "radical" we mean what Husserl meant by 
the term, namely, the ideal of emancipation from all presuppositions. This means 
beginning with the ambitious task of knowing things without any a priori adoption of 
epistemological, metaphysical, ontological, or value principles. 
1\1an, the truth-seeker (/alih 01 Iwqq), is there on his e:-\istential site. By allowing 
his existential capacities to unfold, excluding any intervention from without, and by 
exploring the freshness of what is now seen to be a puzzling \vorld with puzzling 
phenomena, the Illuminative school is proclaiming to phIlosophers the Husserlian 
maxim before Husser!: ."back to the things themselves," see, perceive, observe and 
describe phenomena afresh -- a ma:-\im which ultimately sounds for the Illuminative 
philosophy a return to their beings not (as Husserl did) to their essences; it is urging 
them to overthrow the artificial and sophisticated barrier of schemes and values 
between man and the "life world" developed by humanity throughout the ages. The 
"things in themselves" are "beings" with which we are in touch. In this sense at the 
beginning everybody is a radical and naive empiricist(see Appendix I). In his everyday 
life, he is in touch with the surrounding world as it appeared to him or as he 
'encountered it in immediate experience. This is the Husseriian world, the "life world, 
"the ordinary world in which one lives, works, and plays, Like Husserl, the 
Illuminative 'school is judging things in their own terms as experienced. From 
beginning of consciousness of facts until cognisance of Being, the Illuminative method 
partly is a descriptive one, that is phenomenological; namely, before theorising advises 
us to experience. 
The Illuminative school suspends all preconceived commitments and places the 
entire world of conventions and tradi"tions in abeyance. Here again this school's ideal 
I' . 
of freedom from presuppositions is like Descartes', Hume's, and Husserl's. For the 
Illuminative school as for these thinkers, this ideal is a preparatory stage to examine 
all beliefs and noetic processes for evidence, validity, and consequences. The 
examination of these is accomplished by breaking away from them and, thus, 
dislodging them temporarily in order to find out whether philosophy in its fresh start 
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from "things" in experience to reach the indubitable truth, confirms or disconfirms 
these beliefs. Moreover, through this radical method, this school pushes its search and 
enquiry to its extreme consequences. Sadra, for example,(I61 depicts our "blank" and 
receptive mind as constituting and perfecting itself, and struggling to obtain 
far-reaching conclusions entirely on its own. Our progressive ascension, Sadra holds, 
has a tint of inevitableness and necessity. Seemingly without any preconceived notions 
we achieve cognisance of causality, God, eternity of the world, and mysticism. It 
appears as though any mind will reach the same truths if it took as its point of 
departure the unsophisticated given of experience and followed the canons of 
consistency. Thus, Alfred N0I1h \Vhitehead's well-known dictum that in philosophy 
there is no method that surpasses common sense and real insight would be considered 
almost true by the Illuminative school. 
Such an approach, to begin with, places the Illuminative school among the early 
pioneers whose ideal was the establishment of philosophical propositions on the 
radical method of the freedom from presuppositions. Had this school been 
philosophically more prolific and had it utilised such a method to its fullest, we would 
have been in a better position to pronounce more emphatic and elaborate assertions 
concerning this important and valid methoc!.r]71 Thus, as we have partly seen so far 
and as we shall still find out in this section, behind the new words and expressions of 
Descartes, Hume and Husser! to give a radical start for philosophy, stands the old 
. philosophical and methodological practice of the Illuminative school. In comparison 
with the ancients, this method seems to be entirely nove! and was not a familiar item 
in the household of ancient philosophy. 
Plato, for instance, could not even conceIve of philosophy or philosophers 
operating outside the social order. Philosophising must begin with the already 
presupposed concepts and values available in the polis; given ideas can be changed 
and melded to establish a better life in the polis and to improve the moral life of the 
individual. However, such concepts as justice, courage, and virtue were taken for 
g~anted by Plato, although he examined their lexical meanings and formulated 
(stipulated) his own. Aristotle, on the other hand, although he was a ruthless examiner 
of the beliefs of his predecessors and an empiricist rationalist in his approach to 
philosophical problems, did not conceive of the method of sllspension of the 
traditional world of conventions and values and of the "natural view of the world." 
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From a methodological point of view, the resemblance between the I1\uminative 
school, Descartes, Hume, and Husserl perhaps is not so much in detailed outlook as it 
is in the insistence of these authors upon an ideal of a radical beginning. We are 
emphasising this point again in order to avoid any possible misunderstanding of our 
comparative remarks. Our intention is not to identify the ideas of the three modem 
European thinkers and the Illuminative school, but to show that it was aware and had 
attempted to apply "radicalism" in beginning its philosophy, a view that has been 
correctly and emphatically endorsed by these moderns. 
The Illuminative school was as acutely aware of the impossibility of reversing or 
annulling the cultural achievements and beliefs of humanity by such a method, as were 
Descartes, Hume, and Husserl; but it was, as they were, more than certain that this 
method furnishes man with a new perspective in his outlook on things. The 
suspension of any kind of belief by these writers was only theoretical, in order to clear 
the way for their philosophising from any preconceived prejudice. Mystical (practical) 
aspect of the Illuminative philosophy furnishes such a possibilityJ18J 
It may be remembered that Hume disregarded all beliefs and metaphysical 
assertions and "bracketed" all the assumptions of scientific procedure, e. g., causality, 
placing in abeyance the epistemological investigations of former philosophers and the 
sophisticated framework of the world of tradition. He started from the very 
fundamentals and questioned all habits of the mind and of the conceptions of the 
phenomenal world. His ideal was an assumption-free description of appearances or 
impressions. Through his rigorous descriptive method, he found out that there is no 
reason or guarantee in experience for the necessary connections between ideas. 
Demonstrations depend on the relations of ideas, and prove only what is conceivable 
or inconceivable and not what is in fact the case. Apart from relations of ideas, all that 
we perceive and all we can demonstrate is the existence of oLlr perceptions. There is 
no reason to suppose that our impressions are supported by a material world, or a 
subjective self(l~' Thus, Hume's attempt at a presuppositionless beginning led him to a 
upiversal skepticism in all knowledge. At best our impressions can yield probable 
knowledge, and certain knowledge is an unattainable goa\. In his caution to keep his 
assumptions to the minimum, HUll1e could not re-establish the natural world, the 
everyday world. His remained a chaotic world of approximations. Hume did not 
suspend beliefs and all traditional facts in order to reinstate them again at the end of 
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his analysis. He tried to go as far as his radical method permitted him to go in tracing 
his source of evidence in experience. 
On the other hand, by removing man from the context of traditional beliefs, the 
Illuminative school practically "bracketed" these beliefs(20) for examination by leaving 
nothing except the self and his confrontation with experience and Being. Like Hume, 
this school examines the means to know the surrounding phenomena in order to lay 
control over human environment (sayr at afaqi). Its unsophisticated radical 
empiricism advises in the first instance to study the connections and relationships of 
items of experience and to study the sources and evidence for changes in phenomena. 
It, of course, did not explore phenomena with the same epistemological rigor as 
Hume. But the fact that it started with an assumption-free attitude in exploration and 
a method in the first instance similar to Hume's seems to be certain. However, the 
Illuminative philosophy does not remain in the state of ignorance -- suspension of 
belief. It achieves perfection in knowledge and establishes its view of reality. The 
world of beliefs, conventions, and values that is temporarily shattered (through 
tawhah) by removal from the traditional environment is rebuilt and established by an 
independent enquiry. Hume \vas not willing to assert a certain proposition about any 
external or internal entity outside or inside the mind except the proposition: only 
impressions exist; whereas the Illuminative philosophy, as is clear from its mystical 
aims, arrives at the questions about the very foundations of things: Who am I ? Are 
there beings like me? \\There am I going? What purpose is there for my life? What is 
my relationship to the surrounding world? Starting with an unbiased background it 
tries to find answers for these questions. By these questions, one is supposed to have 
known that he had accepted many false opinions through tradition and that were he to 
attain truth and certainty for himself he should momentarily paralyse the effect of all 
inherited dogmas and previously held opinions. 
The Illuminative school is like Descartes, who also sought a temporary release 
from the engulfing world of misty tradition: 
"1 would have to undertake once and for all to set aside all opinions 
whieh 1 had previously accepted among my belids and start again 
from the very beginning ... I have fOllnd a serene retreat in peaceful 
solitude. 1 will therefor\.: make a seriolls unimpeded effol1 to destroy 
g\.:ncrally all my fonm.:r opinions. In order to do this, howe\,\.:r, it will 
not be necessary to show they aI'\,: all falsc."(]/} 
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As Descartes found peaceful solitude conducive to the application of his 
methodical doubt, so did the Illuminative thinkers. 
Again, like Descartes, an Illuminative philosopher has not to prove that all the 
opinions of his predecessors are false. The extrication of the mind from the corpus of 
available beliefs through presence is not a mark of skepticism or agnosticism but a 
mean of search for truth and cel1ainty. By the same token, methodical doubt does not 
mean that Descartes was either a skeptic or an agnostic; but instead, wishing to find 
certainty he was forcibly led to demolish his old opinions down to their very 
foundations, because he realised how untrustworthy these opllllons were. An 
Illuminative philosopher in his practical philosophising provisionally wishes to 
suspend every concept and judgement about God, the world and the body by making 
himself begin his search without any such conceptions. Descartes also wished to 
"bracket" concepts and judgements about God, the world and the bodyJ2.?) Not 
because he, or the illuminationists, really doubted the existence of God, the world or 
the body, but because everything they had learned aboLlt them had to be examined 
even if it happened to be somethin~ that is true. Of course, the Illuminative 
philosophy difTers from Descartes in that it did not doubt the reality of the external 
world nor did it bother to prove its existence. For this school, the proposition, "The 
world is," is true. Nor is this school intending to establish a "wonderful science" of 
philosophy in the manner of Descartes and Husserl. Again, while pointing to the 
preceding significant resemblances between this school and those authors, one should 
be aware that these resemblances are not meant to blur the important differences 
between them. It is true that the Illuminative school's aim, like Descartes', is to 
commit us to the slow and laborious search for cel1ainty and truth. However 
Descartes wanted to found his radical approach to truth and certainty using the 
deductive method in mathematics and pure reason; in contrast, the Illuminative school 
used a plurality of methods, e.g., the experimental, intuitive, deductive, and 
behavioural. Here we are not maintaining that the Illuminative school used the method 
of systematic doubt with the same efficacy and conscious elaboration as Descartes or 
i 
Husser!. What we are advancing is that this school equally knew the importance of 
starting all philosophising with a radical beginning and was awake to the impulse of 
Cartesian Meditations before Descartes. 
"The same spirit was responsible for the continuing radicalisation of 
his o\\'n philosophy" ·'fn.:c from prcsllppositions"(.?3) 
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Also, in so far as Husser! derived his inspiration fi-om the spirit of the Cartesian 
Meditations, the same resemblance's that were discerned between Descartes and the 
Illuminative school can be discerned between the latter and Husser!: 
". . . then is not this :1 fitting time to rene\\" his [Descartes'] 
radical ness, the radicalncss of thc bcginning philosopher: to subject to 
a Cartesian overthrow the il1111l8nse philosophical literature with its 
medley of great traditions, of comparatively serious ncw beginnings, of 
stylish literary activity .. _ and to begin \\"ith ncw meditations ... at first 
we shall fiut out of action all the contsictions has been accepting up to 
now, including all our scienc8s. "(2-1) 
As was remarked earlier, both the Illuminative philosophy and Husserl's 
phenomenology emphasised the notion of going back to the things themselves; the 
reaction . against tradition that harbours ull\varranted beliefs,·. dogmas and 
authoritarjanism are shared by both philosophies. It is true that the Illuminative school 
was not after a universal radical science of philosophy like Husser!' In so far as it 
stressed a radical beginning to philosophy and the description of surrounding 
phenomena afresh, the Illuminative philosophy was a phenomenology. However, apart 
from other considerations, the significance of phenomenology as propounded by 
Husserl was not as a philosophy perhaps, but as a method, discipline or a tendencyJ.?5) 
The Illuminative school, in stripping man of all beliefs and in making him start from 
the "beginning" by appealing to a direct encounter with and description of facts, can 
be considered aware of the phenomenological tendency and its far-reaching 
significance. In our discussion of the Illuminative epistemology, we shall point out the 
Illuminative employment of other aspects· of the phenomenological method, such as 
the phenomenological reductionJ26) 
Whether the above comparative remarks are accepted or not, it must be granted 
that the Illuminative school, through the attempts to comprehend the "secrets" of the 
universe, believes in the description and analysis of the aspects, qualities, and relations 
o~ experience in the world. The Illuminative school believes, as instanced by Sadra/27) 
that while theories may interpret facts, at the same time they abstract from the realities 
of the surroLindino world as we encounter them in the locLls of immediate experience. ;:, 
Pure theories without concrete embodiment and without seeing them in their actual , 
operation, estrange the mind from its natural dwelling place, the world of experience. 
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The Illuminative school, like other systems of mystical philosophy, does not 
content itself with the deductive procedure to the exclusion of other procedures. 
Instead, it tends itself to a plurality of methods characterised by a gradual yet vital 
growth of movement, a movement of the totality of the human self in its attempt to 
comprehend and exercise mastery over its surroundingsJ':8J 
However, although in substance the intimate nature of reality and experience is 
not altered when using these diverse methods, our attitudes, knowledge, and 
emotional cosmos progressively and drastically change; and these, in turn, determine 
our behaviour. For Illuminative school, therefore, knowledge is not a bare conceptual 
understanding of reality and the systematisation of its laws aione.(':9) Abstraction or 
pure theory impoverishes our significant relationship to nature and leaves us 
suspended in the intellectual landscape of semi-real possibilities with our inwardness 
remaining unkindled and dull. On the other hand, true knowledge for this school, as 
for Socrates, Plato, and Kierkegaard, is t hat form of understanding that seeps into the 
depth and breadth of the personality and transforms the whole man: man is a mystic 
by nature. For Plato the philosophical enterprise culminates in love, for Kierkegaard it 
ends in an intense leap to the other "end," namely, God; for the Illuminative 
philosophy it becomes a passionate yearning to become HimJJf)J The insistence by this 
school that scientific observation and the given ness of rational processes should in the 
final analysis embrace the ego in its totality and grip the individual in his very core, 
places this school among the forerunners of existential thoughtJ31J Consequently, this 
school emerges as a typical mystical philosophy that takes Nature as its departure (a/-
Say,. al-Afaqi) , , It believes in the method of the natural sciences but is certainly 
conscious of the dynamic value of human emotions if they are directed to the right 
goal. This goal is God, the being, the embodiment of perfection and beauty. 
Along with all the preceding emphasis on a radical beginning of philosophy by 
the mentioned philosophies, must go the understanding that absolute radical ness is an 
ideal short of complete actualisation. The Illuminative school, Descartes, Hume, and 
H;usserl, despite their emphasis on radicalism, could not start their philosophising with 
an absolute beginning, that is, without any presuppositions at all. Should our enquiry 
permit an examination of their views on this point, it would not be hard to show that 
their own views are based on certain presuppositions too. The temporary "relief' from 
established dogmas may help facilitate the clarity of the philosopher's task, but cannot 
effect a long-lasting ovel1hrow of these beliefs. The complete freedom from 
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presuppositions, as it IS clearly shown in the history of philosophy and other 
compartments of human knowledge such as the sciences, is a misconception and a 
myth; or, as Marvin Farber says: 
"Supposedly radical procedure may turn out to be a means of 
reinstating a vested tradition of long standing. That positive. . . 
findings of rl:al worth may be attained in the process docs not alter the 
fact that such a procedure serves special interests if it finallv accords 
with ... any vested tradition. "(3]) 
The claim that philosophy must have a presuppositionless beginning, Farber 
says, can itself be judged as the greatest presupposition. It is simply impossible to 
remove oneself from one's natural and cultural framework that is "a basic immediate 
fact of philosophy." For instance, to be abl.e to detect the Illuminative school's 
presuppositions in his radical attempt, one H1llS.t. try to discern the motives behind its 
systematic mystical aims. The same applies to Descal1es, Hume and Husserl. These 
motives are generally culturally conditioned and inspired. 
One of the Illuminative school's presuppositions \vas the intention to present 
the reader with the "secrets of Illuminative philosophy" whose basic tenets it believed 
are true; on the other hand, in Descartes, Hume and Husser!, the motive of certainty 
was assumed from the very beginning. Descartes' radical beginning culminated in 
reinstating the culturally acquired conception of God, the existence of the external 
world, and the traditional conception of the soul. Hume's strict empiricism 
presupposed cel1ainty in sense experience and restored the empirical tradition and the 
psychological atomism of Locke; whereas Husserl's radicalism assumed the stream of 
cogitations, or pure consciousness and indubitability of immediate experience as the 
starting point of philosophising. He also reaffirmed the basic spirit of German idealism 
in general. The Illuminative school, on the other hand reinstated the long-standing 
tradition of Persian-1\1uslim philosophy of mysticism. It shelved or suspended the 
traditional beliefs, only to reaffirm them again and in substance in its painstaking 
seprch for the truth. The Islamic Persian mystical conceptions of emanation, creation 
and eternity of the world, immortality of the soul, union with God, were suspended by 
the radical beginning only to reappear in a different style. Despite their determined 
efforts to dislodge the Sisyphus rock of traditional beliefs and cultural setting, 
philosophers seem to be endlessly tied to it. 
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2. 4. The Eidetic Reduction: 
What we called the eidetic reduction in the Illuminative method, as we have 
seen(above, 2. 2), consists of two sub-reductions (i) from appearances to their 
essences and (ii) from their essences to the essence of the knowing self Such 
reductions are reflective and we entitled them eidetic simply because they concern at 
any rate essence (eidetic means here 'essential'; drived from 'eidos' meaning 'pure 
essence'). In other words, the residuum of such reductions are essences -- in the 
fonner reduction, essences of things, and in the latter, essence of myself as'!,. Since 
the word "essence" is central here in the eidetic field, it may be useful if we first know 
what essence means for the Illuminative (Sadraean) philosophy. Sadra has largely 
discussed essence attending it in its full details in his huge volumes (I, II, IV, V) of his 
grand work A.~f(fr Obviollsl\' a detailed discussion of his theory of essence does not 
concern us here simply because it is beyond the boundary of this research. We will 
instead refer to it '.vhen. necessarily applicable. For the time being, regarding it': 
meaning, we would mention here that essence has two senses for Sadra: (i) concept 
(l11ajhIll11/11'1~jlld dhihlli) (ii) limit of existence.(331 The eidetic reduction concerns with 
the first sense by which our mind reflectively constitutes the essences of things 
including our 'selves' of which we reflectively have a knowledge. Whereas, the 
ontetic reduction, as \ve will see, concerns with the second sense of essence which is 
elaborated by Sadra for the first time, due to his special theory of being (see below, 2. 
5.4 and 3.2). Let us speak of these senses a bit more. 
2 . .:t. 1. The ,)'adraeall No/io/l qlEssellce: 
Essence (l17ahix)!(rh) is discussed by Sadra with regard to existence. However, 
the traditional distinction of essence-existence is finally dissolved by Sadra to the 
benefit of a special kind of existentialism (see 2. 5. 4) It is a methodological habit for 
Sadra to stan with the traditional doctrines and then to push them toward his own 
theories through \vonderful interpretations and logical discussions in terms of the 
Illuminative method and aims. It is the case when he stal1s with this traditional 
distinction. He arguesrJ-IJ that this distinction is reflectively made. When we are in the 
level of reflection, we suppose that a thing has an existence and an essence. This 
distinction is good enough to phenomenologically justify our knowledge of ourselves, 
tHings and world/J)I because temporarily, and just for the sake of knowledge, we 
withdraw (like Husserl) the external existence of ourselves, things and world (even 
God) to describe their essences; that is, to catch, as far as we can, a clear concept 
(mC1fhlll11), that is, a mental existence ('II/~jIlJ dhihlli) of this or that thing with which 
reflective knowledge can only be possible. This epistemological approach to essence 
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indicates that essence is concept and nothing more. Essence, in this sense, is an 
answer to the question: "what is it?" (ma h(JO/hi?). (For example, when one asks: 
"what is it?" questioning a particular shape and we answer: "triangle".) The answer to 
this question determines the essence of the thing under question. Sadra says that the 
answer to such a question is a universal concept, a genus which can be crystallised for 
example in Aristotelian table of categories. Since it is concept, the categorical analysis 
of things, however, is in all ways conceptual. It is valid only if we remain in the order 
of concept. Nevertheless, when we turn away from this order and attend the order of 
being the meaning of essence differs: In the latter case, essence is no longer a 
conceptual answer to the question: "what is it?"; rather, it is the special being of the 
thing under question: It is that by which the thing is thing (mu hih of shay' shay'); and 
that by which a thing is thing is, for Sadra, its special beingJ3()) 
In the latter sense, Sadra deduces essence from Being. Essence in this sense is 
the limit of a particular existence; that is to say" what demarcates a thing from the 
others. Of course, this demarker, essence, is not for Sadra here a concept; rather it is 
the particular being of that thing. Sadra tries to demonstrate this point through several 
discussions in detail.r3-) He concludes that the special being of a thing is the principle 
of its paI1icuiarity and individualitY(3s). 
It is true that every thing has two folds: one is its existence and another is its 
essence. However, Sadra explains, these two are not separated in the external reality, 
but their separation is in our mind; in the external reality and as a matter of fact, its 
essence is nothing but its very existence; this is our mind that reflectively understands 
a thing as a twofold fact. Essence as separated is only produced by the formal 
reflction and is merely concept: then sofar as it is considered as mental, it has an 
epistemological function, Belonging to the order of concept, epistemology as well as 
any description (including phenomenology), therefore, concerns only with essence. 
This point concerns us later (2. 5. 4 and next eh.). For the time being, we would 
mention that essence in the sense of concept on which all epistemology, reflection, 
formalism, logicism and subjectivism are grounded requires LIS to pick LIp different 
I 
methods to achieve, to justify and to demonstrate reflectively what we have and catch 
existentially through our everydayness experience and ontetic presence. It is what we 
would attend in the following section. 
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2. -I.]. nU! eidetic.field alld pl/lrality (?lmethod\': 
As already hinted, the Illuminative school advocated a plurality of methods of 
inquiry in the tield of the eidetic reduction, and that these reinforced one another in 
the processes of noetic elevation no attempt was made to fully designate these 
methods among which we may mention the Inductive, Deductive, and Introspection. 
In employing the first and the third, this school displays a tempered form of the 
phenomenological tendency and a tint of its notions (see 2. 4. 3). These methods 
belong to and are applied in the eidetic field that is, in Illuminative terminology to sayr 
al afaqi in which we reflectively discover ourselves, surrounding world, and even 
God, through these plurality of methods and, on this discovery, we build experimental 
and speculative sciences which all concern with essences (concepts). Experimental 
sciences are fundamentally based on . induction', while speculative sciences employ 
'deduction'. However, there is a cooperation between them. The inductive and 
deductive methods cooperate continually until we discern the unity of all bodily and 
animal species. \Ve move from the visible to the invisible by cooperation of induction 
and deduction: an intellectual jump from a limited number of observations to a 
universal and unlimited number, to the universe as a whole. 
Moreover, the inductive method prepares us to discover God deductively; the 
proofs for both the eternity and creation of the world and the like are also instances of 
the Illuminative school's rigorous application of the deductive method promoted by 
the loyal help of inductive inqUiry . 
. Not only this; the method of introspection is also applied in this field as well, 
and co-operates the inductive and deductive meihods. Introspection fundamentally is 
a psychological method for self-knowledge (' ilm al nafs) which interrelates with 
induction and deduction. From an eidetic point of view. I reflectively intuit myself as 
an 'I' of the essence of which I have a knowledge -- that is I have a concept of my 
own self This is reflective of course; simply because I constitute my essence as 'I', 
not in the sense that I existentially create it (as done, we will see, by the ontetic 
i 
reduction); rather, in the sense that I conceptually abstract an essence as 'I' through 
introspection of myself as the agent who reflects and thinks and then exists 
(Cogi to). (39J 
On this, \ve may see that this method of introspection seems like Husserlian 
eidetic intuition by which he grasps the bare essence of the self and constitute the 
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essences in the reflective consciousness. However as we will see this is not the final 
grasp for the Illuminative philosophy as it is for Husserlian phenomenology: the 
eidetic intuition, according to Husserl guarantees the cel1ainty of knowledge; whereas 
for the Illuminative philosophy, what we grasp by introspection as well as induction 
and deduction are grounded by a deeper level of our existence in which we are in 
touch with beings, contact Being; we have not only vision as inspired by intuition (as 
we see In the history of philosophy); we also live with Being and continually 
experience beings with which we are in ontetic touch (see Ch. 3). It is this deeper 
level that, according to the Illuminative philosophy, grounds our constitution of 
essences. We will see the mechanism of this grounding later (see Ch. 7). Though 
Husserlian phenomenology ends LIp with this eidetic reduction which implies the 
constitution of pure essences through an eidetic intuition, and does not pass, as does 
the Illuminative philosophy, toward a deeper reduction of essences to being -- i.e., the 
ontetic reduction, there seems yet to be similarities between these two schools 
regarding the eidetic reduction. In next section we will briefly depict a comparison 
between them to shmv these similarities. 
2.4.3. The II/umillative And The Phellol11ell%xica/ Eidetic Reductions: 
We have already hinted that in applying its method to the eidetic field, the 
Illuminative school has implicitly adopted procedures partly similar to those fulfilled in 
phenomenology. Now, we would have a closer look here at this point to mention the 
similarities between these schools and to describe the Illuminative notion of the eidetic 
reduction in parallel to and in comparison with the phenomenological reduction. In 
doing so, we are, however, cautious not to sacrifice precision and coherence in 
interpretation by a random free mode of association imposed by our mind on the facts 
imbedded in this school's work. Nor are we trying to "ovennodernise" this 
philosophy, thus rendering our comlllents disproportionate with the original. We are 
simply showing the modern relevance of an old method and its implications. 
There is solid evidence in the Illuminative epistemology to uphold the 
contention that it is implicitly aware of the basic themes and some significant aspects 
of the phenomenological tendency. I t is so because along with the Illuminative 
insights go certain phenomenological elements that are employed without calling them 
sllch. These elements are: the three aspects of the phenomenological reduction, 
40 
descriptive procedure, intentionality, the noetic and noematic processes of the mind. 
The Illuminative philosophy did not utilise such elements of the phenomenological 
tendency to the extreme in order to establish, like Husserl, a descriptive scienceJ40) 
However, in the Illuminative approach, the atlinities, resemblance to, and anticipations 
of Husserl's phenomenological procedure are basic and genuine. The difference 
between the two schools is one of emphasis, degree and full active application. 
The first of the three reductions has already been discussed in connection with 
our comparison of both thinkers on the issue of the radical beginning of philosophy. 
We shaIl categorise this early stage of the Illuminative thought by the stipulative 
phrase: "cultural reduction"; it is characterised by the Illuminative hypothetical 
destruction of all varieties of cultural expression and traditional beliefs; this 
constituted a break between him and the intersubjective world of human 
achievementsJ-If) Similarly, Husser! described the initial stage of his phenomenological 
reduction as the "disconnection" of 
"All varieties of cultural expression, works of ... the fine arts, of the 
sciences, also aesthetic and practical valucs of every shape and form .. 
. also realities of. .. moral cllstom, la\\', and religion.' '(I}) 
Both schools considered the telos of such a reduction as man's freedom from all 
traditional and transphenomenal beliefs; this reduction leaves only the immediately 
given and thus excludes the conviction in an independent metaphysical reality. From 
the outset the self possesses only the freshness and immediacy of objects. 
Now in a Husserlian vein the Illuminative school says that we commence our 
'-" -
descriptive procedure of phenomena. This procedure ultimately leads us to two kinds 
of phenomenological reductions which one may call 'essential' and 'transcendental' 
reductions: these will soon become apparent. 
The naturalistic method is, according to the Illuminative philosophy, intertwined 
with a strain of subjectivity from the beginning; it entailed reflection and inward 
appropriation of the results of the experimental search. For instance, soon after we 
discerned the essence of the man, and other essences as well, our mind becomes 
infused with yearning (shmtJq)(-I31 for them. Thus, Ollr attention is turned away from 
. particular objects to their essences. These essences are eidetic, to borrow a term from 
Husser!' Here our initial performance of essential reduction of our experience can be 
observed. 
41 
One can consider here that Husserl' s phenomenological reduction, the epoche, 
IS not newJN) As the Illuminative school depicts, every movement of our mind in 
describing phenomena contains a reduction of natural objects to pure types, structures 
or essences. This is why we categorise this movement of thought as essential 
reduction, a step on the way to purifying phenomena. This method is, therefore, 
simple, being designated as a persistent description of objects, intuiting their essences 
and deflecting attachment from these objects to their structures and the individual 
"thisness" or "thatness" of entities is progressively eliminated. It is obvious that this 
essential reduction is similar to Husserl's eidetic reduction, which is also a matter of 
universality versus individuality. 
For the sake of summary, let us highlight the chief points in the Illuminative 
eidetic reduction, as we called it, only to mention the possible similarities between 
these two schools: 
a) In this Illuminative manner, our mind and experiences possessed a definite 
intentionality (devoted to the eidetic field) that fulfilled itself in apprehending purified 
essences. 
b) We, as an illuminationist, bracket the natural world, perform a continual 
radical suspension of the previous objectifying position, and comprehensively placed 
the physical world in abeyance. 
c) We complement the essential reduction, previously noted, by performing 
what one may call a transcendental reduction; thus, we not only suspend the physical 
world and natural attitude, but also reflectively bracket the essences themselves and 
intentionally focus on the ultimate source of both the natural and "essential" modes of 
being. For us, as an illuminationist, the experience resulting from this reduction is, as 
Husserl says, "The only experience which may properly be called internal. "(45) 
d) Every time we discern an essence we rise from the immediacy of particular 
objects to the level of consciolls generality, progressively conceptualise nature, and 
reduce it to "essential" structures; our mind transforms seeing and perceiving into 
conceiving. This involves the apprehension of essences and a reference to their 
I 
denotations. In mind; therefore, there is a bifurcation. From "one point of view" these 
essences denote (intend) a multiplicity of individual things, from another they connote 
transcendent structures. Accordingly, for mind essences are both conceptual and 
ontological and are both immanent and transcendent. 
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e) With respect to point (d), mind performs two functions: an "upward" and a 
"downward" movement. In apprehending essences, mind is elevated above material 
objects, bracketing these only temporarily; to confirm our apprehension of essences 
mind goes back to material objects. Hence there is a two-way trafiic between mind 
and objects: the experiencing from which result the essences, and in turn the reference 
of these essences to their object-referents. As Spiegelberg summarises, the first aspect 
is that in which "an act [is] directed to an intentional object (lloema)", while the 
second is "the object-referent of a noetic act (noes;s)" /"6) Husser! named these two 
aspects of the cognitive process the noetic and the noematicJ-I7) Thus, the words are 
new, but the contents are old. The Illuminative philosophy was aware of these two 
processes of the mind, or at least, it permits such an interpretation. 
Furthermore, the types or essences apprehended by mind are stripped of their 
material contents. Similar to its processes in points (d) and (e) mind through these 
purified essences "intends" physical phenomena and discover a higher level in which 
the internal meaning of these essences and that of the entire universe are constituted. 
As we will see (see Ch. 3), this higher level is, according to the Illuminative 
philosophy, Being that is the hidden meaning of every descriptive experience and 
every thing. 
In its essential reduction of phenomena, the Illuminative philosophy does not 
completely abandon the naturalistic attitude~ it has a constant recurrence to it. On the 
other hand, phenomenology claims to be a non empirical science; but, it seems, as 
long as the contents of the mind stem from the description of facts, phenomenology 
cannot divorce itself fi~om the naturalistic world completely. The Illuminative 
philosophy, wisely perhaps, did not go as far as' Husser!' Reduction did not 
categorically cut off the empirical facts from which the essential structures are 
discriminated. Husserl probably was aware of this point, but for motives of his own, 
did not subscribe to itJ"8) It seems that the complete flight and freedom from natural 
facts is, indeed, a view precipitated by an uncontrolled mode of fancy touching the 
fringe of lunacy. 
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2. 5. Tile Ontetic Reduction: 
In the above description of the structure of the illuminated method (2.2, above), 
We saw that there is a special kind of reduction to which there is no correspondence 
in phenomenology -- even perhaps in modern western philosophy as a whole. This 
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reduction that we called it Ontetic Reduction IS that keystone on which the 
Illuminative philosophy is founded. ')I,'e confine ourselves here to present it so far as 
our research is concerned. Therefore, introducing the notion of the ontetic reduction 
in a comparative way, we try to show how the Illuminative (Sadraean) philosophy 
goes beyond the eidetic reduction and reduces all essences to existence and how it 
puts us in the context of being in touch with Being and in a current existential 
experience of beings including ourselves. The latter issue will however concern us in 
the next chapter; then in the rest of this chapter, we would attend the former issue --
that is, the reduction to existence. 
\Vhat is this reduction? A return to Being as such; a return of things to their 
reality in general; a return of the self to its principle. In the latter case, this reduction, 
as hinted, consists (If two sub-reductions. Compared with Husserlian phenomenology, 
the ontetic reduction is not in parallel to the eidetic reduction; rather it goe'\ to extend 
beyond the piciptic reduction. \Vhile the eidetic reduction ends up in expioration of 
essences to reflectively II/hlers/alld the reality of things, this ontetic reduction passes 
f)'om this level to a deeper ground; to the root of that level to touch the reality (being) 
of things. Again while the eidetic reduction ends up in discovery of a transcendental 
self, a monad, that implies a radical subjectivism, the ontetic reduction tries to escape 
from this subjectivism by justifying our knowledge on the basis of the special mode of 
our being. However, before attempting to understand the Illuminative (Sadraean) 
approach to existence/Being, it will be useful to see the place of the notion of 
existence in phenomenology. 
2.5.1. Husser! E'(c/ude .... · /~~·d.\·lellce~· 
"Like the neo-Kantian" Ricoeur writes "Husserl lost the ontological 
dimension" ,r.J9) In fact, Husser!' s phenomenology clearly implies essentialism, 
excluding the notion of existence and Being. The suspension of belief in the existence 
of a phenomenon or the explicit doubt (following Descartes) that the phenomenon 
e~ists, is what Husserl referred to as ·'bracketing". This procedure is to concentrate 
.. . I (49+ J) 
on "what" of the phenomenon in order to ascertall1 Its essentla content. . 
Therefore, the preconception that we possess about the nature of existence has to be 
put aside. 
·u 
E. Fink has stated that Husser! avoided the notion of existence and Being or the 
'ontological problem' -- the problem of "how the pure being of an existent is related 
to the being-an-object of this existent". As Fink states, this problem has been rejected 
by Husser! as a 'falsely put problem' J5{J) This seems to be the result of his subjectivism 
that based on the notion of essence. 
Every fact, every individual subject, according to Husseri, has an essence, a 
permanent cluster of essential predicates by virtue of which it is what it is and is able 
to receive accessory and contingent determinations: a quid may be converted into an 
idea, and eidetic intuition is always possible. But how does one pass from the essence 
to the individual? Husserl makes this transition by means of the notion of the eidetic 
singularity. This notion presupposes that the eidetic individual is not the empirical 
individual existing here and now: Essence, even if singular, is not existence, although 
both are irreducible substrata for every new syntactical form. Yet there is an essence 
of the existing particular, under which the pal1icular is immediately subsumed --
subsumption being understood as the transition from the eidetic to the empirical piane 
rather than as the subsLlmption, \vithin the eidetic realm, of the species under the 
genus. For us to apprehend this essence, concrete eidetic singularity must be 
distinguished from abstract eidetic singularity: the abstract is the object related to a 
whole as a dependent part. Species and genus are necessariiy dependent, hence ab-
stract; but the concrete is the independent essence that, without being contained in a 
whole, contains dependent essences within itself: the phenomenal thing, which is a 
concrete essen.ce, contains the abstract essences of extens!on and quality. The 
individual is thus the this-here whose material essence (or whose eidetic singularity) is 
a concrete(51) and which hence mel:its being termed "individual," that is, indivisible. By 
granting such an extension to essences/,':J Husser! turns to existence as such. He 
certainly does not deduce existence from essence (as Sadra does in the section of 
Phenomenology of 1\1ind [1111~/lld DI1/ihlli]), and it is worth noting that the notion of 
dependence is interpreted in sllch a way that the general depends on the singular, just 
as the formal depends on the material: The purely logical form, for example the 
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categorical form of object, is dependent with respect to all that is the matter of 
objects(5]) The individual is, therefore, primordial individual. 
Existence as sLlch is, it follows, independent fl'om, or as Spiegleberg puts it, 
opposite to essence; just "the thatness of things" is independent from and opposit to 
"the what ness of things. 153 'J, Existence, for Husser! is not the radical other of essence. 
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Since the trurh of a thing is its essence which is constituted in consciousness through 
an intentional bracketing, and, on the other hand the thing (the object) itself is only an 
example, then, it follows that existence remains somewhat nominal. (53+1J 
Husser! ends up in a kind of essentialism that, considered from an Illuminative 
point of view, has no exit f)-om the maze of reflection. If essence is true and not 
existence, an Illuminative philosopher like Sadra may ask, how can we go out from 
the trap of subjectivism? Husserl's ultimate appeal to the eidetic intuition gives us 
nothing but essence, and essence is the truth of consciousness and the subject. 
Moreover, the nominalistic approach Husser! has taken regarding existence seems, 
from a Sadraean standpoint, the fundamental error. We will mention later in this 
chapter the Sadraean analysis of the essence that leads to existence. But let us have a 
glance at the existential phenomenology's response to Husserl, before attending 
Sadra's theory. 
2.5.2. F;xislelllial Phenomenology Encounters Existence: 
The existential phenomenologists purport to supply the lack of existence or 
Being in the Husserlian Phenomenology. "In Fink's view", Farber writes, "this is the 
most fundamental problem which phenomenology omits because of its shrinking from 
speculative thought. "(5-1) 
Heidegger also complains that the "question [of Being] has been forgotten"J55) 
and "as long as the truth of Being is not thought all ontology remains without its 
foundation. "(5(,) He applies phenomenology to detect an ans\ver to this question. 
"Phenomenology is the name for the method of ontology"(5-, and therefore, the 
phenomenological reduction for him sounds a different meaning and task: 
"For Husserl the phenomenological reduction ... is the method of 
leading phcnomenological vision from the natural attitude of the 
human being whose life of consciousness and its noetic-nocmatic 
experiences, in which objects are constituted as correlates of 
consciousness for liS. Phenomenological reduction means leading back 
from the appr~hcnsion of a being ... to the understanding of the being 
of this being. "(58) 
Husserl introduced an explicitly 'transcendental reduction', which reduced all 
objects to products of the transcendental self. It is on this point that Heidegger makes 
his most radical break with Husser! and the subjectivistic thought. We need not 
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postulate a "thinking substance" or "ego" as this subject, as Descartes did. Nor need 
we even accept this notion of 'I Think' as a necessary condition or a 'unifying 
principle' for knowledge, as Kant did. In short, we do not accept a distinction 
between subject and object. Heidegger suggests the rejection of this distinction, and 
with it the rejection of the innumerable epistemological problems which have plagued 
modern philosophy. According to Heidegger there is no self. There is simply 
"Being-in-the-world. "The world is no more 'bracketable' than the transcendental self 
is necessary. Once we rid ourselves of the transcendental self we save ourselves from 
philosophical skepticism as well. It is here that Heidegger speaks of Daseill instead of 
the self Considering the being of the self, Heidegger calls human being Dasein 
(literally translated '"Being there"): 
"Dasein is an entity \\"hich docs not just occur among other entities. 
Rather it is distinguished by the fact that, in its vcry Being, that Being 
is an isslIe for it. ... It is peculiar to this entity that \\ith and through 
its Being, this Being is disclosed to it. Understanding of Being is itself 
a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being."(5l)) 
Dasein has "'being in such a way that one has an understanding of Being."(60) Be-
cause of this essential relationship of Dasein (human being) to Being, the problem of 
Being must be approached through an investigation ofDasein; 
"Therefore, fundamental ontology, from which alone all other 
ontologies can take their rise, must be sought in the existential anal)1ic 
of Dasein."(61) 
"Jf to interpret the meaning of Being becomes our task, Dasein is not 
only the primai")' entity to be interrogated; it is also that entity which 
already com pOliS itself, in its Being, to\\"arcls what we are asking about 
when we ask this question. "(6}) 
The claim that we may come to understand Being through an analysis of Dasein 
looks danaerously similar to the traditional Cartesian approach to philosophy. 
;:, . 
Descartes wanted to capture (necessary) truths about the world (Being) and began 
with the discovery and analysis of the subject, of the COKi/o, of experience and 
t .. .. 
knowledge. Similarly, Kant approached his theory of knowledge by examining the 
subjective or a priori conditions for experience and knowledge, and Husserl began his 
phenomenological investigations with an examination of the reduced 'pure' ego. Now, 
in spite of his departure from these philosophers, it might appear that Heidegger is 
also beainnin<1 his investioation with an examination of the subject of experience and 
;:,;:, ;:, 
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knowledge, for the analysis of Dasein is explicitly presented as an answer to the 
traditional metaphysical question of self-identity. It is of the utmost necessity, 
therefore, that we understand that the analysis of Dasein for Heidegger is not the 
examination of a subject, or an ego, or consciousness, and that the "self-identity" 
which becomes a problem in the question "Who is Dasein?" is a very different 
problem than it becomes for Descar1es, Kant, and Husser!. The nature of Dasein thus 
becomes the focal point of Being (fI/() TIme, for it is with this new conception of hu-
man being that Heidegger intends to defend his attacks on Husserl's conception of 
phenomenology, to commence his answer to the "problem of Being," and to attack 
the whole of Western philosophy as misguidedJ(3) 
Other existential phenomenologists like Sartre have more or less followed 
Heideggerian track to supply the lack of existence or Being in the Husselian 
phenomenology. Objecting against the existential phenomenologists, Farber says: 
"It ma~' be observcd that if Husscri misscd this problcm I i.c., Being or 
cxistcnccJ, then so did the exiskntialists. Only Husserl had a right --
and in fact an oblig:1tion -- to 'miss' it and thcy did not."(().IJ 
A discllssion as to how far the existential phenomenology's attempt to supply 
that lack has been successful is beyond our present research. However, in order to 
distinguish some differences between the existential phenomenology's and the 
Illuminative philosophy's approaches toward existence or Being, we would preferably 
remark a point: while they claim a return to Being or existence, what is discussed by 
the existential phenomenologists is not actually existence or Being as such; rather, it is 
ultimately confined to a special being, that is~ to slim of Cogi/o. For instance, as we 
saw in the above quotation from Fink, he devoted the "ontological problem" to the 
"being of the existent". Heidegger \\'ho anew projects the question of being, also 
discovers it in the being of Dasein, namely the subject considered as a special existent; 
in the kind of being of the transcendental 'constitutor'. He says: 
"The question of the meaning of being is the most universal and the 
emptiest of questions, but at the same time it is' possible to 
individualise it \'cry precisely for any particular Dascin. "(651 
Perhaps it is why Husser! critically' remarks: "Thus existence (Dasein) in man is 
equivalent to understanding of being"; and he infers from Heidegger's text that 
existence may well be identified with "understanding of being" J(6) It may also be the 
. ~ .. 
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case when one remembers that the notion of Being is the "emptiest" for Heidegger 
and he then returns to the notion of "nothing" in his wha! is me!aphysics?(67) (also 
Sartre). Thus considered, Being is always grounded by Dasein (at least in Being alld 
Time) and risen in the "'horizon of time": "Our provisional aim", he writes, "is the 
interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of 
Being"(6SJ 
Apart from evaluation of Heideggerian (thus Sartrian etc.) notion of Being, and 
despite the probable similarities, the above concept is not completely employed by an 
Illuminative philosopher like Sadra who considers Being as such, and as we will see, 
sets forth a new sense of Being. A bit more clarification in this respect will be found in 
the follo\ving section and next chapter. 
2.5.3. The flll/lIlil/alil'(! NOlion (!lHeing: 
As we have pointed Ollt, Husserlian phenomenological reduction dismisses 
Being or existence and contains the eidetic reduction applying it to discover the 
essences constituted by/in consciousness. Interpreting the phenomenological 
reduction, the existential phenomenology passed toward existence and Being to avoid 
the Husserlian subjectivism. In parallel to this existential phenomenology's effort, and 
in an absolutely ditferent manner and aims, the Illuminative (Sadraean) philosophy 
aims at Being reducing all entities, essences, consciousness, and even the self itself 
(mind, subject, spirit etc.) to Being. This reduction is what we called the ontetic 
reduction. Applied to the self: this reduction implies a mutual relationship between the 
self and Being. This relationship \vhich is the residuum of the ontetic reduction will be 
discussed in next chapter. Here, however, we would rather speak of a few 
comparative points concerning this reduction proposing more clarification: 
Like Heidegger, Sadra turns to Being saying that Being is the subject of 
phiiosophyJ69J However, contrary to Heidegger who discovers the meaning of Being 
by analysing of Dasein -- i. e., being of a special kind of beingsr'O) -- Sadra keeps 
himself dealing with Being as Such. In the opining of his major work A·~I([J·(7li, he tries 
1 
to demonstrate the primordiality of Being: Being is the root. He fundamentally 
distinguishes Being from quiddity, existence fi'om essence, and asserts that nothing is 
real except existence or Being -- No Being, then no reality or truth; no Being, no 
beings; nothing ever emerged. 
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Again, like Heidegger, Sadra says that existence or Being which is reality or 
truth, is never captured by the mind which can only capture essences and general 
notions. This does not mean for Sadra, however, that we have no access to the reality 
of Being (as one may say about Kantian noumenon)~ rather, we are living in /withlby 
Being -- says Sadra. Since we are rooted in Being and our mind is emerged fromlby 
Being as its constantly sprung manifestation (see next chapter), we then are always 
living with/in it. 
According Sadra, we are 'at home with' Being, to borrow a phrase from 
Heidegger. He expressly says: "The ways toward Being are as numerous as the 
selves"J7l) This way to Being, however, is prior to and root of all supposed aspects of 
a being. In other words, these aspects are whatsoever in fact primarily reduced to 
Being, because they are determinations (10 '(~}/)'()II{f/) of Being manifested as this or 
that being. rf f here is an understanding of Being, as Heidegger maintnins/·3! it is 
because we already are ill /Ollch with Being. To be sure, it is not subject to a logical 
analysis. However, like Heidegger who tries to achieve an analysis of understanding 
of Being, Sadra also holds that it is possible to try for an analysis of our mysterious, 
non-reflective living with-in Being. 
To do this, Sadra uses the Illuminative method~ as Heidegger uses the 
phenomenological method. Heidegger's employment of the phenomenological 
method, of course, implies a reorientation of that methodJ7-1) Interpreting 
phenomenology as a method for ontology, Heidegger adds to Husserlian reduction 
two new stages: construction and destruction; and he combines them in an expression: 
de-constructionF5J because 
"constntction in philosophy" he says" is necessarily deconstruction, 
that is to say, a dc-constructing of traditional concepts". (76) 
As a conclusion one may conclude that the de-constructive method is the fruit of 
the phenomenological method when applied to ontology. 
Without confusing the issue/7-) one may consider that the ontetic reduction 
which Sadra actually uses, in its turn, underlines a leap in parallel to Heidegger's de-
construction. De-construction by which Heidegger goes back to history of philosophy 
to discover the mea nino of beino in the horizon of time, means for Sadra, if at all, 
o ,::"l 
deconstruction of essentialism and ontetic reduction to Being. This means that we 
should demarcate, in Sadraean manner, the realm of essence -- which is subject to 
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eidetic reduction and, as Sadra maintains/'S) structures the subject or the mind and 
reflective thought -- on one hand, and the realm of Being -- which is ground and 
reality of, say, the self and its unitary consciousness -- from other hand. According to 
Sadra, only by this manner -- to borrow Heidegger's term, by deconstructing 
essentialism -- can we reach the source of knowledgeJ79i We will consider Sadra's 
existential analysis of essence in the following section; but before shifting to that 
section one question may be answered here: Why does Sadra emphasise so much, so 
to speak, the deconstruction of essentialism? \Ve can readily extract answer to this 
question from within Sadra's system. \Ve say 'extract' because he is not asked such a 
question, then, there is no answer to such a hidden question expressly. We can 
nevertheless see how an answer follows from his general position. 
What is reaJ and truth is only Being Essence is not real and truth in itself; rather 
its truth or reCllity comes from its mental heillg. It is what Sadra says. What is essence 
then? Mind's' abstraction of external or internal objects; they are constituted in our 
mind by imagination and then they constitute our reflective consciousness and 
thought. Sadra maintains that our reflection occurs only through essences. As already 
hinted, he holds that our reflection always analyses an entity in two aspects: its 
existence and its essence. But in external world there is no essence; the external 
entity, Sadra says, is a manifestation of Being, then its reality is pure being, so it has 
no essence, or if has. this essence is nothing but its existence. (Sadra tries to 
demonstrate this by establishing a few principles like that of conservation of Being 
and that of the hierarchical structure of, being.[see eh.3]) If so, essences are 
constituted in the mind by imagination through the process of perception, and the 
mind categorises them so that it can reflectively think. In short, according to Sadra, 
the structure of thought is essentialistic (eidetic in Husserlian term). But how can we 
escape from the maze of reflection? (\Vhy escape? note that he wants to justify an 
ontetic consciousness which is the base of the mystical apprehension.) The answer is 
simple: By breaking dO\vn the palace of essentialism. If essence forms the texture of 
r~flection, and reflection is supposed to be surpassed, then there is no way is for Sadra 
but deconstructing essentialism. Now in the following section of this chapter we will 
see his analysis of essence in particular. 
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2.5.-1. Smlra 's I-,~'(islellli(fl Alla~)!sis QlEssence: 
As yet, it might be clear that, contrary to Husserl, existence is not somehow 
nominal and void for Sadra. He strongly asserts that nothing is real except existence. 
But this existence, which is sale reality, is never captured by the mind which can only 
capture essences and general notions. Hence there is a fundamental difference 
between general notion of being or existence and those of essences. Since, for him, 
essences do not exist per se but only arise in the mind from particular forms or modes 
of existence and hence are mental phenomena, they can, in principle, be fully known 
by the mind; but the general notion of existence that arises in the mind can not know 
or capture the nature of existence, since existence is the objective reality and its 
transformation into an abstract mental concept necessarily falsifies it. In other words, 
what· exists is the uniquely particular, hence it can not be known by the conceptual 
mind, whereas an essence is by itself a general notion and hence can be known by the 
mind. No wonder then, that philosophers who operated by an abstract notion of 
existence, declared it to be an empty concept, for it is true that to this abstract 
concept as sLich there is nothing that strictly corresponds in reality. But their capital 
mistake was to think that the reality of existence is just this abstract concept: 
"All notions that arise from I our experience ofJ the cxtcmal world and 
are ftllly graspcd by the mind, their essences are preserved [in the 
mindJ even though the mode of their existence changes [in the mind]. 
But since the very nature of existence is that it is outside the mind and 
every thing whose nature it is to be outside of the mind can never 
possibly comc into mind -- or, else, its nature will be completely 
transformed -- hcnce, cxist~ncc can nevcr be rconceptuallyl known by 
an\' mind"(80) 
It is true that there is an abstract notion of existence arising in the mind out of 
different existents, but it is equally true that that abstract notion, far from giving us the 
real nature of existence, falsifies that real nature. If existence was to be treated only as 
an abstract general notion, then it must be regarded as some sort of essence, of the 
order of a genus. We have forbidden this earlier on the ground that existences are 
unique and no general notion can do justice to the uniqueness of real beings. Further, 
being static, each instance of an essence is identically the same. No instance of an 
essence is a unique individual but only a case and yields indifTerently the same result 
as any other instance of the same essence. 
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Essence, Sadra says, is nothing in itself, whatever being it possesses is due to its 
being manifestations of and relation to the absolute existence: 
"They I i.e., essences I, so long as they remain unillul11inated by the 
ligh.t of existence, arc not something to which the mind can POi;lt by 
saymg whether they exist or not. .. , Thc\' eternally remain in their 
native concealment [of non-being] and th~ir origi~al state of non-
existence .... They cannot be said to be or not to be -- neither do they 
create, nor are they objects of creation lobjects of creation being the 
contingent existences, not essences] ... I contingent]existences, on the 
other hand, are pure relations Ito absolute existence]; the mind can not 
point to them either when they are considered out of relation with their 
sllstaining Creator, since these have no existence independently. 
Hmvever, in themselves , these existences are concrete realities , 
unifected by the indctermincncy r of essences I, pure existence without 
rthe admixturel of essences and simple lights without anv 
darkness. ,·(8/ ) 
By 'conjoined' or 'united', Sadra does not mean that as a matter of fact two 
things or realities come together and are united, since, according to Sadra, essences 
possess no reality of their own: It is the modes of existence that necessarily give rise 
to essences, wherein existence is the real, essence, the subjecti\'e element. When 
existence becomes further and further diversified into modes, these modal existences 
generate diverse essences. 
Let us now revert to the Sadraean analysis of essences which ends up in pure 
existence. The steps in this analysis are: (i) the genus is identical with or parallel to the 
potentiality of matter, while the differentia is identical with the actualised form; (ii) 
that genus, because of its imperfection and indeterminacy, requires and is perfected by 
the differentia; (iii) that differntia is the only reality, since genus, as a pure potentiality 
in the nature of matter, can not form part of the actual existence; (iv) that, hence 
differentia equals existence; and (v) that what is called 'species' or 'specific nature' is 
nothing but 'a classification of objects by the mind since actual existents exhibit 
certain characteristics whereby the mind is able to compare and contrast them and put 
them in different classes. 
In his discussion of the Aristotelian dualism of matter-form (in the object) or 
that of genus-differentia (in the subject), Sadra attempts to insert this dualism 
logically into the concept of essence; that is to say , he assigns it to the 
phenomenology of mind (Husserl's)J8.:') His analysis of these dualisms ends up in a 
sort of existence he called differentia so that its Sadraean sense differs from the 
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traditional sense. \Vhereas matter refers to something in the real world, genus is in 
the realm of concepts; but in either case, what concretely comes to exist both in the 
real world and in the mind is the differentia for both matter and genus 'lose 
themselves in its concreteness). 
If we consider more closely the relationship between genus and differentia, it 
appears that the Aristotelian distinctions here are purely mental, for in the reality only 
the differentia exists. This is brought out clearly by a consideration of 'simple' 
differentia as opposed to composite ones. In the case of 'black colour', e. g., what 
exists is black and apparently there is nothing in reality corresponding to 'colour'. In 
view of this, some philosophers have denied that, in the case of colours, there is either 
a general genus or a genuine differentia. This, however, is a capital mistake. For 
although the analysis into genuses and differentiae is only a mental operation, there is 
some warrant in reality to make these distinctions and classifications. Nevertheless, 
what this shows is that existential reedity is 'not composed of genuses and differentiae 
but of modes of existence, i. e., simple differentiae. For, in truth, there is no such 
thing as a composite difrerentia in reality; there are only successive modes of 
existence. In this context, Sadra asserts that the whole reality is nothing but a 
succesSIOn of differentiate which , in turn, are nothing but sllccessive modes of 
existence. 
Based on the Aristotelian matter-form formula, but by transforming it into a 
genus-differentia formula, the status of the differentia has been assigned a far greater 
in~portance in the system of Avicenna, and particularly by declaring differntia to be 
simple and irreducible, it has become allied to the unique and unanalysable fact of 
existence. But differentia , for him, is not identical with existence which in some 
sense stands outside the matter-form or genus-differentia formula even though the 
differentia helps bring the genus into an existential situation. Differentia, indeed, as 
part of the specific essence (composed of genus and differentia) is subsumable under a 
genus and is , therefore, part of what Aristotle called' secondary substance'. 
For Sadra, on the other hand, the differentia is neither a substance nor an 
accident, since it is identical with individual existence. To support this last 
proposition, Sadra develops an argument which interprets the genus-differentia 
formula in accordance with his doctrine of the emergent existence or 'substantial 
change' and thus assimilates it to essence-existence principle. 
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In the progression of reality, we see that the movement is from the potential to 
the actual where every prior is matter or genus for every posterior: wood, e. g., is 
matter or genus for a chair. Now both matter and form are described as secondary 
substances by Aristotle. In the case of primary matter itself -- which does not exist __ 
one can distinguish a quasi-genus and a quasi-form element. For, primary matter is 
characterised by pure potentiality~ hence, it is something that has potentiality, where 
something stands for genus and has potentiality stands for the form, but of course, the 
conjunction of the two is still a mere potential, without actual existence. Sadra, 
therefore, insists that prime matter is not a pure genus but a species, since it does 
possess a differentia and it is thanks to this differentia that it has a positive tendency of 
potentiality \vhich brings it OLit of pure nothingness and, f1lI1her, that this species is 
restricted to one individual, i. e., that something which has the potentiality of 
existence. 
Just as prime matter has only a potentiality for existence, so is it the case with 
every genus relative to its form or differentia, the only difference between prime 
matter and other genuses being that prime matter, even with its differentia, is only 
potential, whereas other genuses become actual when a differentia becomes available. 
Now, since a genus is only a potentiality relative to its differentia, and since genus at 
the same time is 'secondary substance', it follows that a secondary substance does not 
exist. It is a mere' something', a mere logical subject, not a real subject. Real subjects 
are only existential objects, \vhich are the differentiae, not genuses. Further, since the 
potential is caused· and actualised by something real, it follows that genus is brought 
into existence and actualised by the differentia .. The differentia is the final cause, the 
perfection of genus. \\lith the differentia, genuses such evaporates and is taken upon 
it. It is not the case that the differentia is simply 'added to' or exists alongside of the 
genus in a thing; it is the actualised genus; it is the thing. Hence Sadra equates the 
differentia with existence and pronounces it to be a mode of existence. 
In the entire progression of existence, the preceding mode of reality becomes 
gynus for and 'loses itself in the succeeding differentia: 
"It has become clear to \'Oll from what we ha\'c said ... that that 
whcrcb\' a thing is constit~ltec\ and exists ... is nothing but the principle 
of the I~st differentia \\herein all the preceding diffcr..:ntia..: and forms 
which bccome united in it come to be nothing but potentialities, 
conditions and instrumcnts for the reality that is the last differcntia." 
(.\3 ) 
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Thus, this movement represents a progressive diminution of essence and 
preponderance of existence until we reach the pure existence without essence. 
From this account follow the unreality of species, or specific essences. A species 
is obtained by the mind by combining a genus with a differentia and subsuming the 
latter under the former. But existentially , the case is exactly opposite: there the 
genuses lose themselves in the concrete reality of the differentia and vanish without a 
trace; they become simple and unique modes of existence. How does the mind then 
carry out its analyses and produce definitions with their multiplicity of concepts? 
Sadra's. reply to this question is based on his view of the disparate nature of the realm 
of existence and the logical or conceptual mind. In the e:-:istential world there is 
existence or modes of particular existence where vcry existent is basically unique. 
When, however, these existents are presented to the conceptual mind (as opposed to 
the true nature of the mind which is a member of the transcendental existential 
Intelligible realm), the latter extracts from them certain 'essential' and 'accidental' 
qualities whereby it classifies them. This classification, although it cel1ainly does not 
exist in the external world, is, nevertheless, warranted by it for the mind. That is to 
say, it is only an operation of the mind although not a fictional one 
"The reality and being of the differentiae consists only in a pal1icular 
and uniquc cxistences of the essences, which are true individuals. 
What exists cxtelllally is , therefore, only lmodes of] existence but, 
thanks to sense-perception, they give rise in the conceptual mind to 
cCJ1ain general or specific notions (i. c, genuses and differentiae), 
some of which arc attributed to their essence and others to their 
accidental qualities. The mind then attributes these existentially lO 
these objects."(s,/) 
It can be concluded from Sadra' s discussion that in the reality, there is nothing 
but existence, and all essences (then all conceptual, representative thought) that our 
mind constitutes in the eidetic reduction are in fact the determinations (t 'ayyonal) of 
existence and epiphanies of Being. This idea is the Sadraean turning point toward the 
ontetic reduction in which only is the notion of Being central, and through which all 
beings are only emanative entities manifested from Being. 
Thus understood, applying the method of ontetic reduction, Sadra reached a 
sort of illuminative existentialism. 111 fact, It is from this specitic theory of being that 
Sadra considers the philosophical problems in general. It is, however, the nature of 
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the self that concerns us in this research. Following this procedure to reconstruct the 
illuminative theory of self, we should first detect some general principles of Sadraean 
illuminative existentialism in the ontetic field on which the ontology of the self can be 
built. This will be done in next chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Being And Beings: Some Principles Of A Theory 
Since our objective is to see the nature of the self in the light of Sadraean 
Illuminative theory of being, it will be helpful first to present some general elements of 
this theory. In this chapter; however, we might first remind ourselves of one point. 
Sadra discussed his theory of being essentially in first volume of his major work Asfar 
and applied it to the problems of philosophy and theology through the rest of the 
work (VIs. 2-9). He also wrote widely books and dissertations on his theory of being 
and its applications. Our intention here is not of course to study his theory 
comprehensiyely; but only in so t~lr as it is applied to build up an existential theory of 
the self. Therefore, we will study his theory of being fi-olll a peculiar angle. We have 
already said something as regards the Sadraean Illuminative notion of being; now, we 
will reconsider this notion to remind that it somehow differs from modern 
understanding of it. Relying on this reminder, we will then consider the relation of 
Being and beings in general, underlying the reality of beings, the structure of Being as 
well as the modality of the existence of beings in general. These issues are crucial to 
give an account of the special ontetie structure of the self. This application of the 
Sadraean theory of being will be given in the following chapter. 
3. 1. Being As Light: 
We have already said (Ch. 2) some words concerning the notion of Being in the 
Illuminative philosophy. Now, since we describe in this chapter some general 
principles of the Illuminative theory of being, we remind first of an important, and 
interesting point concerning this notion. Being for this school is not a logical concept, 
a category, an essence, or a name. It is (the only) truth of every truth, (the only) 
reality of every reality. Its Concept (mqj111lm) for our mind is the clearest; however, 
i 
its reality (Klflll?) is the unclearest, hidden from our reflective thoughtJ)) It lives with 
. us and we live in/by it, nevertheless, we cannot describe it in deed. We can speak of it 
only metaphorically. For this reason, and to disringuish this notion from the Platonic-
Aristotelian (Occidental) concept of being, Being is considered in the Illuminative 
philosophy as Light, and its manifestation as illumination. It is interesting to note that 
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Suhrawardi , the Master of Illumination, wrote a metaphoric Recital called 
"Occidental E'(ile" in which he symbolically refers to the light of Being as set down in 
the horizon of the OccidentJ-:'! It is why he oriented to the Persian horizon to see the 
flash of Being in the brightness of wisdom-dawn. This means that the notion of Being 
as Light is special, subtle and crucial for this school. Therefore, insofar as our 
discussion here about the Illuminative thesis of being is concerned, some 
interpretation of the technical word /-iKhl, on the basis of which the notion of Being 
and its manifestation is understood and described, is needed. 
The word "light," as Suhrawardi elaborates at the vel)' beginning of his 
metaphysics, is not used in an entirely epistemological sense, for what is clearly 
understood by the intellect, nor in such a restricted sense as when it is applied to the 
physical world. It is intended to mean that of which physical light is primarily a mode. 
He believes that when something is so clear and luminous that any explanation or 
practical investigation to make it any clearer is redundant, it should be called 
"apparent" Thus "apparentness" or "appearance", in this language, does not mean 
that there is something else behind this appearance showing its surface to us but not 
its whole reality. Having said this, Suhrawardi then asks what could be really more 
"apparent" than light itself. \Vould it not be a real absurdity to shine a light on light in 
order to see it? It therefore becomes true to say that anything than which nothing 
more "apparent" can be given in definition or explanation must be truly and even 
literally called "light."(3! This description is also given for the notion of "light" when 
resorting to the empirical essentialities of lights: A physical light is an instantiation of 
light because it has In common \\lith other lights that in the case of seeing nothing is 
more apparent than the light itself 
Given this understanding and interpretation of light, he seems to consider that 
physical light, as a mode of light like any other, can have this description predicated of 
it: that is, "than which nothing more apparent can be given in definition or 
explanation," and thus that definition or explanation becomes totally redundant. 
Fyrtherrnore, by establishing sllch a descriptive principle for his Illuminative 
,. 
philosophy, Suhrawardi feels quite justified in placing the reality of being human in 
this catenory and treatin o it as an actual mode of the notion of light in such a way 
~ .' ~ 
that it can be easily characterised by all the intrinsic characteristics and qualities of 
light, such as apparency, simplicity, indivisibility, indefinableness, and so on. 
59 
After having done this, he goes on to further elaborate the designation of his 
principal technique of light in opposition to darkness, which probably points to an 
ancient Persian religiolls orientation. First he divides what he believes in this way to 
be "light in the very reality of itself' into a mode of light which is genuine, 
unadulterated, and non-inherent in anything else, and another mode of light which is 
accidental and subsists in something else. \Vhat is not light in the very reality of itself 
falls naturally into the category of darkness. Darkness is also divided into a mode of 
darkness that does not occur in another thing and therefore is pure and independent, 
and a mode which does occur in something else and is not independent. The example 
of the former is "prime matter" Chyle), which is called in his Illuminative language the 
"obscure substance" (ul-jall'(f/7r (fl-glwsiq)(-I), the principle of receptivity and passivity, 
Examples of the latter are all material objects that cOLlnt as accidents in the 
Aristotelian manner of thinking. 
In Suhrawardi' s philosophy there are also things which are neither counted 
among the modes of light nor of darkness, but are rather dealt with as being somehow 
in between. They are called "intermediate objects" as, for example, "material 
substances," these are, in his words, neither light nor darkness, but are rather in such a 
state that if rays of light are cast upon them by which they can come to the light, they 
thereby become "apparent;" but if these rays do not reach them, they fall back to 
absolute darkness and disappear.(5) 
These remarks should be taken, at least at the present time, simply as a matter of 
terminology and as a verbal explanation of some technical words. But we must remind 
ourselves of the point that this SOl1 of philosophical discourse involves, in the first 
place, a linguistic colouring from the ancient Persian dualistic terminology of "light" 
and "darkness" is concerned. Of course, being conscious of metaphysical and religious 
consequences, Suhrawardi emphatically confined himself to the "language game" of 
this dualism and conventionally equated the meaning of "light" with "being" and the 
meaning of darkness with "nothingness. "(6) 
In the second place, this terminology leans firmly in the direction of a 
reformulation of the famous Platonic distinction between "being" and "becoming" in 
terms of modes of "Iioht" and modes of "darkness." Suhrawardi tries to avoid 
;:, 
attaching any positive sense to his notion of "darkness" and confines that notion to the 
far side of the square of opposition, which is the direct contradiction and absolute 
negation of the notion of "light" and "being." Given this linguistic achievement, one 
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can suppose, In his favour, that "light" can be substituted for "being" in Plato's 
doctrine. But whether a purely negative sense of "darkness" can also be 
accommodated to the other Platonic thesis, namely "becoming," is a question to 
which Suhrawardi has committed himself and is acutely aware of. However, in this 
research, this question (and the like) does not concern us. What we would like to 
mention here is that this Suhrawardian notion of light was interpreted later by Sadra 
with an absolutely new understanding of "Being". Interpreting Light as Being, Sadra 
gave a new (ontetic) meaning to the Suhrawardian notion of Light as well. In fact, his 
interpretation of Suhrawardian notion of Light as Being not only put it away from 
being a mere metaphor, but also bestow a different sense to the philosophical word 
"Being". The novelty of Sadra's theory of Being in comparison with the western 
theories of Being (from Aristotle to Heiclegger), it seems, is hidden in this crucial 
interpretation of Light as Being. 
It is, of course, appreciated that the term "Light" has been used by some 
philosophers, both in the ancient and modern philosophies, for example, in works of 
philosophers like Plotinus, al-Ghazali, al-Razi, Ibn-' Arabi, Eckhart, Magnus Albertus, 
Aquinas, Bonaventura, Roger Bacon, Descartes, Bergson, Husserl and Heidegger~ 
however, to my best knowledge, none of them employed "Light" in Sadraean sense of 
"Being". Concerning this issue, two principal points may be reminded here: One is 
that the word "Light" is used in history of philosophy, somehow in a physical sense 
and, then, taken as a metaphor -- and not as an ontology. The other is that in the 
history of philosophy what is almost meant by 'ontology' is ultimately ~cosmology', 
and then by 'being,' 'the world'. It is obvious that such senses are not what Sadra 
meant' by these two words, 'Light' and 'Being'; Neither does 'Light' merely mean 
physical, nor does 'Being' equal the world. Since Light is, according to him, the very 
'Being', every speaking of it belongs to the ontetic field and indicates a profound 
ontology (to use modern terminology). At the same time, 'Being' is the mere source, 
and never equals the world; it is both the world and more than the world -- ontology, 
in; its proper sense, is not cosmology. 
It is this understanding of Being as Light (and Light as Being) that among and 
along with the other consequences, allows us to establish philosophically a non-
reflective, ontetic field of conscioLisness in/by which the nature of the self, as well as 
its reflective knowledge, is constituted -- a consequence that hits upon the importance 
of replacing and avoiding the epistemological (the eidetic field) as foundational, and 
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treating Being (the ontetic field) as the most primordial root, long before a technique 
was discovered by philosophers like Heidegger and Sartre. This particular 
"existentialist" consequence will concern us in detail from next chapter onward. Here 
we discuss those principles of the Sadraean theory of being which have direct 
implications for the theory of the. 
3. 2. The Reality Of Beings: 
In the previous chapter we saw that Sadra by applying the ontetic reduction 
removed essentialism to the benefit of a special kind of existentialism. By this 
removal, he also tried to escape from all implications of the eidetic reduction by which 
we remain in the level of intentiomtl, reflective, constituting consciousness of the self. 
He maintained that by such a removing, by the ontetic reduction, we face the realm of 
the reality, of the Being. By this he means that the notion of existence can 
accommodate all terms and degrees of reality in general and overcome the Platonic 
distinction between "being" and "becoming" in particular. Accordingly, the word 
"existence" is equivalent to the word "reality", and like its equivalent is applied to the 
existence of God with the same univocal meaning as when applied to the existence of 
any phenomenal object. Like Heidegger who by relying on an analysis of logos 
maintains that knowledge is a grounded mode of Dasein's existence, Sadra also holds 
that there is no good reason for separating the order of "being" from the order of 
"intelligence", or from any kind of "knowing." 
In brief, anything which comes from absolute nothingness into a degree of 
being, no matter how weakly it may possess the light of realisation, or which is, from 
eternity, in the world of reality, is truly to be considered as an existence. 
This univocity of existence in the philosophy of Sadra is what makes up the 
"innermost" feature of that concept. On the "outermost" of the same concept, there is 
nothing but gradation and variation of the same sense of univocity. For the sufficient 
reason that this outermost variation belongs to the very innermost univocity, Sadra 
I 
maintains it does not jeopardise the univocal application of existence. In this sense 
existence is true of appearances and things in themselves supposed to really exist. It is 
that by which all beings are illuminated, and on which they are dependent without the 
inter-mediation of matter, instrument, or time. But that which is preceded by 
non-existence in time can never dispense with a mediator. The act of Being, the 
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illumination, therefore, has superiority and generation. The light of Being IS so 
luminous and so radiant that it sheds light on everything. Sadra says: 
"All existents that take 'possibility' as their logical modality and all 
reali~ies which are related, and belong, to the Other, ~r~ to be 
cO~1sldered as different vailles (i 'libarat) and different features of the 
eXistence of the Necessary Being. They are rays and shadows of the 
same ~el~-S~I~stantive Light. These shadows arc, from thc standpoint 
?f thCl~ Il1dlvlduation (/11Lwiyah), far from being independent. It is 
Impossible even to conceive of them as unrelated and independent 
entities. This is because 'subordination' and bcing . owned by' the 
Othcr, as well as poverty and dependence on the Other, are the whole 
constitution of their reality. It is not howcver true to suppose that they 
are something in their essence liable to the occurrence of being related 
to and owned by the Other, and thus ckpendent upon the Othcr; not at 
all. But rather the only conceivable truth of their realit\' is to describe 
them as a pure 'dependence' on the Othcr, not C"\-CI1 something 
dependent on the Other. Thus understood, the\" haye no reality in 
themselves conceivable by our intellectual power 'otl1l'r than to be 1~1cre 
subjections and subordinations of one Reality. From this it becomes 
clear that there is nothi:lg in the world of reality but one single Reality. 
Anything else other than this counts for nothing but a manifestation, an 
exhibition, a perspective, a specific manner, a ray of light, a shadow of 
the luminosity and a visage of the endless profundity of this One 
Realit\". "(7) 
The above theory means that all beings, including the self, are the manifested 
forms of one reality; they are emanative entities by their nature -- though their 
portions of that unique reality are different depending on their level of manifestation. 
This is the meaning of ontetic reduction in the Illuminative philosophy. 
Now let LIS see Sadra's position on the mode of being which the emanative 
entities in general· possess. This mode of being in general means for Sadra nothing but 
a "relational" (/,((/)li) and "hangingful" (to 'al/oghi)(S) one of which he metaphorically 
speaks of as the prepositional being .. This means, according to him, that their nature 
is a 'pure need', an 'absolute possibility'; then, like Sartre who says that the essence 
of man is "a lack", Sadra also says SO(9) However, unlike Sartre who releases this man 
of lack, an existent in full need, to the storm of nothingness and in the darkness of 
i-
nihilism, Sadra tries to hang it to a safe platform and to bring it into light. One can 
however ask what the meaning of this hangingful, this relational being is. The meaning 
of this kind of being is very subtle for Sadra. He has devoted pages upon pages to 
clarify its meaning appealing to logical, grammatological and philological illustrations. 
Among the illustrations he puts forward, we can refer to a grammato-philological one. 
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He compares the meaning of emanative being with the meaning of prepositions. In 
Persian and Arabic, and perhaps in Language as such there is a triple division of word 
into noun, verb and preposition. Putting aside their functions in a statement, the first 
two have independent sense, but a preposition has no independent sense~ its sense 
only appears in its function in a statement when is taken with nouns or verbs. For 
example, 'book' or 'went' have their independent senses which they indicate so that 
an audience understands their meaning~ but a preposition like 'by' (ha in Persian and 
Arabic which has several meanings depended on its functions in statement) has no 
definite meaning until it function in a statement. Then, its meaning is depended on the 
other, that is on nouns or verbs; and this means that its meanin u is hanoing on and 
:::> :::> 
relational to the others without which it never makes sense. According to Sadra, the 
same case holds good for the emanative beings~ because their being is hanging on and 
relational to the Other (God in theology). It is on such an illustration that, starting 
with the problem of the relation of Being to the multitude of the universe, what 
Sadra's perspective of emanation gives us is simply expressible by a prepositional 
phrase such as "proceeding frolll ... ," "depending on .. ," "illuminated by ... ," and so 
on. All the words that he has L1sed in the definition of emanation stand for nothing but 
a pure, immanent act issued by the agent as a manifestation of a substantive truth. 
Sadra says that the reality of emanation is analogolls to the meaning of connectives 
and prepositions, in that it has no distinct definable sense in itself separated from its 
substantive principle -- that is Being itself. Thus it cannot be defined in terms of either 
verbs or nouns~ rather it can only be understood in the light of Being, just as a 
preposition is only accurately and meaningfully understandable if one can connect it to 
its own appropriate nouns and· verbs. However the truth of emanation lies for Sadra in 
Beina and its whole reality is no more than a prepositional expression such as "by 
:::>' 
otherness". Since the status of the act of emanation is by nature thus prepositional, the 
only independent reality which really is in-itself and can function as a substantive noun 
to which all prepositional entities are related is, in Sadra's eyes, Being which does not 
in itself come from another principle, and therefore, is not dependent on anything at 
I 
all. This is the unique principle of emanative beings (1m 
3. 3. The .\'trllctllre ql Being 
Now one of the important pillars of Sadraean ontology comes into force: the 
hierarchic (tashkiki) structure of Being(J/) Of course the scope a d I" f 
. , n app Icatlons 0 
this thesis is widely spread in Sadraean system; however we shall encounter it here to 
see how Sadra applies it to justify the reality of the self. Before attempting to see this 
justification, it would be helpful to briefly study this thesis. 
The whole multitude is, according to Sadra, designed as but one manifestation 
of Being. And as a shadow of its face, it always remains entirely dependent upon that 
light of lights. This indicates, as Sadra tells us, that there is an unbroken vertical line 
connecting all emanati\'e beings to Being, the principle of manifestation, in a strictly 
existential unity. And there are also horizontal lines along which the manifested beings 
are to be regarded as differellt from one another and characterised by multiplicity in 
. rank, in essence, in species, and in individuation. All these belong to the factual 
texture of Being itself. For the sake of distinction, the vertical lines is called the "inner 
order" of existence, and the horizontal lines the "outer order" of existence. The 
former is that which mystical experiences and ontetic apprehensions are concerned 
with, and the latter, is what reflective philosophy and the eidetic sciences account for. 
In dealing with the problem of mysticism and ontetic field, all philosophy can do is to 
account for the interpretation and conceptualisation of mystical experiences and 
ontetic apprehensions. Being representational, these interpretations and 
conceptualisations will fall into the order of the horizontal line, whereas factual 
mystical experiences and ontetic apprehensions always remain in the vertical 
dimension of emanation and belong to the inner order of the world of reality. They are 
not, strictly, representational. 
On this ontolo<1Y the Ii uht of existence flashes out from the source of light at the w ' w 
vertex all the way down to the base which is supposed to be the world of material 
objects. While all the rays and arrows emanate fi'om the simplicity of Being without 
any interruption of nothingness or a void, they all enjoy the strongest existential 
c~nnection and unity \vith Being at the top. But they are, on the other hand, widely 
diversified when they are considered as being at the base or at any point between the 
base and the zenith where the horizontal levels converge into an absolute unitary 
simplex, 
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There are two distinct kinds of diversity which are to be noted. These rays or 
shadows of existence can be divided by the mind of a philosopher into different 
fragmentary emanations according to the degrees of proximity to Being. But this sort 
of division, being a mere intellectual retlection on the gradation of one simple thing 
does not jeopardise the simple unity of the emanation with Being. They are also 
actually separated and diversified in essence as well as in individuation, etc. ~ but since 
this separation and diversity which occurs in the horizontal order does not happen in 
the vertical order - the order of unity - it does not drive them to pieces and has no 
impact on the inner system of their continuity and unity with Being. In other words 
the multitude of the horizontal order has no bearing upon the unitary connection of 
the vertical order. 
This description of the Illuminative ontology, together with the distinction 
between vertical and horizontal lines within the structure of existence, is taken by 
Sadra in order to analyse the philosophical problems in general, and in our special 
case the being of the self. It is of fundamental importance to his philosophy to 
understand the "inner unitv" in relation to the "outer diversity" so that one can 
appreciate the problem to which Sadraean theory seeks to give an answer. Let us 
continue our depiction of Sadraean thesis. 
There are various ways and approaches by which Sadra tries to shows, the 
plausibility of the claim of his theory of existence to demonstrate the existential 
identity of emanation with their ultimate principle, i. e., Being. The law of 
"transitivity" or the "hypothetical syllogism" is one of the approaches he uses to show 
it. The logical form of this law is: 
A~B 
B~C 
:.A ~C 
As one can see, this law is based on material implication as its logical 
connective. To apply this law to the theory of emanation, Sadra says, one needs to 
substitute the emanative notion of "dependence" for material implication. To depend 
tdtally, both in truth and in conceivability, on the truth of another is taken to mean 
being overshadowed by, and included in, the truth of another being. Logically, this 
existential relation is expressed by material implication, such that the truth of an 
emanative being consists analytically in the truth of its undetachable principle. Thus 
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"dependence" is here equated with the "undetachability" and "indistinguishability" of 
the emanation from its principle both in thought and in truth. (12) 
Now Sadra says that any given degree or mode of emanation A, will entail, by 
material implication, its immediate principle B. Since B is in its turn an emanation 
dependent, in the same manner, on its own immediate principle, it also logically 
implies its own principle~ and so on, until the range of emanation ends in the ultimate 
principle C -- i. e., Being. 
In this way the unbroken chain of emanation is traced back from the lowest 
mode of emanation A to the intermediate grade B, and finally, to the ultimate source 
of emanation C. This is the logical strategy of transitivity. While these modes and 
degrees of emanation, following one upon the other, appear in their own particular 
stages to be different from one another in terms of such hierarchical levels and 
proportions of closeness and remoteness to the ultimate principle, they all constitute 
only one single and indivisible vertical line fi'om the base up to the zenith of the 
existence. 
Sadra also turns to take an objection to this account. One of the objections he 
critically puts to himself helps to clarify his thesis and it would be useful to encounter 
it here. The objection is made to the strategy: that the implication of transitivity does 
not bring out the claim of this theory, which calls for nothing other than the existential 
identity of all the gradations and modes of emanation. All the rule of transitivity can 
do is to help us know that there is an unbroken relation between any lower degree or 
mode of emanation A, through an intermediate mode B used as a middle term, to the 
ultimate principle C. But whether or not this relation is an identity relation, making 
the whole· massive system of the gradations of emanation and its principle one 
existential unity, is beyond the logical parameters of the hypothetical syllogism. 
The answer Sadra gives to this objection is that the existential relation between 
an emanation and the source from which it has emanated is nothing but an 
"Illuminative relation"(J·i'I, which is unitary and belongs to the order of being and not 
the order of conception. In point of fact, it is this "unitary" relationship which 
( 
accounts for the sort of existential identity which the emanation has with the source of 
emanation. Within the context of this unitary relation Sadra applies the rule of 
transitivity in order to lead from one occurrence of this relationship at the base to the 
ultimate one at the zenith of the hierarchic structure of existence. In other words, the 
operation of material implication in the system of Illuminative relations results 
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logically in a kind of existential unity subsisting from the lower class of emanation 
right up to the ultimate principle and source of the Illuminative emanation without any 
disruption or any extraneolls mediation. 
3. 4. The Existential Possibility (~f Relational Being: 
In the above context Sadra takes a decisive step forward to logically support his 
theory. He considers here the modality of the emanative being. Investigating it in a 
difficult discussion, he tries to set up an argument designed generally to obtain the 
modality of a concept in connection with its reality and the consideration of its 
existence, whether the concept is empirical, transcendental, or merely illusoryJJ.I) In 
other words, given anything as Cl subject term in an existential form of proposition, 
Sadra tries to determine the modal strllcture of such a proposition and decide whether 
that subject is "necessClry," "possible," or impossible." As an example, Sadra considers 
the transcendental concept of God in comparison with the predicative concept of 
existence in the light of this Clrgument. Putting the idea of God as the subject term and 
the meaning of existence as the predicate, we get a complete proposition in the 
form: 'God exists. ' Then, from the standpoint of "modality", this statement is 
subjected to the question: I s God's existence necessary, possible or impossible? When 
any two of these alternatives -- in the case of God's existence, possibility and 
impossibility -- are nded out the remaining one is kept as the truth value of the 
modality of the proposition. Then the statement becomes: 'God exists necessarily.' 
Sadra maintains that the same modality decision-making procedure can easily be set 
up for every concept present in our mind, whether it be through our sense-experience, 
our intellect, or our imagination. On this, he concludes that everything, no matter 
whether it be in the order of essence or in the order of existence, is either necessary, 
possible, or impossible. This amounts to the generalisation that all forms and degrees 
of existence will come under the same consideration of modality as all the varieties of 
essence normally do. 
I It should be noted that the validity of the argument is based upon the exclusive 
sense of this alternation, because it has already been established in this philosophy that 
all of these primitive terms (i.e., necessity, possibility and impossibility)(l5) are 
triadically contradictory. Possibility in its special sense (a/-imkall a/-khass), as Sadra 
depicts it, is a twofold negation: the negation of 'to be' and the negation of 'not to 
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be'(16). That is to say, the status of a possible entity to existence and to nothingness is, 
by itself, 50:50; in the sense that 'existence' is not exigency for this entity in itself, just 
as 'non-existence' is not exigency for it. Possibility, therefore, contradicts both 
necessity and impossibility. The contradiction of necessity and impossibility on the 
other hand is clear from their definitions: necessity is the exigency of 'to be' and 
impossibility is the exigency of 'not to be'(f7). In fact each pair can be reduced and 
translated into the general form of the law of the excluded middleJ181 It is logically 
impossible, says Sadra, that any concept, no matter what it may be, can ever be 
entirely outside this exclusive alternation. It is equally impossible that a concept can 
ever assume any more than one of these alternatives. That is, every concept must "at 
most" and "at least" be qualified by one of these primitive forms of modality. 
This kind of alternation is called the "complete disjunction"!I,)) meaning that "at 
least and at most" one of the disjuncts is true. This is to be distinguished from the two 
incomplete disjunctions. First, there is the disjunction in \vhich "at least" one of the 
disjuncts is true but all of them may be true as well. This is called the "inclusive 
disjunction"J-~(J) Second, there is the disjunction in which "at most" one of the 
disjuncts is true, even though it may happen that none of them is true. This is called 
the "restrictive disjunction" (.:'1) The complete disjunction may be exemplified by two 
or more exclusive disjuncts. An example of two exclusive disjuncts is: 'Every number 
is either odd or even,' which implies that no number can be both and no number can 
be neither. 
The same pattern of complete disjunction can be exemplified in a three-disjunct 
formula like this: "Everything is either necessary, possible, or impossibleJ.?.?) 
According to the exclusive sense of the complete disjunction, this statement is taken 
to mean that "at least and at most" one, and only one, of these modal predicates is 
true of a thing. 
The three-disjunct form of the complete disjunction is applied by Sadra to the 
existential feature of an emanative entity where to be entitled to intellectually 
distin<luish between the essence and the act of existence of that entity. Setting aside 
; -=:> 
the problem of its essentiality which is withdrawn by the ontetic reduction, Sadra 
comes to the point where he directs this disjunctive question to the pure existence of 
the emanative entities. The question, however, is not whether a being such as the self 
is necessary, possible, or impossible. Rather, it deals only with the actual existence of 
the self as it has specifically issued forth from Being, regardless of its essentialities, 
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which belong to the order of its conceptual definition. The question asks if such a 
form or degree of existence can be qualified by necessity, possibility, or impossibility. 
In other words, if the existential feature of an emanation be considered as a thing 
distinct from essence, then what is its modality? Such an existence cannot be placed in 
the rank of necessary being which has no causal connections with anything. The very 
meaning of emanation implies that it is a form of existence which has supposedly pro-
ceeded from Being standing as the source of its emanationJ.?31 With regard to the 
existence of an emanative entity, e. g., the self, Sadra suggests that such an existence 
must enjoy the modality of possibility. More specifically, he considers the self as a 
possible being. 
A crucial point, however, arises from this conclusion: what is the meaning of 
possibility in reference to the CJuestion of the existence of the self as an emanative 
entity? Regarding the meaning of possibility Sadra distinguishes between several kinds 
of possibility among of \vhich only one is applicable here. It is what is called in Islamic 
philosophy al imka/l al khass meaning that the bearer of sLlch possibility may 
existentially either be or not be. This is what Sadra calls the "existential or ontetic 
possibility" (al imkall a/lt'l~jlfdi) in contrast to the « essential or eidetic possibility" (al 
imkan a/ mahowi)('?·/). The Sadraean thesis on the existential possibility somehow 
sounds Heideggerian-Sartrian. \Ve know how much Heidegger and Sartre lay 
emphasis on the same aspect of the reality of human being. Both of them try to 
discover our existential possibility in language of "facticity". Sal1re who may be 
clearer than Heidegger in this respect, defines it for us in a closely Sadraean tone: 
I 
"On one hand, while it is necessary that I exist in the fOnll of being-
there, still it is altogether contingent that I exist in the first place, for I 
am not the foundation of m)' being~ on the other hand, while it is 
necessarv that I be engaged in this or that point of vic\\', it is 
contingc;lt that it should be precisely in one to the ~xclusion of ?thers. 
\Ve have called this twofold contingency embracmg a necessity the 
., f I c: . If "e 5) factlelt\' 0 t lC lor-Itse. -' 
Let us here have a closer look to the Sadraean thesis of "existential or ontetic 
possibility" , 
An essence, as opposed to an existence, can quite conceivably be said to be a 
ObI bOb se I't 'IS existentially neutral (qlfiddilas lalllllm). That is, it can PoSS) e emg, ecau· . 
, ' I 'II ' tOon of Being and it ceases to exist 
come into the lioht of eXistence by t le I Uillma I , 
::;, 
when Being withdraws itself from illuminating, To characterise an essence by 
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possibility is just another way of reflecting upon its state of neutrality between coming 
into the world of reality and ceasing to exist in this world. Thus, Sadra concludes, the 
very meaning of essence is existentially neutralJ26) But how can it be true of an 
emanation which is a form of existence to say that it is "existentially neutral"? Can a 
degree of existence in the form of emanation be existentially neutral? If the subject 
under consideration is emanation, which is taken to mean that a pure light of existence 
has issued forth from Being, then how is it understandable if one modify it by the 
predicative phrase "existentially neutral"? 
There is one significant point in this ontology which might shed some light on 
the matter under discussion, and that is the distinction made by Sadra between what is 
existentially neutral and what is not: An essence can be subject to the disjunction 
"either it is or it is not," therefore it is e:-.:istentially neutral in terms of "liability" to this 
disjunction. But e:-.:istence, on the other hand, is not liable to this disjunction, nor for 
that matter, to non-e:-.:istence, i. e.," . it is not." On this account, Sadra has 
characterised 'essences' by c:-.:istential neutrality. 
Assuming that the meaning of possibility is the state of equilibrium between 
existence and non-existence, which is the meaning of the above disjunction, and, 
furthermore, assuming that the meaning of emanation is substituted for "X" in the 
following argument, "X is a form of existence; but is X existentially neutral?'" 
becomes a self-defeating question in Sadra's eyes, in the same way as "X is a' 
rectangle, but is X neutral in having four sides?" is a self-defeating question. Thus, 
although the modality of possibility is, according to Sadra, the only conceivable, 
modality for emanative eXistence, the implication of its being existentially neutral is 
not meaninoful as a characterisation of this SOl1 of existence. 
:=> 
Here Sadra argues that the modality of possibility, in its primitive sense, IS 
irreconcilable \vith the existential part of any form of possible being, whether it is an 
emanative or non-emanative being, that is, whether we do, or do not, have an 
emanation. If so, he tells us, we cannot rely on this modal argument in making our 
decision about the species of the modality of the existential component of any kind of 
beino or of the existence of the universe at large, The only benefit that we do derive 
0' 
from this argument is that we know that we cannot leave the existential feature of the 
universe undecided and indeterminate from the standpoint of its modal constitution. If 
we do so that is if we leave the existential state of the universe undecided, it will be , , 
I . d"" t'on" and in a way., ultimately an an infrinoement of the law of "exc lISIVe ISJunc 1 , o 
',,', 
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infringement of the law of the "excluded middle." The original question concerning 
the existential status of an emanation widens when asked of the existential structure of 
the universe in toto. That is, this question can no longer be regarded as a restricted 
issue concerning the emanative status of the self. Rather, it is a most fundamental 
point concerned with the major problem of the ontology of the world of reality as a 
whole. 
It is under these circumstances that Sadra distinguishes between two species of 
possibility. One sense of possibility is that which characterises the essential feature of 
a being as distinct from its existence. This possibility, of course, belongs to the order 
of essence, and is taken to mean that an essence is existentially neutral. The other 
possibility is that which qualifies the very constitution of the existence of any form of 
being issued f0l1h fr0111 another. This meaning of possibility is not existentially neutral, 
rather· it stands for a positive relation between a higher rank of existen'ce and a lower 
one. The:first possibility is called "essential or eidetic," and the second "existential or 
ontetic, " according to the subject under consideration. 
As we have already hinted above, Sadra understands by "existential possibility," 
as distinct from "essential possibility," the sense of '·dependence" of one existence 
"upon" anotherJ.?7) The meaning of "essential possibility," on the other hand, is the 
state of "equilibrium" with respect to existence a'nd non-existence. Thus the logical 
truth of a "possible being" is to be defined as that which may either be or not be. This 
is the meaning of the existential neutrality of a conceivable essenceJ28) Existential 
possibility means, as we already saw, absolute hanging on and total dependence on the 
other. Sadra, the originator of the Illuminative "existential possibility", finally Clarifies 
the meaning of this possibility for us: 
"On the matter of the possibility ofa pure essence from the concept of 
whic.h all the implication of existence is withdra\\11, it consists of the 
negation 'of the necessity of being; together with the negation of the 
necessity of not being, with reference to the conceivability of the 
essence in itself. But, conceming the possibility of the very reality of 
existences, it is to be taken to mean that the reality of these existences 
/. is absolutel\' related to, and dependent upon, another reality, such that 
they are cO;lceivable only in temlS of pure relation to the substantive 
reality of the other. Thus, the reality of possible existences is merely 
prepositional and is understandable only in the li~ht of the radiation of 
another existence. They are, moreover, deVOid of any sense of 
independence both in concepti~n and il~ factual ~ruth .. That is not th~ 
case when a universal essence IS taken mto conSideration. Although It 
is tmc that essences do not stand for anything before becoming 
involved in some degree of existence, they are nevertheless entItIes 
conceivable in themselves in the sense that one can think of them 
independently insofar as one can present them in one's mind .... This 
means that, despite the reality of existences, the conceivability of 
essences is not to be dependent on another being as prepositional 
functions of that being. It is this conceptual sense of independence that 
enables us to direct our mind to essences and make our judgement 
about them as to how they an.: identical in themselves and how they are 
different from one another. "(291 
72 
By now enough has been said to show the general elements of the Sadraean 
theory of Being and his analysis of the connection of the emanative existents to Being. 
Now, among the most important consequences concluded by Sadra from the above 
analysis, an issue can be considered here as crucial for the presentation of his theory 
of self: The ontological relation of the self as an emanative being to Being through the 
existential modality of possibility; and realising how this meaning of possibility 
provides the self with a special presence to ident ify its reality through being absorbed 
in Being. These issues will be discussed in the next chapter which ·concerns with the 
ontetic structure of the self. 
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Chapter Four 
The Ontetic Structure Of The Self 
In the previous chapter the general elements of the Sadraean theory of being 
were presented so far as the issue in question is concerned here. In this chapter, we 
will proceed to see how the Sadraean Illuminative existentialism interprets the ontetic 
structure of the self on the basis of its theolY of being. In this study we have three 
interrelated aims: (i) we will tirst see Sadraean approach to the reality of the self, that 
is, to its being; (ii) we will also see the relation of the self with other beings in the 
existential context; (iii) we will see that there is no self in subjectivistic sense in the 
order of being; what is there is only a unitary conscioLlsness. In the end of this chapter 
we will consider two old but disputable problems concerning the nature of the self (its 
simplicity and its substantiality) in the light of the JIIuminative approach. Then this 
chapter studies the ontology of the self as one may call it in modern terminology. The 
epistemological implications of this theory will be discussed later. 
4. 1. Primary Considerations: 
Sadra discussed the elements of his theory of the self widely in four of the nine 
volumes (I, II, III, IIX) of his huge and hardly understandable book Asjar in a 
sophisticated complex of logical, ontological, epistemological and mystical idioms, 
metaphors and ideas. Also he has discussed the nature of the self in his later works 
like Maja/yh and 'Arsh;yyah plus several dissertations he has independently written. 
Then, as expressed by his commentators like Kompani,r1J it seems too difficult to 
catch the depth of his theory; perhaps because he sometimes goes beyond our 
conceptual, eidetic thought and requires us to sympathise with him in his 
apprehending the truth. I n this chapter we are not concerned with all aspects of his 
theory of the self, nor to detect all the elements of the Sadraean perspective. All what 
/. 
we want to do here, is to depict his description of the reality of the self. 
For Sadra, the reality of self is hidden in its special mode of beingJ.?) As he says, 
and presupposes, man is the only full-handscript of God (A I-NlIskha{ al-Kamelat al-
I1ahiyyah) among beings, a 11llcrOCosm in macrocosm, to this latter the former 
corresponding(';} by way of wisdom -- that is, the performative self s mystical 
experience of Being. In a Heideggerian manner, Sadra also maintains that it is only 
man that has this special being among the others, but unlike Heidegger who locates 
this speciality in the temporality of Dasein's nature, Sadra underlines God's devotion 
of man to Himself; this is, Sadra believes, what makes man's existence specia1J4) 
However in agreement with Heidegger, Sadra holds that the nature of the self can not 
be grasped by analytically eidetic reflection. The reason is clear from his perspective: 
the nature of the self is his special being, and being can not be caught by essential 
thought simply because being is not a category to be essentialised and conceptualised 
then understood by the eidetic reflection. To apprehend his nature, we need to leave 
the eidetic thought and to sympathetically come up in the light of Being; if so, we 
would then experie/lce the being of the self. Otherwise, the nature of the self always 
remains mysterious and, as easily seen in HusserJ's phenomenology, far beyond our 
reflective understanding. This is why Sadra in his description of the nature of being, 
starts from the structure of Being itself, not, as Heidegger does, from the analysis of 
the being of the self. Instead to see the being of man in the horizon of temporality, 
Sadra considers it in the context of Being itself. His theory, therefore, emerges in the 
general frame of his theory of being some relevant elements of which were considered 
in last chapter. As we have seen, he considered that Being manifests itself in the form 
of beings in such a hierarchic (Tashkiki) manner that they are continually ever-
lastingly hanging on it so that if it deprives them of its light they will nihiliate. 
Applying this theory to the nature of the self, this manifestation implies a double 
nature for it in particular: The self is hanging on (i.e., being emanated in the 
Illuminative terminology) and present to (i.e., being absorbed in) Being at the same 
time. It is this double nature of the self that makes him special and outstanding among 
beinas· that is while all beinos are manifested and emanated entities from Being, it is 
,::", ,::, 
only the self that is absorbed. in Being at the same time. The reason is that the 
absorption is, according to him, an experientially and sympathetically conscious 
presence before Being. It is his factual practice in everydayness (in Heidegger's term), 
and unbounded unreflective consciousness (in Sartrian terms). This kind of presence, 
I ' 
that is, this kind of existential, non-reflective, unitaty consciousness is what makes the 
self distinct from the other beings. It is this consciousness that is the basis of our 
actual life and the source of our concrete, social, moral aspects, as well as of our 
intentional, reflective thought. Such a consciousness is already approved by the 
Illuminative mystics when they spoke of their higher mystical experiences; however, it 
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has not been theorised in a philosophical manner; nor has it been justified for our 
ordinary life while we are not mystics. It is through this illuminative theory elaborated 
above that such a mystical idea comes in the form of a philosophical theory so that it 
is applicable to our experientially ordinary life. This formulation of the unitary 
consciousness covers all aspects of the seWs life simply because this consciousness is 
its special mode of being. We will see this point later in this chapter. Here, instead, we 
would first explain the Sadraean thesis on the reality of the self. 
4. 2. Tile Reality Of" The Se(l' 
The reality of the self is, according to Sadra, prepositional. In order to 
understand this thesis, \ve would first specially remind ourselves here of the above 
discussions on the prepositional nature of emanation (see above, 3. 2) and the 
existential possibility (see above, 3. 4). Keeping them in mind, we now try to explain 
our SadrC1ean approach to the being of the self. 
Through the argument from "complete disjunction" Sadra reached the point 
where to say that the only modality applicable to the existential truth of an emanative 
reality, like the self, is "existential possibility." Here Sadra comes to argue that the 
self, by the very nature of its existence, is a continually "absorbed" reality. For, as 
already seen, in the case of an emanative entity like the self, to exist means for Sadra 
to be manifested by/from Being, and the maintenance of a situation of hanging on and 
dependence on Being. That is to say, it can never be detached from Being and stand 
by itself as an independent entity in the world of reality. 
In this Sadraean perspective, it is not, therefore, true to say that the self could 
have issued forth from Being and could continue to exist while no longer having 
existential dependence on it. This false interpretation of possibility, Sadra argues, 
would mean that a possible existence was possible when and only when it had not yet 
come into existence through Being. But as soon as that same possible existence was 
to come into the world of reality, it would change its basic status from that of 
essential and existential possibilities to that of essential and existential necessities. 
That is, it would no longer remain as a possible being, but would, in the continuation 
of its existence, become a necessary being.r:iJ This idea of possibility, Sadra argues, is 
not valid, because if a being becomes, even for the briefest moment of the continuity 
of its existence, unneedful of. and independent from, its principle, it means that it is at 
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that very moment a self-sufficient being with, at that moment, no basis for being. 
Whatever a self-sufficient being might be, it ought by definition to mean a necessary 
self-grounded existence. This existence then, even though it is at that very moment 
continuing in existence, is no longer an emanation and has become a necessary being 
which does not rely for its existence upon Being. This is a transmodification from 
possibility to necessity. 
Concerning this problem, Sadra turns to the above-discussed kind of the 
emanative being asking: Why is a certain being, say the self, possible and another 
being, say God, necessary? The answer, on the basis of his analysis, is that the very 
nature of the fonner is to be hanging, dependent on and held by Being, while that of 
the latter is to be absolutely groundless and independentJ6J As we have already seen, 
when one is speaking of emanation he is not dealing with a being constituted by the 
essence-existence relationship, but rather with that very simple indivisible entity the 
whole nature of which is to be known as an issuance forth from Being. This is the 
meaning of the prepositional state of being which characterises the reality of the 
emanative being (see above, 3. 2). A simple thing which has no definable identity or 
reality except as a mere issuance from and a manifestation of Being is only possible in 
truth, and conceivable in the mind, if, Sadra says, it is preserved by the very Being. 
The question as to how sllch an entity can, from another point of view, as it 
were, be spoken of as distinguished by essence and horizontally diversified is, in 
Sadra's eyes, analogous to the question as to how a prepositional entity can be 
spoken of, and defined, as distinguished by its noun, pronoun, verb, adjective, etc. 
Then, Sadra tries to supply an answer to the fonner question in comparison with the 
latter question. rn this case, he says"that \vhen we speak of a preposition, say the word 
"from," describing it in terms of ' ... used to introduce the place, point, person, etc., 
that is the stal1ing point,' we are speaking of the preposition in a very important 
sense~ but at this pal1icular stage of language we are not using the expression "from" 
in its prepositional function. On the other hand, if we use it in its genuine 
prepositional sense in a sentence such as "the cat jumped down from the wall," it then 
f. 
quite definitely functions as a true working preposition. This time, although it is being 
. implicitly used and meant as accurately and meaningfully as it can be, it is not laid out 
as the direct object of our concern. It is, instead, in this case, that which binds 
together the whole structure of our sentence, that without which the meaning of our 
language would break down, and its independent conceptualisation has not been 
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spoken of at all. J n other words, Sadra supposes, a preposition has no independent 
sense (see above, 3. 2) while nouns and verbs have independent senses apart from 
their functions or even additional meanings or states they may undertake in a 
sentence. According to this account, while a preposition is used with its correct 
meaning in the sentence, it is far from being spoken of in that sentence. Once it has, 
by conceptualisation, been put in the form of an independent entity to be spoken of as 
the subject of discussion, it completely loses its initial meaning of preposition and 
finds a ditTerent meaning. 
Speaking of a preposition however is a reflective language and is indicative 
enough, in Sadra's eyes, for the depiction and presentation of its definition and all the 
essentialities of its grammatical evaluation as far as its theoretical meaning is 
concerned. This analogy, though primarily linguistic, would seem logically profitable, 
for Sadra, as a pronouncement of the linguistic problem of the prepositional nature of 
emanation, its similarity to prepositional entities in language, and the difficulty and the 
solution that both have in commonJ";") 
On the basis of the above discussion, it can be easily seen why Sadra describes 
the reality of the self as prepositional: the self is an emanative being and the reality of 
every emanative being is prepositional in the sense that it is eternally dependent and 
hanging on Being, simply because the emanative being is by nature an existential 
possibility meaning for Sadra (like Sartre) 'absolute need'. Such does Sadra 
understand the reality of the self. With such a perspective of the reality of the self, 
Sadra turns to the second issue we mentioned above (see above, the latest paragraph 
of sec. 3. 3) to situate the self asa being-present-to-Being. Sadra speaks of this 
present-to-Being in terms of absorptton and immersion. This will concern us in the 
following section. 
4. 3. The Se(lA.\' Presence In/To Being: 
Sadra built up the reality of the self as a prepositional being that thanks to its 
emanative nature has an eternal dependency on Being. This, Sadra holds, allows us to 
consider the self as a factual presence immersed and absorbed into Being itself rather 
than to consider it as a merely transcendental subject who stands beyond of our 
, 'H I' theory Rather Sadra moves in a conscIOusness -- as one may see III usser Ian ' , 
, 'I 'I' h H 'd and the existential philosophers move later. Dasein is simi ar way In w llC el egger ' 
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introduced and defined by them as "heil1}!.-ill-lhe-world". Dasein cannot be 
distinguished from its existence in the world. Therefore, it makes no sense to suppose 
that we know ourselves better than we know the world (Being for Sadra), and it 
makes no sense to say that we know aboLlt ourselves in a different way than we know 
about the world. We know ourselves and the world identically, for ourselves (as 
Dasein) and the world constitutes a single phenomenon: 
"The compound expression' Being-in-the-world' indicates in the very 
way wc have coined it, that it stands for a unitary phcl1omenon."(SJ 
Just as the existential philosophers consider the self as Dasein that is as a being-
in-the-world who has an ontetic-ontological structure in the horizon of temporality, 
Sadra also considers the self as a being absorbed in-the-Being itself, that is as a being-
presence-before-Beingwho has an ontetic structure; and this implies the self to be in 
the world as a factual; live, vital and performative reality rather than as an abstract, 
transcendental (in Kantian, Husserlian sense) or epistemological presupposition as we 
may see in the modern subjectivistic philosophy. For Sadra, as for the existential 
phenomenologists, the self is already a being whose 'facticity' is a pure need to supply 
his perfection; and this implies the self to be already involved in the order of being 
before falling in the order of concept. The self is absorbed and immersed in Being 
through which the self journeys to discover its mysterious land. To be so is, for Sadra 
as for Heidegger, to be present: present before Being (in-the- world for Heidegger) 
which implies its present for itself. To this implication Sadra applies a special name: 
the unitary consciousness which will concerns LIS from the next section onward. 
Instead we would now tllrn here to Sadraean ·notion of absorption, i. e., the presence 
before (or in) Being to depict its meaning a bit more in connection with the emanative 
aspect of the reality of the self. 
Through his detailed disCLIssions on existential possibility and the analogy 
between the prepositional sense and the, reality of the emanative being, Sadra arrives 
at a position of understanding how to situate the self as present before Being. As 
already hinted, he uses the words "absorption" and "immersion" to indicate this 
peculiar situation of the self. \Vhen the whole reality of the self as an emanative being 
is nothing but an existential possibility in the sense of prepositional dependency, the 
state of "absorption" or "immersion" in Being does not seem odd, or, to use a 
stronger word, inconceivable for Sadra. The prepositional dependency which indicates 
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"hanging on," and being "held by," Being, according to Sadra, implies the self to be 
absorbed and immersed in Being. Such an absorption is, for Sadra, a fulfilment to be 
achieved by the self through its ontetic experiences. It is, Sadra holds, the whole 
existential feature of the self as a pure, emanative existence to be "immersed in" 
Being. It is its very existence, that is not even possible to think of except in the light 
of thinking of Being that is the substantive ground for the seWs being. 
From a subjectivistic point of view we may of course always think of our 
selfhood independent of thinking of any principle; and it clearly denies the validity of 
such an Sadraean analysis of the selfhood as a pure, emanative existence absorbed in 
Being. This is so, a subjectivist may say, because if it were the case that the self, 
because of being totally dependent on anotr;-er, could not even be independently 
understood and thought ot: it would be impossible for us to e\er have had the 
impression of our sel1l1ood on its OWI1. But the fact that we do have the idea of our 
selfhood on its oiNn counts as suflicient reason for believing that the self i~ not totally 
dependent on another in this extreme sense of absorption. 
Sadra answers such a point of view on the basis of his thesis of ontetic 
reduction: this so-called impression of the selfllOod is the introspective self which 
comes into the mind through the conceptualisation and introspection of the factual 
. ..
performative truth of the self. The emanative reality of the self rather is the 
performative one which talks, feels, thinks, wishes, judges, decides, and has sensation, 
imagination, and intellection, and is acquaint~9 .. with all these-. acts and powers of its 
apprehension. The perfonnative self is that which always acts and perceives and is 
never acted upon, or perceived, by itself or by another, except through 
conceptu~lisation. Everyone can, by way of introspection, concept~alise the factual 
reality of his own seltllOod as well as those of others. Despite this understanding, it 
should not be maintained that our impression of the self is the very reality of the self 
or even a real and truthful representation of it. 
The analogy already drawn between the reality of the self as an emanative 
existence and the objective reference of prepositional phrases, may be helpful here 
t • 
and make this point somewhat clearer: If we make a pedagogical statement by saylllg, 
for example, '''by another' is a prepositional phrase," the phrase "by another", as the 
subject matter of this particular statement, is not really being used with its proper 
prepositional nature. This is not a substitution instance of a preposition at all; and, for 
that matter, it cannot be a true representation of the objective reality of "by another." 
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Rather, it is a merely reflective conceptualisation of that reality which we speak of in 
the factual circumstances of our ordinary language. But if I say, in a normal instance 
, 
that "I am sitting by the window," or "the self is dependent on Being, " 1 have truly 
used these prepositions with their own objective meanings. This is because their 
reality is illustrated by given examples instead of by generalisation and 
conceptualisation. 
If an emanative being, such as the self, is expressible only in terms of a 
prepositional phrase, e. g., "by" or "on" and so on, its reality, too, like any other 
preposition, Sadra argues, it will not be understandable unless it is absorbed into the 
meaning of Being. As we have just seen, an introspection and representation of a 
prepositional phrase are a complete distortion and, in a way, a falsification of the 
objective truth of such a linguistic entity. Likewise, Sadra maintains, an introspection 
of the self is an illusory representation of its existential reality, and cannot be taken as 
its true representation. I n Illuminative language, the word "illusory" is frequently used 
to signifY this, that is, to conceptualise and interpret the unitary truth of a reality 
which can never truly and exactly be represented. 
Though it will later be discussed in detail, it is however wOl1h noting here that 
the Illuminative philosophy denies that the self can ever know itselt: and still less be 
known by others, through representation. Thus the independent impression that we 
may have from the seltllOod of ourselves can never characterise the truth value of the 
reality of the self as ·it exists in another. This reality, as we will see, can only be 
apprehended through the unitary consciousness (see next chapter). 
Now we may draw Sadraean thesis on the second issue we mentioned above 
(see last parag. of sec. 3. 4) as to how the Sadraean interpretation of possibility 
provides the self with a special presence to identify its reality through being absorbed 
in Being: Since the reality of the self is nothing but a prepositional being, that is , an 
existential possibility which is a 'pure need', the self then is hanging on Being which is 
eternal necessity and absolute perfection. That is to say, the self, the reality of which is 
mc;>re or less analogous to the sense of a connective or preposition, cannot be thought 
of accurately as distinguished from Being which is the principle of its being. Such as it 
is, this existential reality of pure dependence upon Being gives rise to the notion of a 
kind of existent ial "absorption." This means that the reality of the self as an emanative 
entity is to be known as something "over-absorbed" in Being. As Sadra analysed, this 
Illuminative sense of absorption is, therefore, directly derived from the existential 
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meaning of the prepositional truth of emanation, namely, "dependence on", "issuing 
from.," "held by," and so on. However, Sadra maintains that the self stands out __ in a 
Heideggerian term -- among beings due to its presence before/in Being; that is, the 
self absorbed in Being can experience its emanative being so that through its 
everydayness it can catch its reality in an absolutely mystically ontetic apprehension 
called "the unitary consciousness" (9) 
Therefore, absorption in being, which is presence inlbefore Being, as ultimately 
understood by Sadra, is a living, perfonnative, non-reflective and ontetic experience 
which in its high form shapes the mystical apprehensions and in its ordinary form 
shapes our commonsensical experiences and inspirations throughout our everydayness 
life. This current experience of Being, or as we called it "the unitary consciousness', 
that the self possesses by its absorption in Being (or, to borrow Heidegger's phrase, 
by its being-in-the-world), builds up the factual reality of the self as a being-toward-
perfection ( a/ )li/~jlld a//{f/ib Ii al k{flJlol): 
"Through going ahead to\\"ard perfection, the self become unitary, then 
this unitary is practical (factual) and is consciollsness." (101 
Sadraean 'self then like Heideggerian 'Dasein' and SaI1rian 'for-itself is 
continually in the process of realising its existential potentialities. It is for Sadra the 
authentic root of all that we have, do and know,(J II and since Sadra maintains that 
absorption is experience of the very emanative being the self is, then it can easily be 
seen that this experience, i.e., the unitary consciousness is identified with the being of 
the self Not only this, since the emanative reality of the self can only be grasped in 
this unitary consciollsness, then the unitary consciousness, it can be concluded, is the 
being of the self In this relation Sadra clearly writes that this consciousness: 
"is neither a negation nor ~l rclation; rather it is existence; however, not 
any sort of existence. It is an actual special being which is pure [i.e., 
non-eidetic J."{1~) 
He ultimately says that we can not logically define this consciousness, just as 
we can not define our special 'being'. \Ve only grasp it in our living experience of 
. Being,(lJ) because as we will see (Ch. 5), there is no representation of this 
consciousnessJ/./) However, it does not deprive us to reflectively assign an essence to 
it and think of it. This reflective thinking of it, however, can not show its reality to us, 
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because, as we will see later (CI 7) hi' k' 1. , SlIC a t lin Ing itself is grounded by that 
existential consciousnessJI5J 
4. 4. The Unitary Consciollsness : 
In last paragraph of the previous section we referred to the unitary 
consciousness with which we \vould be concerned from now on speaking of the self 
as this existential consciollsness. This is because, as we mentioned in that paragraph, 
any seeming separation of the unitary consciousness from the self is simply rejected: 
the Illuminative school does not believe that in the order of being there is an 
interruption between the self and the unitary consciousnessJI6J In this respect Sadra 
writes: 
"Evcr~' body \\'ho is conscIOus of himself Ilt.:("cssaril\' is that 
consciousness of himself and this consciousness is currently 
continually the sclffor cvcr."(n 
And after trying to demonstrate this thesis, he concludes that the reality of the 
self is "its existence, and its consciousness of its individual (Shakhsi) existence is 
realised only by presence of this existence."(IS) 
The self and the unitary consciousness are separating from each other only 
metaphorically, as when we introduce the notion of the self 'behind' such a 
consciousnessJ19) The unitary conscioLlsness which is a factual experience of and an 
ontetic presence before Being constitutes the being of the self; in other words, it is the 
self simply because it is, indeed, the experience of no-self (self in its subjectivistic 
sense) or, to use a mystical term, of"emptiness"((allo).(':OJ 
In such a discussion Sadra may again be regarded as a forerunner of existential 
phenomenologists in rejection of the subjectivistic notion of consciousness and the 
transcendental self(':1J Just as in Heidegger and Sartre,r.:':J we already found in Sadra 
that both notions of 'consciousness' and 'self fell with the denial of the 
transcendental subject, or as we fOLlnd in Kant, Hegel, and Husserl (all after 
I 
Descartes), the affirmation of the Cogi/o was at the same time an affirmation of both 
the existence of consciousness and the self A comparison between Sadra and Sartre 
here may make the case clearer. (lSJ Sartre, in particular, takes the existence of 
consciousness as his beginning. His denial of the transcendental self is not a denial of 
consciousness or existential self which as Sadra he seems to identify as 'for-itself. 
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This consciousness seems to be for Sartre as for Sadra existential and an openly 
performative practical experience. For both of them, the acts of consciousness provide 
us with a describable starting point; there are no acts of an 'underlying' or 
transcendental self. Consciousness is analysed not as a knowing consciousness or as a 
primarily reflecting consciousness, but rather as an active, 'living' consciousness. 
While Sadraean thesis rejects DescaJ1es', Kant's, and Husserl's theory which takes 
thinking and knowing as the essential conscious acts, it somehow agrees with the 
Sartrian position that consciousness is first of all a perceiving, feeling, mobile 
conSCIOusness. Consciousness is first of all a practical, a 'non-reflective' 
consciousness. As already indicated, the unitary consciousness is, according to Sadra 
'ontetic', meaning that it is existentially primordially a factual lived experience. In a 
more or less same manner, we may see a similar tone in Heidegger and Sartre. For 
Heidegger and SaJ1re practical or 'ontic' acts are more 'primitive' or 'original' than 
acts of 'ontological' cognition. In Sadra, this insistence on precognitive intensional 
performative experience, i.e., the unitary consciousness is carried through consistently 
and persuasively; in his analysis, the traditional dualisms between mind and body, 
subject and object are discarded in favour of the notion of being-present-inlbefore-
Being -- a notion which sounds like the Heideggerian conception of "being-in-the-
world". 
In the light of the above remark, it may easily be seen that the "intentionality" 
which is the crucially central keystone in Husserlian eidetic consciousness finds no 
room in Sadraean ontetic unitary consciousness simply because the latter belongs to 
the order of being in which the unitary consciousness, the experience of Being, 
genetically existentially acts, not intentionally that bears a subjectivistic tone. True, 
intentionality belongs to the eidetic field (with Husserl); it is the essence of reflection. 
In the ontetic field, 'intentionality', if has any meaning for Sadra at all, should be, in 
agreement with Salire, stripped of its Husserlian heavily cognitive connotations and 
becomes equivalent to the concept of 'mobility'. The self, according to Sadra, is 
c9nscious, not of his being, but through his being. This is why he says that the unitary 
consciousness is an existential building up of the being of the self; a currently 
continual process of going ahead toward perfection (sayrllra{ ila al kama!). The 
. . . "I thO k" or "I paradigm of an intentional act, then, 111 agreement With Salire, IS not 111 
know," but "I can." 
8~ 
However, like Sartre who believes that the existential consciousness is 
dependent by its nature,l-:-!I Sadra also goes on, as already seen, to say that 
consciousness is absolutely nothin u apart from its source i e B' d' I 
.;:, , . ., emg, an It a ways 
remains dependent, 'unfulfilled', and 'incomplete' (in Sartre's word: "decompression 
of Being"). This leads Sadra to maintain, with Heidegger and Sartre (and perhaps 
Post-Heideggerians like Rorty, Den'ida and FoucauIt)/'5) that the existential 
consciousness can have no 'contents'(}(i) and can have no independent existence, no 
existence apart from Being. It would further follow that there can be no intelligible 
thesis of idealism, which relies on its dependency. With this analysis, the traditional 
notion of subject (in Cartesian-Husserlian sense) is altered radically. There is no 
subject or self 'in' or 'behind' consciousness; the self, as already hinted, is simply the 
unitary consciousness itself: Self is not relative to experience as we may see in 
subjectivistic approaches; rather it is this eXI)erience. Consciousness beino an 
, .;:, 
existential experience, is no longer the subject in Kant's meaning of the term, it is 
subjectivity itself or in Sartre's words, the immanence of self in self 
There is further room here to compare Sadra with Sartre. As often mentioned, 
the unitary conscioLlsness should be regarded as an existential experience. We would 
underline the word 'experience' here. The word 'experience' here indicates, for 
Sadra, a creative relation to Being which puts the self in absorption. Therefore, it does 
not mean, in a superficial positivistic sense, the scientific experience. Rather, it is a 
purely existential experience for Sadra. Such an experience, according to Sadra, is the 
hermeneutic' content of mysticism (·i1/all). However, since it is the being of the self, 
we, even being non-mystics, also live with a special degree of such an experience. It is 
root of ail aspects of our acts. Now if we take the word 'perception' in its existential 
sense as seemingly used so by Sartre and the existential phenomenologists like 
Merleau-Ponty who maintain that phenomenology is initially an investigation of 
perception, we may, then, tind more similarity here. In a similar manner, Sadraean 
'experience' and Sar1rian 'perception' need not be analysed as a primarily cognitive 
nption (as we find in Husserl). Such an existential experie~ce and perception may be 
viewed more broadly as the general relations of consciousness and Being or as the 
original relation of consciOLlsness to being. Accordingly both Sartre and Sadra take 
such an existential perception and experience as the nature of consciousness. For both 
Sadra and Sartre such an experience and perception are to be analysed as 'primitive'. 
In this case, both also begin with the doctrine that the existence of consciousness itself 
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is known simply by virtue of its existence. What Sartre and Sadra concur in on this 
latter doctrine is that self-knowledge (in its subjectivistic sense) is not the defining 
characteristic of the existential consciousness, for it ignores the 'non-reflective 
consciousness' or 'preconscious intentionality'. It may be said from this perspective 
that Cartesian Cogito is true and necessary only on a reflective, articulate 'level' of 
that existential experience or perception. The definition of "consciousness" thus 
focuses on this -- that is, its always being existentially an experience inside Being. 
According to these authors, consciousness, it seems, is this existentially factual 
experience; it is not an object itself or an object for itself Sadra determined this by 
insisting that the truth of this experience can never be accessible for reflective 
thought; then it is , to use a mystical term, "empty' for reflective thought. Sartre also 
points out that this consciousness is 'nothing'. 
As we have already seen (above. 2. », the Sadraean thesis of ontetic reduction 
provides him with another idiom which we can call "ontetic touch", and by which he 
was able to say that the emanative self in his process of experiencing Being is at home 
with the reality of beings and can then catch their existential truths. One can say, on 
this perspective, that Sadra may have maintained that the existential experience of the 
unitary consciousness has a twofold task: to be the experience of its very being as well 
as of beings at the same time. Though the unitary consciousness is by its emanative 
nature as a self, in Sadra's term. being-for-the other(i.e., for Being which is in-itself), 
that is, it has no independent being apart from its prepositional, hangingful being, 
however, the unitary consciollsness is "being-far-itself' (wlIjud Ii naf\·eh){27) in the 
sense..that it is presen.ce-inJ~efore-B"eing and experiences both its ?eing and the other 
. ~ .. . 
being with: which it is in' an ontetic touch. If so, we may see a similarity in Sartre: 
Though the twofold task of Sadraean unitary consciousness may seem different in 
nature from Sartrian .task of consciousness, some similarities may, however. come in 
force here. Sartre arrives at a distinction between two very different kinds of Being: 
the being of objects for consciousness (beings-in-themselves) and the being of 
cqnsciousness (being-for-itself). Consciousness is dependent , for Sartre, on its 
objects just as for Sadra on Being for its own existence. To avoid any postulation of 
. consciousness as an object of some sOl1 distinct from its objects, Sartre introduces a 
. . u· (of) "This 
convention of parenthesising the (of) 111 the expression consciousness . 
locution is similar to Sadra's characterisation of "being present inlbefore Being" (or in 
Heideggerian term "being-in-the-world") In both cases, the point of the linguistic 
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innovation is to prevent us from separating different components of the expression, 
specifically, from attempting to logically distinguish consciousness (or the emanative 
self) from its objects (Being). "Consciousness (of) objects" is thus to be taken as a 
primitive for Sartre just as presence before Being, the unitary consciousness is a 
primitive for Sadra. Both expressions carry enormous philosophical thrust, for they 
are basic rejections of Husserl's basic distinctions between Cogilo and cogitatio, 
noetic act and noema, subject and object. On the basis of this characterisation of 
consciousness as an existential experience or perception, in a more or less similar way, 
these author~ recharacterise the sense in which this existential consciousness which is 
being-for-itself, is self-knowing (in Sadra' swords l71a'refat al-Ilafs). The existential 
consciousness is essentially aware of itself as well as the other beings with which it is, 
according to Sadra, in an ontetic touch.'-'s, According to both Sadra and Sartre, this is 
even a necessary' ontological' (ontetic) feature of consciousness. It is not, then, to be 
confused with the reflectivity of the Cartesian COKito. There is no self (in 
subjectivistic sense) in this existential consciousness, and all of this is still non-
reflective. The ('ogito is based on reflective thought-experiment (see eh. 7). 
Consciousness can then be characterised as "being-for-itself' (in Sadra: wujud Ii 
najseh) because its existence consists in its dependency on objects (Being for Sadra), 
its non-reflective knowledge of its own dependency on objects, and the possibility of 
explicit recognition of itself in the Cm1esian Cogito. 
Much of the characterisation of being-for-itself (w/~jlld Ii lIafsch), however, 
must be made in contrast to Bein~-in-itself (lI'l{jud }1 dhatch). The key to the 
distinction between the t\\'o kinds of being is, says Sadra in a Sartrian tone, the 
centrally impol1ant recognition that Being-for-itself can never be dependent on any 
thing except itself; that is to say, its being comes from within itself not from without; 
in Heideggerian words it is groundless; rather it is the ground of beings (see above, 
sec. 3. 2, 3. 3). Whereas the being-for the other, the emanative self as the unitary 
consciousness, is absolutely dependent on Being (objects for Sartre). 
I Though the above comparison shows the similarities between Sartre and Sadra, 
it must not however be taken that the aim and nature of their discussion are simply 
. d I WI·I S (Ira I·ntends to catch a theory to cover all implicit, tacit one an t 1e same. 11 e a 
knowledge (111{f 'refa/7) from a commonsensical everydayness to the higher mystical 
. I . t ·t·on to a huae invisible kernel, Sartre avoids 
apprehension, from the naIve sensua til 1II I ::> 
·In ·lnv·ls·lble field and mystical apprehension. Moreover, while Sadra any involvement 
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following the Illuminative mystics In suggesting the unitary consciousness as an 
existentially current experien I °d bO ° 0 0 0 0 • • • ce, 1e avOl s any su ~ectlvlstlc Idiom In this particular 
case (when for example he speaks of the experience of non-self (fana al-dhal) 
considering it as "emptiness" ('adam), Sartre who strains to follow Husserl in his 
analysis of consciousness, constantly falls back into traditional subject-object 
language~ this may easily be seen in his division of consciousness in two kinds one of 
which is the object for the other. Although he intends to support Heidegger in his 
rejection of Cartesianism, the dualism between consciousness and one's own body is 
never rejected, even though he insists that one's body is not simply "another object." 
In spite of his rejection of Husserl's transcendental eoo and his epoche Sartre seems ~ , 
not to succeed in getting rid himself of those Cartesian elements \vhich he most needs 
to reject according to his own methodology. 
In this context, it may be interesting to point out here that one can also find, 
with some reservations, a support relevant for the Sadraean notion of unitary 
consciousness in Wittgenstein' s philosophy. Of course, Sadra and Wittgenstein belong 
to two different traditions of philosophy. Our aim is not here to deny this fact. 
However, despite of the differences in intention, method and philosophical attitude, 
there seems to be a similarity on the nature of human consciousness. This similarity is 
hidden in their approaches (though completely different in method and aims) to 
consciousness as a "particular current experience". As yet, to some extent, we have 
seen this ideal in Sadra. Let us find briefly its relevant in \Vittgenstein. 
Wittgenstein has referred to a double consciousness(J9) that stands close to 
Sartrian theory of consciousness of which we have already spoken. The relevance that 
we wouid mention here between Sadra's and Wittgenstein's approaches to 
consciousness can be found (as in Sartre's) in the deeper level of this double 
consciousness which is fundamental. Early \Vittgenstein seems to consider this deeper 
level of consciousness as identified with life and life with reality. In this stage, 
consciousness means for him "my current experience,"(30) while holding that "all that 
° I" h' . of the I)resent moment "(if) Although he criticised himself for IS, rea IS t e experience . 
h" I'"' ° I (P) to this profound idea Wittgenstein turns later to deeper IS so IPSIStlC appl oac 1 ° - , 
d d" fl"d Ilich is somehow close to Sadra's Illuminative position. un erstan II1g 0 t liS I ea w 
". d' I f subiect-obiect (inner-outer) "which has dominated ReJectll1g the IC 10t0l11Y 0 J J 
philosophy since DescaI1es"(3olJ, he critically points out that 
"thc picture is somcthing like this: Though the ether is filled with 
vibrations the world is dark. But one day man opens his seeing eye, 
and there is light"(J-I1 
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Wittgenstein conceived 'consciousness' "as the ray of light which illuminates 
our private mental episodes. "(J51 Then, it is misleading to look for the essence of 
consciousness "through turning one's attention towards one's own attention. What is 
needed is an investigation of how the word' consciousness' and its changes are used. 
Such an investigation reveals that consciousness does not refer to a phenomenon 
occurring inside us. The alleged ontological split between the physical world and the 
world of consciousness is merely a categorical difference drawn in our language."(36) 
Perhaps it is right to say that \Vittgenstein, through his analysis of language and 
its relation to "thought" ends up in a practical interpretation of 'consciousness' which 
remains faithful to his early idea of "current experience":- I am not c1aming to have 
knowledge (in its reflective sense) when I say "I am· sitting in a chair," (37) because I 
am actually aware of this, at the time that I am sitting. There is only a current 
experience in which "the ego is not an object" .r381 Wittgenstein clarified this position 
more in his analysis of, e.g., seeing and painJ39) 
As we may see, the \Vittgensteinian approach to "consciousness" sounds 
somehow in Sadraean tone: This can be found in the emphasis on consciousness as 
"current experience," as "light," as well as practical, living "activity." Though it is the 
case, one point should, however, be noticed here. Wittgenstein achieved the above-
mentioned idea of consciousness through his analysis of language which is the anchor 
of-his philosophy; while Sadra, as we have seen, grasped that idea through the ontetic 
reduction in which the notion of Being is the anchor. 
One interesting similarity between Sadra and Wittgenstein is the application of 
this notion of consciollsness. As we know, one serious problem in philosophy is our 
relation with each other in the sense that if there is an "I", how does he contribute to 
the other "1." Phenomenology su(wested ~~ here the well-known plan of 
"intersubjectivity;" which because of its Leibnizian sophisticated tone of harmony 
b~tween monads, is given up in Heideggerian existentialism. We have seen above, 
. instead, that Sadraean philosophy is able to suggest a practical justification here for 
the above problem by setting forth the idea of the ontetic touch through which every 
conscious being (ol-McnI:jlld 01- 'Aqel) can grasp the reality of the othersJ40) In this 
stage, as we already hinted, there is only an ontetic presence, a unitary consciousness 
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which experiences being of the others. Wittgenstein justified our connection with each 
other through our common using and employing the language which is a "form of 
life". Both "forms of life" and "language" are emboded in acting, and since we are 
sharing with each other in these items we comprehend each other. 
As we see, the similarity between these two answers is hidden in their emphases 
on practical and applied (rather than a subjectivistic and idealistic) aspect. However, it 
must be noted that Sadra had not laid upon language as much as Wittgenstein had. 
Sadra had not Wittgenstein's narrow theory of language~ On contrary, Wittgenstein 
seems not to have Sadra's narrow notion of Being and the ontetic reduction. (41) 
For the time being, we would like not to go further here in comparing Sadra and 
Wittgenstein. All we wanted to mention was that there is a similarity (along with all 
other probable similarities and ditTerences) between them In considering 
"consciousness" as a current e:xperience, and even as light; and in their emphases on 
the practical, applied aspect of this consciousness.' We will see later some more 
similarity between the Illuminative philosophy and Wittgenstein.(see eh. 6) 
4. 5. Final Considerations: 
Having established that the being of the self is nothing but a prepositional 
existence with a pure possibility and that it is a reality presented to and absorbed in 
Being which enables him to say that the self is but a current and continuos existential 
experience, that is, a unitaty consciousness, Sadra moves from this basic achievement 
towards the other fundamental theories which are of vital interest in Illuminative 
philosophy, and among which these two old problems concern us here: (a) That the 
self is a most simple reality. (b) That the question whether or not the self is a 
substance can be decided if by "substantiality" is meant the practical, but not the 
theoretical and categorical, negation of being in another. A thing can be a substance if 
its actual existence proves not to be in another, and if its act does not depend upon 
another beingJ44) 
I 
4. 5. 1. Simplicily: 
Dealing with the problem of the absolute simplicity of the self, Sadra relies 
upon the principle of the above-established identity between the unitary 
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consciousness and the "being" of the reality of the self. Since, in the domain of the 
unitary consciOllsness as thus described, there remains nothing to be pointed to which 
would be other than "I-ness" ( that is my existential experience of the 'being' of my 
'self) the pure reality and the absolute presence is governed by nothing apart from 
the ontological state of "I-ness." \Vere there any element which could be understood 
as constitutive of genus or differentia other than "I", and which could be referred to 
by "it", Sadra argues, it would give way to the state of "it-ness" and, as a result, cause 
the entire authority of the performative "I-ness" to collapse. In this case the "I-ness" 
would become contradictory. Just as there is no possibility for a transition from the 
state of "I-ness" to that of "it-ness" in the unitary consciousness in the order of being, 
holds Sadra, so also there is hardly any possibility for suggesting any objective 
composition of "I-ness" and "it..:ness" when the state of "I-ness" is in effect -- that is, 
when we remain with the unitary consciollsliess. Thus, to existentially experience the 
being of my 'self by presence is to rule out any elel;lent of not-being myself, which 
would not be present in myself: and to concentrate instead on the absolute purity of 
"I-ness" which is wholly present to myself. Since this unitary consciousness remains, 
at this paliicular stage, in absolute simplicity, the self also, because of our equation, 
must remain in the ultimate degree of simplicity. (./5) 
As far as the equation of this sort of consciousness with the existential reality of 
the self is concerned, Sadra takes this position to say that we do constantly know 
ourselves insofar as we really are in ourselves; that is, insofar as we exist in the world 
of reality among external beings, not as we "appear," in the Kantian terms, to 
ourselves is the form of phenomenal knowledge. The most outstanding feature of the 
unitary consciollsness, according to Sadra, however,"is that the immediate objective 
reality of the self, as it is, is its being known. 
-I. 5. 2. SlIh.\'tanlialily: 
With regard to the problem of the substantiality of the self, Sadra considers it 
~ith clarity and easily decides the issue on the' grounds that he supposes that he has 
already established the proposition of the identity of the being of the self with the 
unitary consciollsnessJ46) 
As we know, historically speaking, the problem as to whether the self is a 
substance or not has been one of the crucial and important issues in any discussion on 
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the self. Though suggested by Plato, it was however Aristotle who first time 
formulated the nature of the self as a substance. This word has two senses for 
Aristotle: In first sense, it means the objective reality of an individual, say, this John 
who stands here now; In second sense, it means what, when it exists, exists not in 
another being. Among only five substances in second sense, the self is one in 
particular. Such an idea which indicated that the self has an independent existence has 
had a troublesome histoly. We know how much this idea, enforced by Descartes, has 
played role in modern subjectivistic philosophy and how many philosophical and 
theological problems it has raised in modern thought (simply think of self-body 
relationships in this context and its implications!). Perhaps, it is one of reasons for 
which modern thinkers such as Foucault, Den"ida and ROI1y, as we may see, tend to 
ignore and to give up a term like the self in this sense. (·n 
However, dealing with, the question whE!ther or not the self is a substance, the 
. . , 
Illuminative position is different. It does not give up the notion of the self~ meanwhile 
it forcefully rejects it to be a substance. In Suhrawardian sense, Sadra holds, the self is 
a light~ it is pure being. Here, to rapidly come to his argument, it may be useful to 
refer again to a distinction Sadra makes between being and essence on which his 
method of ontetic reduction is applicable (see Ch. 2). Sadra distinguishes being from 
essence saying that essence is either substance or accident (Aristotle's ten categories). 
Moving from this distinction, he comes to say if the self is a substance, it must then be 
an essence. But, applying the ontetic reduction, we have seen that the nature of the 
self is an emanative being. Then the self cannot be ,a substance. Secondly, substance 
is' defined in terms of, independence, meaning that· a substance is what has_ 
independent existence and its being must not be dependent on the other. This 
criterion, obviously, does not hold good for Sadraean notion of the self the reality of 
which, as we have seen, is nothing but dependency and the being of which is merely 
prepositional. It follows that the self is not, for Sadra, a substance in its official sense. 
Of course, it is accepted, that in a non-official, then non-essential, sense we may say 
t~.e self is a substance. This sense based on the existential experience of its being. To 
understand this Illuminative sense of substantiality of self let us quote Suhrawardi's 
saying in this respect: 
"Substantiality, however, whether considered as a complete essence of 
the self or given as a negation of a lsubsistingl subject or locus for its 
occurrence, is not something I objectively] independent such that your 
reality itself consists of "that" object referred to as an "it". Assuming 
"substantiality" to have an unknown meaning, \\'hile vou constantlv 
know your reality not by anything superadded to that rc~litv knO\\TI b~' 
yourself, this unknown substantiality which is absent fr~m vourself 
will not count as the whole, nor even as part, of your real it;, at all. 
When you have made your careful inquiry into yourself you will find 
out that what you are made of as "yourself' is nothing but that which 
knows its own reality. This is your own rperformativc] "I-ness". This 
is the manner in which everyone is to know himself, and which 
everyone's rperformativel "I-ness" has in common with YOll."I-ISJ 
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In point of fact, this Illuminative sense of the substantiality of the self has been 
constructed from the two consecutive theorems. The first is the identity of "the 
unitary conscioLlsness" and "b~ing" of the self, and the other is the purity and absolute 
simplicity of the self and the unitary consciollsness, which decisively and actively 
excludes any element of "otherness" tl'om itself. That is to say, the self as unitary 
consciousness ever experiences itself as "I-ness" and never as "It-ricss" in this stage. 
Once' these two premises have been accepted, the conclusion obviously follows that 
the self has a form of reality which does not imply any sense of "otherness." This is 
the meaning of the independent reality for which Suhrawardi' s Illuminative 
terminology of "substantiality" stands. 
The remaining par1 of Suhrawardi's text is intended to re-establish a warranted 
and straight-forward version of "substantiality," and disentangle this notion from the 
classical approaches to the controversial distinction between the category of substance 
and that of accidents. In doing so, Suhrawardi otTers his own definition of 
"suhstantiality," a definition that he tries to articulate in the light of his inquiry into the 
factu~1 circumstances of performative "I-ness" on the one hand, and the commonly 
understood meaning of the word "substance" on the other. Far from being a priori and 
dogmatic, his definition is characterised by the mere negative import of 
"substantiality," namely," not being in another," and by being based only upon the 
information yielded by the performative unitary consciousness itself, regardless of all 
metaphysical discourse concerning the issue. 
When he sU(1(Jests that supposino that the self has an unknown essence, be it O~ , ~ 
substance or accident such an essence can constitute neither the whole nor part of the , 
reality of the self, he means that we should not concern ourselves with these 
controversial problems which are not warranted by the factual reality of "I-ness." All 
we can do, Suhrawardi suggests, is to make a careful inquiry into our performative, 
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and not conceptual, '"I-ness" to find Ollt what their reality consists of Of course, by 
"inquiry" he means an inquiry into the awareness of ourselves and into what we are 
aware of by the unitary consciousness. As soon as the result of this turns out to be 
nothing more nor less than the unadulterated reality of "I-ness," there is no reason 
whatsoever why we should inflict the reality of this "I-ness" with an "it-ness," even if 
such an irresponsible infliction were not to prove to be contradictory. 
In conclusion, on the basis of this Illuminative theory that the performative 
unitary consciousness of "I-ness" is exactly what the reality of "I-ness" is in truth, 
together with the simplicity of the nature of this consciousness, a negative sense of 
"substantiality" can evidently be established. This negative sense alone is able to 
describe the reality of the self as a form of "being" which, while simply and 
performatively is, does not exist in another.(./<)) Now if the category of "substance" as 
such can undergo this reduction and simplification and be reinstated in this negative 
version without calling for a positive, unknown essence, Suhrawardi may arrive at the 
conclusion that the existence of the self proves to be a substance revealed to us in this 
illuminated and non-official sense. (50) 
By now, we discussed the ontetic structure of the self in Sadra's Illuminative 
philosophy explaining that (i) the reality of the self is a special kind of being~ and (ii) 
this kind of being is in a current process of existential experience of Being, a process 
which indicates in this regard that the being of the self is a unitary consciousness 
through which the self grasps the reality of beings by an ontetic touch. In the next 
chapter we will consider the most important characteristics of this unitary 
consciousness in more detail. 
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CHAPTER FIVE" 
Characteristics Of The Unitary Consciousness 
In the preceding chapter we have seen the ontological aspect of the Illuminative 
doctrine expressing that the nature of self is but a unitary consciousness identified by 
its 'being'. Hereafter, through the following chapters, we would find out the basic 
epistemological implications of this doctrine. In this chapter, we would preferably 
consider some of the main epistemological characteristics of th~ unitary consciousness 
which would helpfully make clearer this Illuminative notion. 
5, 1. Tlte IIl1itlllT Consciousness !.,. Se(r"()/~iectit'e 
In the previous chapter when we ha\'e been discussing the Illuminative theory of 
the 'being' of the self we mentioned that from the Illuminative standpoint the self is 
ultimately but a unitary consciousness so far as it is an existential experience of the 
being of the self. This unitary consciousness is, therefore, marked by the intrinsic 
characteristic of "self objectivity". Self-objectivity is the chief characteristic of the 
unitary consciousness. Sadra says: 
"It is concluded that in this kind of consciollsness ('ilm) what. 
realh' exist in itself is one ~nd thc samc. "(lJ 
This is because the essential nature of the unitary conSCIOusness, as already 
discussed, is that the reality of this existential consciousness and that of the self are 
existentially one and the same. In other words, since the emanative (which grounds 
the 'being' of the self) and absorbed (which grounds the unitary consciousness) 
dimensions of the self are tw·o expression of one and the same truth ( that is, the self), 
then, from this Illuminative standpoint, there is no object (in the ordinary, 
subjectivistic sense) in experiencing the being of the self; that is because there is no 
duality in this stage at all, no room there for speaking of object or subject; there is 
only a unitary consciousness that is the being of the self. Then the unitary 
consciousness is self-objective in the sense that there is really no object, no subject. 
The term "objective" here should not be understood in its subjectivistic sense, rather, 
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for the Illuminative standpoint, it indicates that the self "realises" (somehow In a 
Hegelian sense) itself because it is actually pure existence. 
Taking the hypothesis of self-awareness as an example, the Illuminative school 
posits that the self must be absolutely aware of itself without the interposition of a 
representation. Any representation of the self, empirical or transcendental, necessarily 
renders the hypothesis of self-awareness contradictory. It is rather by the very 
presence of the sheer reality of the self that the self is utterly aware of itself This train 
of positing leads, in Illuminative eyes, to the very notion of the self-objectivity of the 
unitary consciousness. "Self-objectivity" then is the chief characteristic of the unitary 
consciousness through which it has to be distinguished from any other species of 
human knowledge. Self-objectivity means that the unitary consciousness has no object 
in its technical sense. 
The unitary consciollsness, according to. this school, has all its relations within 
the framework of itself, so that the whole anatomy of the notion can hold true without 
any implication of supposing an objective reference (in the subjectivistic sense) calling 
for an exterior relation. That is, the relation of knowing is, in that form of the unitary 
consciousness, a self-object relation without the intrusion of a connection with an 
object. By this, to be sure, the illuminationists would not understand an abstract, 
idealistic or solipsistic sense of the unitary conscioLlsness isolated from the world of 
reality; Rather, they maintain that this self-objectivity indicates an anti-idealistic and 
anti-solipsistic positi-on. As we have seen, this consciousness is an existentially 
performatively current experience of Being. Occurred in a lived context of existence, 
this experience, they say, is far from being abstract or solipsistic, On contrary, it is a 
living experienc'e of 'my' being as well as the other beings with which it is in an 
ontetic touch. Being self-objective means for the unitary consciousness a currently 
realisin a its existence in the line of going ahead toward its perfection. Thus o , 
understood, it seems, self-objectivity is the other version of identity of the unitary 
consciollsness and the 'being' of the self 
5. 2. The Unitary COl1sciousness Cannot Be Erroneous 
One of the main characteristics of the unitary consciousness is its freedom from 
the dualism of tmth and falsehood. This characteristic must be understood on the 
basis of two principles in the Illuminative philosophy: 
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a)Principle of primordiality and unity of Being as such: since Being as such, 
Sadra says in a Heideggerian tone, is existentially really unique truth~ and that the 
unitary consciousness is a manifested mode of that Being, it is then concluded that the 
unitary consciousness is true. Its truth however is existential, not logical (in technical 
sense); ontological not epistemological. If so, it is not then subject to the logical 
dichotomy of truth-falsehood. 
b )That this dichotomy can be supposed where there is an object. Now, as we are 
said, in the case of the unitary consciousness we have neither object, nor subject, then 
this dichotomy is not eligible to apply here. In other words, the unitary consciousness 
is not subject to this dichotomy because its nature is not concerned with the notions 
of "reflection" or "correspondence" and the like. When there is no object, correspon-
dence between the subject and object, the internal and external states, and so also 
between "external fact" and "statement" makes no sense; simply because such 
dualisms belong to the order of concept and not that of being -- i. e., to the eidetic 
field not to the ontetic field. Thus, while in the order of concept and the eidetic field, 
it is the case that the principle of "correspondence" has been widely accepted as the 
criterion for truth or falsity in a statement about an external object, and while it is also 
the case that this principle has been set up as the standard for the examination of truth 
or error in, as Russell puts it, knO\vledge of truth/:) such a principle cannot, and is not 
required to be involved in the case of the unitary consciousness -- especially if we 
remind ourselves of its self-objectivity. 
Since the dichotomy of truth and falsity, in Illuminative philosophy, supposed to 
depend upon the correspondence relation in the first instance between subject and 
object, between the mental object and the external object, and in the second instance 
between a statement and its external reference, there is no application for such a 
dualism in the unitary consciousness. If there is no correspondence (since no object in 
subjectivistic sense), then there is no meaning for reflective knowledge; no meaning 
for reflective knowledge, then no meaning for a statement about this knowledge~ no 
ll1eaning for a statement about an external physical object, then no meaning for the 
truth or falsity of such a statement. Consequently, the unitary consciousness is not 
. prone to the logical dualism of truth and falsity. (3) 
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5. 3. The Unitary Consciousness hi Not The Phenomenal Act Of Mind: 
One of the characteristics of the unitary consciousness underlined by the 
Illuminative philosophy is that the unitary consciousness is not my phenomenal acts, 
whether sense-perceptions, or psychological states of mind. It is because the unitary 
consciousness, as we have already said, is 'my' existence so far as I existentially 
experience it~ and it is the unique context for phenomenal acts, perception as well as 
psychological state of mind. In fact, Sadra says that it is the unitary consciousness that 
creates them~ it is their LlpsLlrge.(.fJ They are various aspects of the unitary 
consciousness but the unitary consciousness can not be identified by only one of them, 
just as it can not be identified by a collection of them. The unitary consciousness is 
them and more than them; simply because it is the 'being' of the self. (5) 
Such understood, the above characteristic of the unitary consciousness seems to 
put it, if not opposite to, behind and in the ground of the Cartesian Cogilo, Husserlian 
constituting ( eidetic) consciollsness as well as the Humean psychological' I'. 
After being troubled by his famous methodological skepticism, Descartes arrived 
at a point where he found himself no longer susceptible to doubt. Focusing on his 
indubitable principle, "Cogilo," Descartes said: I am really doubting; whatever else 
may be doubtful, the fact that 'I doubt' is indubitable. The cel1ainty of the existence 
of my doubt leads me LIp to the certainty of the existence of myself. Descartes, 
therefore, managed to establish the consciousness of his selfllOod through his self 
certainty of the state of doubting. I.nother words, he brought one phenomenal act of 
his mind .. to accou,lt for the truth of the existence ofhis personal identity. Also Husser! 
who regards himself "as Cartesian Meditator,"(6J applies epoche "in order to regain it 
by a [reflective] universal self-examination"(7! in which the self"is accessible"J8) 
Sadra appears to take issLie with Descal1es and Husser! on their reflective 
position. Starting with OLir particular sense-perceptions Sadra argues: 
"No particular sense-perception or phenomenal state of mind, even 
though in the form 'I', can ever bear witness to the tntth value o.f the 
existence of mvself. This is because any phenomenal evcnt which I 
attribute to nl\'~elf, such as my feeling cold or warmth, or pain etc., 
must be, and "is presupposed by an underlying awareness of myself. 
With this underlying awareness can l appropriate cold, wannth, pain, 
pleasure, etc., to myself. If l suffcr from severe cold wcather, or 
escape from the flame of a burning fire, it is only because I already am 
a\\·are of sOllll.:thing which, in one way or another, belongs to myself. 
This is true in doubting, thinking, believing, etc. Thought, doubt, or 
belief, in general, can eVl.:r be appropriated to myself, nor can thev be 
a subsisting phenomena in m~'sclf. But as particularly applied to 
myself possessed by myscl r in terms of my own thought doubt or 
belief, it involves the underlying awareness of myself. This' is the ~ase 
no matter how the reality of the self is to be understood, and how the 
problem of identity is to bl.: handled by philosophy. "(9) 
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The unitary consciollsness, our awareness of ourselves, is not reflective at all. It 
is because, in Suhrawardi's words: 
"Anyone who has a reality of which he is never oblivious is not 
obscurc. This is so bec:llIsc of the clarity and apparentness of his 
reality to his reality to himself He is not a lllode of darkness inherent 
in another thing, for e"cn a mode of light cannot be light in itself let 
alone that of cbrkncss. Therefore, he is an il11maclll~te purity of light 
that cannot be located b~· physical indication."(}{)) 
This knowledge ('((/m), the unitary consciousness, is identical with the very 
reality of the self, and the reality of the self with pure light; therefore the reality of the 
self is pure light and that than which nothing more apparent can be apprehended. 
It is also refuted by Sadra that the unitary consciousness can be identified by my 
actions as suggested, we may see, by Hume and early HusserlJi}) In this respect Sadra 
writes: 
"\Verc it the case that I, through my O\vn action, whether it is 
intellectual or physical could become a\\are of myself, it bc as if I 
should bring forth from myself cvidcncl.: to bear witncss to myself. It 
would obviously be a \'icious circle in which the knowledge of my 
action functions as acallSl' of my knowledge ofmysc1f which is itself 
already implied in, and senes as the cause of thc knowledge of my 
own action. "( I':) 
The reason that an illuminationist like Sadra keeps avoiding to take the unitary 
consciousness as a collection of my phenomenal acts, whether sensual, psychological 
or mental, or simply of my actions may be clear from their common position in this 
case: Our actions or phenomenal acts are 'intentional' or reflective~ whereas the 
I 
unitary conscioLlsness basically covers the hidden existential ground of such actions; 
. principally it is an existential e~perience of no-mind~ it entails not only my eidetic 
consciousness (in the Hllsseriian sense) but also my non (lln)-consciousness (in the 
Freudian sense). It is 'my' existence and can not be simply a collection of actions or 
be known somehow through its phenomenal acts. 
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5. 4. 11te Unitary Consciousness Is Non-representatil'e 
Another important characteristic is that the unitary consciousness IS non-
representative. The unitary consciousness neither achieves itself nor can be achieved 
by representation. We know how much Kant emphasises the representative 
consciousness of the selfJl3) In order to establish simultaneously the nature and 
function of the transcendental, Kant prefers a reflective analysis which makes the 
transcendental self appear. The reflective analysis basing itself on synthetic 
judgements, shows that 'the highest principle of all synthetic judgements is therefore 
this: every object stands under the necessary conditions of the synthetic unity of the 
manifold intuition in a possible experience. "( 1./) These conditions make the tran-
scendental subjectivity appear. The mediI/ill of synthetic judgements is the whole in 
which all our representations contained -- i. e., inner sense, \vhose apriori form is 
time. And the unity required in judgement rests on the unity of apperception. This 
unity, which tends to emphasis the "I" of the "I think," is, at least in the second 
edition of Critiql/e, the keystone of the Kantian system. But we find even in the first 
edition that all empirical consciollsness has a necessary relation to transcendental 
consciousness "namely, the consciollsness of myself as original apperception. "(15) For 
we are conscIOUS 
"of the complete identity of the sclfin respect of all representations 
which can ever belong to Ollr knowledge. "(16) 
It is therefore an absolutely primary principle, that the vanous empirical 
consciousness must be linked to one unique consciousness of self. This consciousness 
is the simple representation: I. Kant adds: 
"Whether this representation is clear (empirical consciollsness) or 
obscure, or cven wether it ever actually occurs, docs not herc concer:n 
us. But the possibility of the logical form of all knowlcdge IS 
necessarily conditioned by relation to this apperception as a faculty. 
"(17) 
The self is only a "simple representation" concerning which "there is not even a 
question of reality". In other words, the "I think" is the unity of consciousness and not 
the consciousness of a unity; its being is that of a logical, conceptual condition, not 
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that of (til existential reality. It founds the reality of experience, but it is not founded 
lIpon the experience qf a reality. 
Considered from the Illuminative standpoint, the problematic of Kantian position 
lies in his conceptual, reflective analysis of our consciousness of 'self ~ such a 
position, obviously, leads us to ignore the existential reality of the self as well as an 
experience of such a reality (as we underlined in last paragraph). 
Relying on the existential reality of the self and the experience of its reality, on 
contrary, the Illuminative theory of the unitary consciousness tries to demonstrate that 
our consciousness of ourselves in its authentic and original state is not representative. 
"The fact that our selves apprehend r = the unitary consciousness] the 
reality of themsel\\.:s do~s not impl~' that that apprehension has come to 
them by a representation. This is because of the following: 
First; the representation that is used which appears in the mind is not 
exactly' the mind as it is in itself. But that which is aware of itself is 
supposedly aware of what itsobjecti\'c "I-ness" consists of, rather than 
that with which this objective "I-ness" is in conformity. Any 
representation taking place in the mind of the knower is in fact 
something added to his reality which, in comparison with that reality, 
serves as an "it" and 11I.:vcr as an "I" . 
Secondly, suppose th:1t self-apprehension is by reprcsentation. Now 
every representation existing in the self as an intellect is universal [in 
the sense that it is not impossible to predicate it of many]. Even if the 
complete sum of the universals referring altogether to one single 
individual among others have been gathered together in a unitary 
complex, it still can not make that representation cease to be universal. 
But the fact is that everyone's apprehension of his own reality is with 
such strict individuality that it can have nothing in common with 
another. Thus one's understanding of one's own individual reality can 
i1evcr be admitted as being by means of any representation at all." (18) 
Since the contemporary discussion on the problem of self-consciousness is 
more or less inspired by Kantian spirit, and mostly often this discussion presupposes 
his doctrine on the representative'!', it seems to be of chief importance in this respect 
to explain and interpret the Illuminative position in more detail here in the light of 
Suhrawardi's argumentations, followed by Sadra, to clarify more and more the 
Illuminative position concerning the unitary consciousness and self-awareness. 
5. 4. 1. Firsl Argument: 
Let us follow Suhrawardi in his first argumentation: 
"A thing that exists in itsdf and is conscious of itself does not know 
itself through a rcpresentation(l9) of itself appearing in itself. This is 
because, if, in knowing one's self, one were to make a representation 
of oneself, since this representation of his "I-ness" could never be the 
reality of that "I-ness, " it would be then such that that rt!prcsentation 
is "it" in rel~tion to the "I-ness," and not "J". Therefore the thing 
apprehended IS the representation. It thus follows that the apprehension 
of "I-ness" would be exactly what is the apprehension of "it-ness", and 
that the apprehension of the reality of "I-ness" would be therefore 
exactly the apprehension of what is not "I-ness." This is an absurdity. 
On the other hand, this absurdity does not follow in the case ~f 
apprehension of external objects, for the representation and that to 
which that representation belongs arc both "it"s."(':O) 
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Before explaining this argument, three preliminary remarks to be helpfully 
reminded here. 
(A). A first glance at the text informs us that there are at least two necessary 
conditions to be grasped for the correct understanding of the subject matter we are 
talking about. (i) That we are here dealing with a thing which is existent "in itself' (Ii 
nafseh) though not necessarily "by itself' (hi lI(r!"eh)_ That is, the thing must not be a 
form of being that might, by its nature, be subsistent in· something else. (ii) That we 
should concern ourselves with those things that are supposed to know themselves and 
can be in one way or another conscious of themselves. These things are not from 
inanimate beings; rather they are those beings who can take a position that gives a 
rational justification for their saying: "I do this and that." 
(B) As already stated, according to the Illuminative theory, in the process of 
knowing, in general, there is an "agent" standing for the pelformative "I" which is 
established by its very nature of authority to act, not to be acted upon. This "standing 
for" is just for the subject "I", and nothing other than "1" can ever participate in this 
private incontrovertible rank of being. This stare of authority is to be called "I-ness." 
-"I-ness" therefore is the kingdom of the authority of the subject which perfectly 
satisfies the above two conditions. This is because, as it stands, the ''1'' is "in itself' in 
the sense that whenever it expresses itself in any form of statement such as "I ... ", it 
means neither more nor less than "I myself ... ", as an active subject. Contrary to 
Heidegger and Sal1re who maintain the public source of the 'I', the Illuminative 
position does not imply that "I am in, or, with another". The'!, is also conscious of 
iti-elf, because as soon as "I" has been expressed by itself it is understood that the "I" 
_ knows itself, whether that expression is direct, "I know myself," or indirect, "I know 
something" or "I do something," etc., which presupposes that "I know myself." There 
is, on the other hand, another sense of "stand for" which is opposite to this "I-ness" 
and which is peculiar to what can be truly called "another." Whatever this "another" 
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may be, whether "he," "she," or simply "it," it cannot participate in the authoritative 
kingdom of I-ness. This sort of "another" must then be fitted in its appropriate class, 
viz. "it-ness". We might well call this Illuminative thesis the "I-it" relationship. This 
relationship (that is actually between the'!, as my primordial state , and the 
representation of the same '1') is considered in the Illuminative philosophy as a 
transferring from the order of being to the order of thought and, as we will see, the 
nature of this relationship is Illuminative, i. e., existential. (see, Ch. 6) 
(C). With regard to all this, the Illuminative authors would say, if I know myself 
through a representation of myself and not by the very "presence" of the reality of 
myself, we come up against this question: Is this representation of myself identified 
with the reality of "I-ness" or does it remain in the state of "it-ness"? Being a 
representation distinct from the reality of ll1ysel( it can never be fitted into the realm 
of "I-ness," but ought rath.er to be placed and kept within the boundaries of "it-ness." 
It then foliows that the "I-it" dictum can no longer hold true in the case of knowing 
myself, and this law of knowledge is violated. For in this case, the representational "I" 
falls into the category of "it-ness" and is no longer within the realm of "I-ness," and 
therefore "I" by transforming into "it" becomes "not I" when it should be nothing but 
"I." 
These are remarked because they are implicitly presupposed in this Illuminative 
theory. Now let us revel1 to the Illuminative argument:. It might be said that there are 
apparently two ways in which the fact that one is really conscious of oneself can be 
proved. One is by knowing something other than one's self, such as is the case when 
one expresses one's knowledge in a statement saying: "I know objects x, y and z." 
This means that by attribution to myself I am already aware of myself. The other is by 
directly knowing one's self, when one reflects upon one's self and presents one's 
self-knowledge in a statement by saying "I know myself." In both cases the knowing 
subject is aware of itself. 
Concentrating on this awareness, the Illuminative argument makes the claim that 
thle knowing subject "I" in itself is a complete self-object consciousness, and then 
raises the question as to what the nature of that implied consciousness may be. In 
. other words, from this standpoint, any "I" clause, whether it is in the form "1 know 
myself' or "I know, or do, such and such," is analysable into a complete self-object 
consciousness which can be stated: "I know myself." Subsequently, the complete 
judgement, "I know myself," can be reduced, without any loss of meaning, to the 
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self-expressing "I" as standing for its own ontetic existential reality of "I-ness." The 
question then is: what is t his consciousness of' self, or that greatly simplified "I"? 
It is supposed by the Illuminative school that in the consciousness of any 
particular thing, thought, or feeling, there is always a performative agent which 
"brings about" that particular act of consciousness. The reality of this agent will be 
called "I", no matter what sort of nature it may be in truth. From a reflective point of 
view, in the same act of consciollsness there is another thing involved which is not the 
agent, but related to it as that which has been "brought about" by that agent. 
Reflectively, we suppose a reality for this latter thing as the object that we are 
conscious of and will be referred to by "it". In the case of our consciousness of self , 
'1', we move in this "I-it" rebtionship. In this manner, Suhrawardi sees that in the 
unity of consciousness there is always a predominant dialectical process of the nature 
of an "I and it"opposition \vhich must be carefully observed and must not be violated. 
That is, in this regard neither is .. \" reducible to "it", nor "it" to "I" In the anatomy of 
this position, "I" and "it" make up a unity of opposition. 
On the basis of the "[-ness/it-ness" dictum, Suhra'vvardi tries to establish his 
point of argument in the following way. If it were the case that the knowing subject, 
in order to know itself, objectifies itself~ it would set up a phenomenal representation 
distinct from itself which would be called ··it" and not "1. " In that case, while, as the 
law of "I-ness/it-ness" requires, the "1" must remain in its unchangeable subject 
authority of "I-ness", the "it," being the "self," also falls under this category and 
becomes united with "1." Hmvever, once again, as the law of "I-ness/it-ness" stands, 
the "it-ness;' can never be converted into "l-ness" and becomes totally united with the 
active reality of "I". Nor can the factual reality of ''{'' be transubstantiated into the 
reality of "it." Consequently, Suhrawardi may argue, the "I-ness" and "it-ness" tum 
out to be both different and identical in the same respect. This is impossible. Let us 
see how, on the basis of Illuminative approach, they can be different by a sort of 
opposition, and yet at the same time united in a self-identity, both in the same respect. 
/-
They are different, because each of them, on the I-ness/it-ness relation, stands 
for a different function and a ditTerent component of the unity of consciousness. For, 
while it is true that the "I" never becomes "it" in the unity of consciousness, it is also 
logically and epistemologically true that the "it" never resigns its own totality to the 
subject authority of the "I". So it does not become altogether identical with the state 
of "I-ness" either. In other words, according to the Illuminative position, the relation 
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of "I-ness" to "it-ness" within the unity of consciousness is considered to be a kind of 
"correlativity". The standard property of a relation of this kind is, the Illuminative 
authors see, that all the related members of the class must be mutually "simultaneous", 
in act or in potency. That is to say, they are all supposed to be in the state of 
equilibrium with regard to act or potency in the sense that if one is in act the other or 
others must be in act as well, and if one is in potency the rest must be in the same 
condition too. 
The relationship of fatherhood and childhood is of this kind of correlativity. If X 
is the father of Y at this present time, Y must simultan·~ously be a child of X at this 
present time, and vice versa. But if X is the father of Y in the past or future, Y must 
also simultaneously be a child of X in the past or future, but not in the present, and 
vIce versa. 
Putting the "I-ness/it-ness" dictum into this· categoricai relationship, the 
Illuminative philosophy argues that, concerning the' case of self-consciousness,' if we 
suppose that the "I" is really in act sllch that the "1" can truly say "1 know myself," its 
opposite, "it," must also truly b~ in act simultaneously to the same degree of certainty. 
That is," 'I' know myself' is just another way of saying "r know 'it'" and because the 
"I" in this case is in act, the "it" is also simultaneously in act. Conversely, if the "I" is 
not in act but rather in the state of potency, the "it" also must remain in the state of 
potency. The conclusion is that in the state of unity of consciousness the difference 
and opposition between "I-ness" and "it-ness" cannot be eliminated but rather become 
sharper. They mLlst therefore, by necessity of inter-correlativity and simultaneity, be 
different, and never be identical. 
At the same "Lime, this conclusion does not lead these authors to ignore (as we 
may feel in the Sm1rian position) the identity of "I-ness" and "It-ness". These two are, 
in some respect, identical, because the "it" as substituted for "myself' in a self-
consciousness statement means nothing but the knowing subject itself, the self for 
which the "I" has already been designated. By using an equation, we see that the 
expression "it" in a sentence like "I know it/myself' is equivalent to the object term 
"myself', such that it can be substituted for "myself' as the object of my knowledge~ 
and the expression "myself' is also, being a reflexive term of the subject, in a way 
equivalent to the term "I'" and that therefore the "it" is convertible to the "I" by this 
, . 
formulation: A = B, 8=C, A=C. Furthermore, if I have the right, according to the 
Illuminative theory, to believe that "I know myself," what has, then, been expressed 
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by "myself in this statement is nothing other than what is meant by "I". Supposing 
that the expression "myself' somehow ceases to be identical with "I", the whole of the 
statement falls short of being in any \vay meaningful. It means that "I" and "it" are 
identical here. Thus understood, in a statement such as "I know myself," the "I" and 
the "it" must be both identical and different at the same time. 
This is the absurdity that Suhrawardi is talking about and wishes to attribute to 
the phenomenalistfllJ theory of self-consciousness in which, it seems, he sees the 
dramatic setting down of the reality of' I'. He tries to point out that if it were the case 
that our consciousness of the truth of our selves is by a phenomenal representation, 
we would be driven into this flat contradiction. For, the absurdity comes only where 
there are two opposite and inconvel1ible terms "I" and "it" involved They face each 
other in a state of opposed interrelation, making up together a piece of phenomenal 
knowledge distinguished fi-om other kinds of knowledge as self-knowledge. 
It appears all but obvious that the \vhole' force of the argLII:nentis based upon 
"invariability," or, if one wishes, "inconveI1ibility," of the state of "I-ness" into 
"it-ness" and vice versa. \Vere the "1" in one way or another convertible into "it," 
there would be two "it"s and a possibility for the two "if's to be united with each 
other and judged by the uniting act of the self without contradiction."I-ness" is 
therefore the court in which "judgement" is made on "other" things and can never 
become one of them; it must, at the same time, always remain distant from judgement 
as "other" things. One can, of course, objectify' oneself when one reflects upon oneself 
by saying: "it" is "I" who know myself But by objectification it seems to be meant 
that one can fictitiously treat oneself as an "it" and bring one's judgement of 
unification upon oneself But this is an objectified fictitioLlS -self' that has nothing to 
do with the real performative "self," the knowing subject which is the maker of the 
judgement, not the object of it. One should notice that by fictitious self the 
Illuminative school does not unwillingly commit itself to a mystical monistic theory 
which proclaims that all the plurality of this world is illusory and fictitious. It rather 
seems to specify that no reflective knowledge of the self can be accounted for by 
I 
anything but a transformation from the invariable "I", the existential self, to the 
variable nature of "it." If it were not so, the "I" could no longer be represented at all. 
Thus, any conception pretending to be a representation of the "I" is fictitious and 
contradictory. This will then be an "introspective" piece of knowledge which should 
not be, strictly speaking, called self-consciousness; but grammatically, it is a sort of 
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judgement about a fictitious self similar to those about others. There is no difference 
whatsoever between saying "S knows P" and "It is I who know P" or "I am the one 
who knows P" provided that the --I" in the second, and the "I" in last statement are , 
convertible into ~·it." The only difference between the first, on the one hand, and the 
second and third, on the other, is that the judging subject has not occurred in the first 
statement but is understood by the act of judgement from the outside, while it has 
fictitiously occurred in the second and third ones. Since the ''I'' in such a place as this 
is necessarily converted into "it", the occurrence of the "I" signifies nothing but "it." 
One can however put the absurdity demonstrated by this argument in various 
ways. These ways may really have been intended by the author himself, but they need 
to be explicated in order to be completely understood. They are the followings: 
(a) "if my acquaintance with myself were by a represe.l1tat~qd· instead of the. 
p r~se~,ce6 r~y rea I i tyt~', ~,)' s~ If, then my a cq lIai n tan ce wi t hm;s~if\v~lIl d be ex~~tl;~,' 
.•. ',~.-.~:' ";:.,o( . .'~'.:,. . . . ' ",J •. : ,:' . ,~.'" .~~~ .. '\,,:~~;'~.~ " ;" • 
my ~cqlfaintance with \\/hat is not myself, viz. with"a represen!at}oJT; even though it be 
a representation of myselr. This absurdity p.roceeds from the "epistemic" feature of the 
, . . . . ' . 
problem which can b~ clearly .understood £i'om his words "the apPI:ehension of the 
reality of "I-ness" would be, therefore, exactly the apprehension of what is not 
"I-ness," namely "it -ness. "" 
.' . 
(b) Should "I-ness" and "it-ness" ever be identical 111 the case of 
self-consciousness, while, as tl~e subject-object relation stood, they functioned 
distinctly; they \VOllid be then b~th identi~al and different in,one and' the same respect. 
, This is, of course, a logical form of absurdity that arises fi'om the:violation of the law 
'> I." ", ., '. ,0", , '" .. ' '" 
" .' qfthesubjec~:-object relation in a proposition. ' 
, .. ~ . .;,).t,.~l'. ;, ..•. \ •• , . • _, " .'~ "-'4'" ,; 
;, : .. , (c)'lfthe expression "myself" in' a statelnent li~e "I know myself' means "it" as 
refering to the representation of myself which is obviously on a par with only 'not 
myself", then "I know myself' must, have the meaning that "I know only 
not-myself." Now,"1 know only not-myself' is just another way of saying "I do not 
know myself" This would be destructing human communication, should a statement 
like "I know myself' ever mean that '} do n~t know myself" This absurdity belongs 
" 
to the linguistic features of the issue. 
At the end of this explanation of Suhrawardi's argument, we must remind 
ourselves of three important points concerning the obje,ctive of this argument and its 
consequences which the illuminative theory suggests us. 
107 
(A) For everyone who is, in the manner of his nature, to be acquainted with 
"himself' in such a way that in the scope of his own acquaintance there remains no 
logical possibility for anything other than himself: his consciousness of himself is 
nothing other than the very reality of his self. Anything besides the bare reality of self-
ness counts as "another" which lies beyond, and is foreign to, the true unitary 
consciousness of oneself. Thus, there is, so to speak, a typical equivalence and 
interchangeability between this kind of "consciousness" of the self and the bare reality 
of the "selfhood" it. In other words, as already discussed, the meaning of the unitary 
consciousness becomes absolutely equivalent with the meaning of the very "being" of 
the self. This is the meaning of the self-objectivity of the unitary consciousness. (22) 
In these terms, 'my' most private reality is nothing but the individual fact of my 
existence, for which the \\ford "Y' h:as been designated as a direct reference, not to be 
"; . ,~;. ~: ~,~: ... . 
used in the manner that an ordina,.-y \vor((is lIsed ':in·:i~'s:meaning. This sort of "I" can 
i;'d~~r be"Gonverted (Inder ally':circt'I::~lstances into "i:~':"~/ t~~:~ iik~., The language game 
,,; .. .;. .. ,; '.' '. '.. .' ~ 
. of "I" therefore is radically different fro'~l that of anything else expressed by "it." If we 
call the former "subject language" and the latter "object language," the subject 
. -
language is that which can ,!ever be lIsed and spoken in the object la_ngua~e, because 
as soon as the subject "I" becomes objectified and has been spoken of in the object 
language, it has already been converted into "if' and is no longer the "I ," 
However, one may ask, how we can manipulate such a radical difference 
b,etween"the two languages? One "ans,Wer to this question may be, if I am not 
mistaken, the difference between the theory of "meaning" and the theory of 
. ~ . l; '~:" • 
"r.efereQce." When ''1'' as ~}ubje~;t 'term is expressed in a sentence: it is not u~ed to 
mea~ ;'t~e concept of'the reaiity~f "I-ness," ,:ather it has be~~"·design,ated to directly 
refer to the reality of the subject. The subject language is therefore referential to the 
performative "I", which, by showing itsel~, makes itself known as a living subject in a 
self-judgement. The word "I" accordingly functions as an "arrow" pointing to the 
kingdom of the performative "I" in any self-statement, not as a word used for the 
meaning and conceptualisation of the self: though it can do so in an introspective self-
/-
proposition. 
(B) The most signiticant point that one can conclude from Suhrawardi's 
argument, as well as' from other arguments which the author presents later, is that 
there is at least one thin~ sLich that it is "being-in-itself' in the sense that so far as it is 
a unitary consciousness. its being does not subsist in another, and such that it is 
." ,;.1; '.' 
, -
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known to us by virtue of this unitary consciousness. This consciousness, as we have 
seen, is the existentially current experience of the reality of my "I-ness" which has 
been proved to be in itselt~ though not necessarily by itself, and present to itself, in the 
sense that it cannot possibly be more apparent to itself than simply being in itself. 
(C) As we have seen, there is no mention in the above text of much interest in 
those basic metaphysical and transcendental concepts which generally appear in all the 
classical kinds of philosophical studies, such as "existence" and "essence", or 
"substance" and "a~cident" and so on. Instead, the great emphasis has been laid on the 
empirical, active "reality" of "I-ness," which, as we have already observed, does not 
have any connotation connecting it with the controversial problem of the 
essence-existence distinction. It seems that the main objective of this approach is to 
. ,C9.hside~ the truth of t!~~'''actual reality of the subject which"is ~h~racterised by the two 
, ",. " .. Ir'- ., '~~:~d'i!i~~;S ment~~D~d. .'a:~9.ve. It does not matter if the ki:~1~': ~f ~ubject h~'r~"~nd~~, 
~~~~ideration has to be c~I1ed, in the transce;1dental langua~e, substance, accident, 
I .... ~ . .' -
noumenon, or. phenom.enon. Nor does it matter if thi~ sense o( "reality" later falls 
under the heading of ."existence" or of "essence" when th~ problem of the 
essence-existence relation is considered, although, in the end, as we have seen, 
Suhrawardi, then the Illuminative philosophy, does reach the position that such a 
, 
projected reality of the self is nothing but a pure existence. This is because, according 
to his Illuminative principle that the reality of the self sufficiently satisfies all the 
ern'pirical essentialities or' light, and because light also perfectly applies to pure 
existence in terms of the greatest "apparency," the self:-can be defined in terms of a 
pure existence, 
" .. 'i, 
',., 
, 'None of these thl'eeimpdrtant points' IS really what draws Suhrawardi's 
attention at this stage of his investigation. As we have seen (see, above, 3.9.2) the 
notion of substance in its conventional positive sense does not belong to the absolute 
simplicity of the reality of "I-ness", neither does it belong to its negative implication 
which is not to exist in another being. Perhaps substance. as well as other 
, "1.etaphysical concepts, are all, in his op'illion, to be understood and considered only 
after a cel1ain intellectual analysis made by the philosophical mind of the simple reality 
of the performative, factllal "I-ness." Thus in the territorial simplicity of"J-ness" there 
is no possibility for the!:le manipulated questions sllch as substance and accident. 
Indeed it should be admitted that one of the greatest merits of this type of argument is 
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their careful avoidance of emphasis on any of these delicate metaphysical problems, 
but instead their examination of the very performative reality of"I-ness," 
5.-1.2. Secolld Argumellt: 
, Now, let us pass on to the presentation of the next argument: 
"Again, assuming that it li,e., consciousness of 'self] is by 
representation, then if one docs not know that that representation is 
one's own, one thus never knows that one has ever known oneself. But 
if one supposedly knows that the representation belongs to one's self. 
one must then already have known oneself with no representation. 
However, it is inconceivable that one apprehends oneself by means of 
something superadded to one's self, since this superaddition would 
serve as an attribute to oneself. If f this is so, then, one decides that 
every attribute associated with one's realit", no matter whether it is 
knowledge or anorher attribute, bdongs to one's own r~ality, and it 
then implies that one, has known .oneself before these attributes and 
even without rhcm"Tl1c conclusion is that one does not kno\\' oneself 
through one's" Slll~Cr21dd(;d attribllte~ among which is one's 
representatimtQColi~$df'1('?3) .. c. "~.",,,,"/, ," 
, . ~ oJ • • 
"to. _.,' ~"" # 
. Whereas the first argument was concerned with '~t'he i~gical, epistemic, and 
sel~'antic function of the state of "I-'ness" as opposed to 'that of "it-ness", this 
argument seems 'to deal \\;ith the metaphysical distinction between' "attributes" and 
what these attributes we ascribed to, which is prospectively suppo~ed to be the reality 
of self-ness. Still, there has been no 'interest shown in what manner this reality should 
be interpreted, as belonging to the category of substance or accident or some other 
category. 
Although this consideration quite clearly calls for a distinction between 
attributes and the self to- which the~e attribut,es aloe referred, it has been set forth in 
. .. '. . ,~.' I "\ . . ';1.. '. ... . ' 
'su.ch a way t:hat even tb~~.distillction is to be made by,:the' performative self itself, and 
not by an outside agent: This is because a judgement from the outside that makes a 
distinction between attributes and the thing to which these attributes belong treats the 
self as an object which, being converted into an "it," can easily be analysed into 
qualities and the thing qualified. This obviously brings us back to the vulnerable 
classical argument for the subsistence of material substances, an argument with which 
t-
Suhrawardi qoes not wish to get involvedJ.?-I) 
In other words, this argument must be brought into line with the first so that it 
may satisfy the two above-mentioned conditions, i.e., that the self und~r consideration 
should be something existing in itself, not in another, and that it must have the power 
to be existentially conscious itself. Given these two conditions. it becomes clear 
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enough that this argument is concerned only with a self that is speaking, doing or 
making a judgement of which he or she is conscious. That is because anything other 
than this performative self could be changed fi'om a unitary conscious'!, into an 
inanimate one, which could be referred to by ··it." Having made this qualification, 
there is therefore no possibility of considering this argument among those traditional 
ones which deal with the distinction between substance and accident on the one hand 
, 
and attributes and that which the attributes are predicated of on the other.All these 
classical arguments spring from the consideration that there is a material substance 
which acts as a continual, never-changing '"it" that holds and unites the variety of 
accidents in the succession of events. 
In the case of a self-knO\vlec\ge given by representation, the knowing' subject 
·'i '()~ght, befo;:~hand, to have "appropriated" the repre~~ntat'id'n of hims~lf to himself so 
, , ,~s:to achi~~~"ti;~ a~'t' of knowing himself by the act ot\pe~ification, Oth~twise, if such 
;'~;'~F.; .. ~:~, ... -:.>"{ -" ".r::.. .. :: ... ,.'~ .. ~~,';~ ... . :. . .~ ....... >:~-:' .... ~ -,. -~~.:~ ~:f:",·r. <"~a . 
. ,~.}:: an "appropriation"di'd rIot take place properly, he would· for ever fail to know himself. 
I.~ ~ , - .'; . ". - : '., . 
For a representation which is neither appropriated to himself nor to any other 
, , 
particular person is characterised as universal. A non-appropriate represe~tation is to 
be held universal because it C~1J1 legitimately be applied to anyone who may be 
represented by such a non-appropriated representation. Now, if this were the case, 
;. . , ..... . 
Suhrawardi asks, how could one appropriate the representation of oneself to oneself 
in all certainty, and be sure that it is one's own representation while one supposedly 
. , • does not already know·oneself withollt representation?,' Jhe' representat.ion thus h~lps 
, :~.i: ' one to know one'sowh 'self' if and only ,if one can specify it and appropriate it to 
~:.' .. "-;:. '; ,:' ~~ •• ~ ;. - .... 1 
one's ·seolf so that one ,can' kno\\' one's. true self through that appropriated 
'.:. '\ • "~,. J' • i -,~ . 
:/ ,::~" .'. t ~':.':~::" .' . ".} ;:: t'~ .• 
. representation. On the other hand, if one cann'otproperly make this appropriation, one 
can never succeed in knowing oneself with any degree of certainty, since a 
non-appropriate representation remains universally open and applicable to a multitude 
of individuals as its possible objective refere·nces. Such an appropriation implies the 
awareness of the self-knowing subject, not by representation, but rather by 
presence. (2~) 
/. 
A counter-example for this argument could be a question like this: In the case of 
. knowing an external objec.t, which ,undoubtedly exemplifies knowledge by 
representation. how' can one "appropriate" the representation of the object to the 
object itself, in order to know that specified ~bJect. while one does not already know 
the object without representation? Whatever the solution for knowledge of an external 
III 
object by representation turns out to be, it will also be the solution which is proper to 
knowledge of the self by representation. The Illuminative philosophy's answer to this 
counter-example is that in the course of knowing an external object, say a table, 
insofar as we are not able to know that object by presence, we cannot with certainty 
appropriate its representation to it, at least not exactly as we do in the knowledge of 
ourselves. This is the reason why our knowledge of the external world must remain in 
the mode of "probability," or in Sadra's terminology, in the state of "accidentality," 
and can never be raised to the logicfll state of necessity or self-certainty. For that 
matter, our scientific "truth" is always characterised by degrees of probability and 
verification. But, it is obvioLls that a necessity and self-certainty is characteristic of our 
private knowledge of oLII'selves. 
One can put thisa'rgt;ment in other way: Assuming, for the sake of argument, 
,.~: . ,,?,~}J:~~:;,. 
that our consciousness' of Olii'selves is, like our reflective knowledge of external 
;:" ' .. :j: :' .', . ? " : -,- .\~. . . ~.:.~'.. . ", - :.. ".: .;: .. 
objects, by a represell'fation of the reali'ty of ourselves and not by the e~isten{ial 
. . . ~ 
presence of that reality itselt~ it then follows that this representation must be 
appropriated and referred t? ourselves as its "objective reference." This appropriation 
cannot be done except by knowing oLlrselves through another representation 
appropriated to ourselves as its objective reference. The other representation also 
requires 'another appropriate representation, and so on. This will then go on ad 
infinitum. Thus, in knowing myself: either I should not know myself at all, or I should 
'. know a range _ of i~tlrlite antecedent represe,ntations of myself along with_ the 
consequent knowledge, of 111yself at the end. The first alternative is contradictory, _ 
. while the second is an ~bsllrdity of an infinite nUf!1ber of items of knowledge within 
... ',' ", :- =;i· -, :" .. - .. ,} ','., .. -: ; ~. . 
• the limited scope ,of a single case of self-knowledge in.~a limited span of time. This is 
again another form of contradiction, because it requires an infinity in a finite case of 
knowing. Notice that in both alternatives it is assumed that, by virtue of self-certainty, 
we do know ourselves in one way or a~other.. That is, in this interpretation an 
unspecified sense of knowledge is understood through the assumption of the fact that 
we do know ourselves with all certainty. Taken thus, I cannot know myself by 
I· 
representation at all. However, since I do, with all certainty, know myself, my 
consciousness of my 'self must be by presence and not by representation. 
"Since YOU arc not absent from ,'our own reality and from your 
. . 
awareness of that reality, and it is not possible that this awareness be 
by a representation or ;1I1Y sllperaddition, it thus follows that in this 
awareness of your reality you need not have anything besides the very 
'" ',"' 
rcality of yourself, \\'hich is apparent to yourself or, if you wish, not 
absent from yoursel f. Consequently, it is necessary that the 
apprehcnsion of the reality of the self itself is only by itself according 
to what that self "is" in its bdng, just as it is necessary that YOll arc 
never absent from your reality and from \\'hatevcr YO~lr reality may 
consist of. On the other hand, whatever your real it" is absent from 
. , 
like those organs, viz. , heart, lungs, brain and all intermediate forms 
and modes, no matter whether they arc modes of darkness or of light, 
is not implied in thal constant awareness of your rcality. Your constant 
conscious reality is therefore not a material organ, ncither is it an 
intermediary one. Had your reality consisted of any of thcse things, 
you, as the constant and unfading consciousness of yourscJf, would 
never become absent from it. "(26) 
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Finally, we would remind ourselves here of a point. The preceding arguments 
proved at least the negative side of the Illuminative thesis; that is, the self cannot be 
absolutely known through anyt hing accessory t9 th.e pure reality of itself,. no matter 
",' , '\,', ~ .. :., , : ,-.' ., . "' 
..... whether thi~~:~cy.essory thing is a representation mad~ .~y i,tself or any other .thing that 
.' - ' .. -. :,_ .. , . "' . , .. . . 
can be refehed to as "it." From this already provedIlleorem, together with the earlier 
..t. ," .' <-.·t .. . . 
presuppositiqn tha~ we are in principle concerned and in touch with those beiDgs that 
are not absent fron;. themselves, two most important conclL,~.ions mar be derived here, 
. one following upon the other. (i) That the .unitary consciousness, the ~xistential 
experience of the self must necessarily be through the sheer presence of the reality of 
" ",' .. ...: . .. 
the self; this is the positive dimension of the thesis discussed in detail in previous 
chapter. (ii) That whatever is not known through the presence of the pure reality of 
'''', ~ • 't ... 
the self has neither a basic, nor even a pm1ial, part to" -play in making up the existential 
constitution of that reality, and lies, therefore, beyond the kingdom of"I-ness." 
. . -, ",. . . . '. ~ 
As for the .first1wpothesis, we can easily see that Suhrawardi' argumentation 
~ '. ~ . ',,:' ... ',. '", .. '.~' ' . {.', " '.' " : .... 
here is suppol1ive 'of Saaraean analysis of the unitary consciousness we saw in last 
chapter. Suhrawardi has pointed Ollt here that although we are, in actual 
circumstances, aware of ourselves, we l~lave clearly understood that it is absolutely 
impossible to attain this awareness through a representation, which would obviously 
count as something other than the bare reality of ourselves. It must thus be concluded 
thftt our awareness of ourselves is necessarily through the sheer "presence" of the 
reality of ourselves. The awareness of ourselves means neither more nor less than the 
. very existential reality of ourselves. This is the material equivalence between 
"knowing" ourselves by presence and "being" in ourselves as the existential reality of 
• ~r~ 
,'.'" 
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ourselves, and this is the meaning of the self-objectivity of the unitary consciousness, 
which in fact constitutes the positive aspect of Illuminative theor)'. 
5. 5. Tile Unitlll)' Consciousness is llon-temjJoral: 
As we have seen, the Illuminative theory of the unitary consciousness signifies 
that something exists in us before our personal history; to say that one bears the 
unitary consciousness in himself is to af1irm that he depends neither on his personal 
history nor on the world ( of objects); he would be dependent only if he had to acquire 
what he already possesses. Therefore, so far as he possesses this unitary 
consciousness, he is unengenderable, because it is an existential current experience __ 
as we have already hinted~ therefore, he is always already there. Of course, he is born, 
but the upsurge of tile for-itself (Ii 1I((f.\·eh) a being capable of revealing Beingio itself 
is not merely a historical event. The unitary consciousness is, according to the 
illuminationists, non-temporal. Considered from their standpoint, history then arises 
from a non-histol'ica[ ground, from a beginning which inaugurates time. 
In one form or another, this idea has some relatives in modern philosophy. Even 
in Kant we might find a certain support for it. It seems to be the ({priori which for him 
is non-temporal, since it represents a system' of logical conditions. But in addition to 
the transcendental subject Kant maintains the idea of the thing-in-itself, not only in 
order to combat the temptation of idealism, but also to designate the moral subject 
who acts according to an inte[ligible causality. For the Kantian subject is also a moral 
agent, and reason is also pr,1(tical reason. This moral subject is no longer purely 
logical as free actions insert themselves into the temporal web, and the kingdom of 
ends to which he belongs Illust be attained within history. Now this subject is not 
wholly temporal because his n'ee actions are absolute beginnings. 
We can also tind a relationship to Sartre whose existentialism is both a genetic 
theory of personality and a search for a fundament for the personality. He sees the 
finally irreducible element ,in Illan to be an "original project" in which the for-self 
determines its bein o and by which it unities itself fl'eely. Having all the unpredictability 
::> , 
of a free act and being, both completely contingent and irreducible, this "original 
choice of oLlr being" is really pre-temperal or non-temporal. Sartre attributes this 
choice to fl'eedom and attempts to guarantee its non-substantiality by saying that "the 
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structure [constituted by this choice] can be called the truth of freedom."(28) He 
introduces the notion of person here: 
"I freedom J is not to be distinguished from the choice of freedom; that 
is, from the person himself."(.?9J 
True, if we present Sartre' s position to the illuminationists like Sadra, they see 
instead that the person (or Illan: iIlS(fIl), considered as subject, is given to himself 
during his existential presence; and they would not designate a specific given in this 
action. This is because the subject has a primordial existence: he is affected by a 
contingency (see eh. 3) which, one may say, is not necessarily the mark of freedom. 
Nevel1heless, whether the subject is responsible (in Sartrjan sense), or not, what we 
would see is that, according to the IIIulllinative philosophy, the subject is rooted in the 
nOfol~tenlp'oral ~- even though he manifests and~~realise.s himself only in time. 
"-:',',:!; The' non-temporal is the unitary cO,I~s_2ioushess which IS the ground of the 
subject. It can, however, be the principle' of an individual history to the extent that it 
actualises itself or merely tends to actualise itself All genesis or authentic 
developrne'nt which is not simple repetition is, according to Sadra,f10) an actualisation 
of the unita'ry consciousness, as we have alrea'dy s-een. \-Though a condition of history, ", 
the unitary" consciousness in itself is nevertheless nbf historical for the irIuminationists 
simply because it is being and being is not temporal for them (contrary to Heidegger 
and his foUo\vers;See eh, 2); only the circumstances of its actualisation are -- so far 
- ~ -, 
as the unitary consciollsness is born in and \vith the individual (fard). This has the 
paradoxical ilhplication that the unitary c6'nscio~isnesshas no birth date, since birth, in 
any case, has a date only so far as eve11ts are' -dated in relation to it or so:far a~ it too is 
. . " . ~ . . ' : " ',. - ,'. 
considered as an event in the world, The unitary consciousness is the principle of 
genesis, not its effect. And, as imbued with and grounded by it, the subject is 
unengenderable. 
To the extent that it concerns what is foreign or prior to facts, the unitary 
consciousness does not have to be submitted to a factual test, simply because every 
te~t will be supplied by it through its living and current experience. Yet it calls for 
facts in two ways. First, it does not discredit a genetic theory; the priority of the 
unita'ry c,pnsciousness, as we have already seen, is not only logical, but also real and 
existential. This is why the llnitaryconsciollsness retains its autonomy by appearing as 
an origin, as a beginning which has no beginning: the existential and thus non-
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temporal priority of the unitary consciousness expressed in the temporal order as a 
radical priority. 
However, from a subjective standpoint, one may say that the unitary 
consciousness also has a logical priority. The benefit of this priority seems to express 
its absolute character and to translate it into the language of temporality by such an 
expression as "always already there." I t is this "always already there" that a genetic 
theory may bring to light: by showing how the unitary consciousness is actualised, 
such a theory manifests the primordial character of the unitary consciousness. As we 
have seen, by his method of ontetic reduction, Sadra detected the unitary 
consciousness (the self) as being always already known. 
More generally speaking, a genetic theory of the' self (Saclra uses: lakwill and 
Sayrllrah of J/((/" .. y>J) on dle basis or the unitary consciollsness can show how an 
.~:. . . 
individual (fard) has been open to certain meaning or values, and closed· to others: It 
~ \ ,J \t'. ,. '.~ • ,t ~. 
is depe~de·~t~·:-on being in ontetic tOllchwith them in the order· of b~i~~. Since his 
childhood, one may be defined by a cel1ain character of the unitary consciousness 
which it conceals and which, taken as a whole, form what we may call, to borrow a 
phrase from existentialists, his existential ({priori. This means that the unitary 
, . 
consciousness is actualised only if it belongs to a performative self who currently 
experiences. A performative self is that who is born and possesses an existential 
~ . . 
nature. This nature is constituted through that process of current experience, through 
the accomplishment of the unitary consciousm~~s. -
The unitary consciousness in fact signifies what is not known at first, what I 
know only afterwards when I say: I already knew' it or I have always known it. In fact, 
' .. ::-.;: .. ~ . . 'It>.~ ;. ~:~':\. "" 
. the unitary consciousness, as we have-seen; is the presence of. the self to self: in 
Bergsonian terms, the immanence of the past in the present. The unitary 
consciousness is what I am because I am essentially my current experience of my 
being in present of Being; this determines 'the meaning of my being in the present. 
Thus, from the Illuminative point of view~ the unitary consciousness must be 
understood in reference to being rather than in relation to knowing. Knowledge may 
;-
also be referred to, if it is defined not as a process of aiming at, but as one of 
. coinciding with: if, says Sadra, it is a manner of being and not a manner of acting or of 
preparing for action by elaborating of concepts. In this sense, knowledge is nothing 
.' 
other than presence to self 
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Moreover, the Illuminative theory of the unitary consciousness implies that our 
existential current experience of Being always has a pal11y actualised aspect and a 
partly non-actualised aspect (because it is a being-toward-its perfection [al-Maw}lId 
al-Talib Ii ai-Kamal]). To actualise the latter is to realise, in another perspective, 
what Kant took to be impossible: a non-objectifying knowledge of the self And it 
seems to combine two very different senses of self-relation; the relation to oneself as 
negation of the self, thus as the emptiness (jalla) which defines the unitary 
consciousness for Sadra, and the relation to oneself as presence to self, hence as the 
plenitude which defines self-know~edge for him. 
By now we have encountered the most important characteristics of the unitary 
consciousness. As we saw, all these characteristics indicate that the unitary 
consciousness is factual, existential and not accessible for our reflective thought. It is 
beyond the time but grounds it; then it .. i~peyond memOl"y. and imagination, rather, it is 
their root. It is the evidence or lIni~n~terablility of the self, simply because it is the 
being of the self. In following chapters, we \vill see two applications of the theory of 
unitary consciousness in particlIlar:(i) to Ollr private states (ii) to our reflective 
knowledge. 
II? 
CHAPTER SIX 
The Unitary Consciousness And Our Private States 
So far the meanlllgs of the Illuminative theory of the self and the unitary 
consciousness have been described. In order to establish that this unitary 
conSCiousness is primordial and has the sole principal role to play in the basic 
formation of the human intellect, the Illuminative philosophy proceeds to an empirical 
illustration which shows some ~pplications of this theory. The point of this study in 
this chapter is to present slich an application of the theory of the unitary 
consciousness when dealing with our private states. We will start with the Illuminative 
theory as to how we are aware of our private states in general; then we will consider 
the application of the lII.ulllinative theory of the unitary consciollsness to the body and 
," 
sensations in particular. 
6. 1. Our A lI'areness (~l the Internal States 
Concerning the problem of ollr awareness of private states as such, the 
Illuminative philosophy offers us an ontetic interpretation by applying the Illuminative 
theory of the unitary consciousness. Dealing with this problem, Suhrawardi says: 
, . 
"The self docs in f~lct apprehend Ithrough the unitary consciousness] 
its bod~ as \\dl as its imagination and its phantasm. The supposition 
that these things an: appn:h;:ndl..!d through a representation inherent in 
the realitv of the self, while the representation as such is universal, 
. . 
would imply that the'self is tile movel"of a uriiversal body using 
universal mental powers, and has no apprehension of its particular 
body nor acquaintance with the powers which belong to itself. This 
!,eonsideration I is obviously not right, because the imagination is 
ignorant and it cannot apprt:hcnd itself, just as it is ignorant of all the 
mental pm\l;rs, so it cannot challenge these powers in actual operation. 
Now if thc imagination is not competent to realise these mental 
powers, no material powcr can ever understand the tntth of itself; and 
if the self as an intellect were also not supposed to know an)1hing 
other than universals, then it would necessarily follow that a man 
would never know his own particular body, his own particular 
imagination, and his own particular phantasm, all of which pertain to 
himself. But this is not actually the case, because in the world of 
realitv there are no human beings who do not know in their own 
prese;,ce their o\\'n particular bodies and their o\\"n particular 
mentalities, using their own particular powers. The conclusion is that 
man kno\\'s all his mental powers with no mediation of an\' mental 
image, and knows thl: entirety of his body in the same manner.~' (}) 
118 
In this passage, Suhrawardi has taken a step toward an empirical account: Like 
self-apprehension, the apprehension of one's own body and all its mental powers and 
activities must be characterised as a form of the unitary consciousness. 
This point is to be explained. Setting aside for the moment the question of the 
self-knowledge given in this philosophy as the principal step towards the solution of 
the problem of human knowledge in general, the Illuminative philosophy tries to 
answer the question of how and in what reasonable manner we can be or are , , 
acquainted with our bodies, Ollr mental powers of imagination and phantasm, and our 
sense perceptions· in general. 8y asking this question and dealing with the 
metaphysical and epistemological aspects of this problem, it does not necessarily mean 
that we become ul1\\illingly involved in the psychological evaluation of human 
mentalities and the ways in -\\.·(li.~hi the mind functions. On the contrary, as Sadra tries 
to clarify, it seems that the question of how I am aware of my mental powers of 
understanding is far 11'0111 being a psychological question such as one of knowing, 
according to "scientific procedure", my mental powers as designed to act or as being 
acted upon. However there are two points to be noted. 
(a) The whole point behind this philosophical Issue is that whereas we are 
undoubtedly aware of our powers of imagination and phantasm as well as our bodies, 
we need further to understand how we can characterise this awareness. Is it that, in 
order to know OLIr own particular power of imagination, we must in one way or 
. another grasp a reprc5entation ("if that particular power? And also, are we supposed, 
in ·order to know -our phantasm:to have a melital image as the representation of that 
phantasm, and likewise for our body and all the powers operating in our own 
particular body? If this is the case, then the question will be: How and where does 
such a representation take place? Does the representation of the imagination come 
into the imagination itself: and that of our sense experience in our senses themselves, 
and of our body in the body itselt: etc. ? 
i 
As the classical epistemic law stands, the representation of these things never 
occurs in these things themselves, but rather in the higher stage of the self which is 
called the "intellect," or the power of transcendental understanding. This is because, 
just as sense-perceptions can never perceive themselves, nor a body ever apprehend 
itself, so also imagination and phantasm cannot imagine and fancy themselves. On this 
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hypothesis we must come to the conclusion that the representation of these things can 
only appear within the intellectual power of the self and never in any lower mental 
power of apprehension. Thus, all the representations and mental appearances taken 
from our bodies and mentalities IllUst accordingly be regarded as intellectual, and, for 
that matter, universal, and no apprehended motions in our body regarded as 
particular. 
(b) Given that all these representations situated in the intellectual self are 
abstract, and in that sense, universal, the self as performative can never act upon, or 
be informed by, the pal1icular reality of the things represented. This is simply because 
it can have no communication in the level of concept whatsoever with these particular 
things if the link between the intellectual universal representations and the particular 
reality of these things is missing. In these circumstances all the "1", as a performative 
self, can do is "intellectually" move the universal body which is' the representation of 
my particular body instead of ill0ving my actual body itself, alld operate the universal 
imagination and phantasm, \vhich are representations, instead of operating the real 
particular ones. This is \\~hat Suhrawardi points out in his empirical theory by saying it 
"would imply that the self is the' mover' of a universal body using universal powers .. 
" 
.. "(2) This is, of course,' the denial of the most evident, actual motion of our particular 
bodies that we empirically perform in every intentional act, the ~bsurdity of which 
denial must be called a pragmatic contradiction, if not a logical contradiction. For the 
way of operation, and the functioning, of our intentional moven'lents contradicts the 
claim of such a denial that there are no pal1icular motions at all in our bodies, and that 
all our bodily movements arc ulli\ersal.(3J 
~ 
By now, we have described the general ,position of the Illuminative philosophy 
concerning our consciousness of our internal states in Suhrawardi's language. In that 
discussion, I tried to show that this consciousness is not reflective, representative and 
conceptual. \Ve saw how our consciousness of these states is in Suhrawardi's 
language by presence. In the following sections we would focus on two issues in 
particular: the first is the relation of the unitary consciousness and the body; arid the 
s~cond is the relation of the unitary consciollsness and Ollr sensation/feelings. 
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6. 2. Tlte Unitary CO/1sciousness and The Body 
In the previous section, we saw that our consciousness of our body, according 
to the Illuminative philosophy is not conceptual and representative. Nor is that all 
however: In the light of his detailed discussion on the body-mind relationship, Sadra 
goes far beyond Suhrawardian general position. In fact, the Illuminative philosophy in 
its Sadraean version presents us a theory to remove, in the ontetic field, the dualism of 
body-mind (or mind, etc.) in the light of his theory of Being(-IJ to accord with our 
everyday experience and to remove the ancient platonic explanation of the relation 
between the mind and the body which is embodied as a relation between a driver and 
the chariot he steers. Plato thought that the mind is a substance free from matter and 
exists in a supernatural world. Later, it descends to the body in order to steer it and 
manage it. It is clear that Plato's explanation of this pure dualism that separates the 
mind and the body cannot explain the close relation between them that makes every 
human being feel that he is one, and not two things that come from two different 
worlds and then met. The platonic explanation remains incapable of solving the 
problem, in spite of the revision made in it by Aristotle who introduced the idea of 
'form' and 'matter' -- a revision that influenced philosophical minds after him during 
the medieval period. 
In post-medieval philosophical discussion of the mind-body problem, the central 
figure is Descartes whose well-known dualism of res cogitons-res extel7so (Cartesian 
dualism) (positively and negatively) formed the major attitudes in modern philosophy. 
For a cartesian dualist the mind and body are both substances, but while the body is an 
extended, and so a material, subst::tnce, the mind is an unextended, or spiritual, 
substance, subject to completely different principles of operation from the body. It 
was this doctrine that Gilbert Ryle caricatured as the myth of the ghost in the 
machine. 
Dualist theories are also to be found in a more sceptical form, which may be 
called "bundle dualism". The word "bundle" springs from Hume's insistence that 
I 
when he turned his mental gaze upon his own mind, he could discern no unitary 
. substance but simply a bundle of perceptions. (see Ch. 1) Hume thought of such a 
bundle as non-physical. A bundle dualist is one who dissolves the mind in this general 
way, while leaving the body and other material things intact. 
121 
Besides dividing dualism into Cartesian and bundle theories, one may also divide 
it according to a different principle. "Interactionalist" theories hold what common 
sense asserts, that the body can act upon the mind and mind can act upon the body. 
For "parallelist" theories, however, mind and body are incapable of acting upon each 
other. Every event occurring in one of them is accompanied by a parallel event in the 
other (like two synchronised clocks). This necessary accompaniment between mental 
events and bodily events does not mean that either of them is a cause of the other. 
The mutual influence between a material being and an immaterial being, according to 
parallelism, makes no sense. Rather, this necessary accompaniment between these 
two kinds of event is due to the divine providence that has willed the sensation of, for 
example, hunger always to be accompanied by the movement of the hand for reaching 
the food, without this sensa! ion being a cause of this movement. It is clear that this 
theory is a new explanation of plato' s duali~m 'that separates the mind and the body. 
There is also an intermediate view, especially when combined with with a bundle 
theory of mind, that is called the doctrine of "epiphenominalism". This view tries to 
cognise the independent reality of the mental with approving the controlling role of 
the brain in the mental life. 
Mentalist theories arise naturally out of dualistic theories, particularly where the 
dualistic position is combined with Descartes own view that the mind is more 
immediately and cel1ainly known than anything material. If this view is taken, it is 
natural to begin by becoming sceptical of the existence of the material things. 
(Remember Berkeley). 
Though it is usually accepted that Cartesian dualism (res cOKilalls-res extensa) 
logically ends up in the deadlock of mentalism, Descartes' own particular form of the 
theory, however, seems to have still a bit room to avoid such a radical subsequence. 
Through his /v/editotio/ls, he tries to attest a "substantial union" between body and 
mind through nature: 
"Nature tcaches l11e nothing more expressly or clearly than the fact that 
I have a body, that this body feels out of sorts when I am in a bad 
mood, and that it needs food or drink wh~n I feci hungry or thirsty .... 
"(51 
This voice of nature is feeling, the experience of obscure and confused qualities; 
it has to be ouaranteed by divine truth and appear as being itself the voice of God. Yet 
::> • 
what Descartes discovers in the Cogit() is a reason for the union, not, as we see in 
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Sadra, its being. The union needs a justifying reason because, even if it is directly 
experienced, it is not immediately clear to reflection: for the reflective knowledge, the 
mind is really distinct from the body, since it is an autonomous substance. This 
precludes interpreting the union as a unity (as Aristotle thought) or as an identity (as 
Spinoza maintained); it can only be a conjunction. Descartes does, however, make as 
much progress toward unification of the two substances as is possible. He recognises 
that the mind is compromised by the body; feelings are not the thoughts of a mind 
distinct from the body, and the body in its turn is structured by the mind: its functional 
indivisibility results from its union \vith the mind. Apart from this union the body 
exists as a mere collection of mechanical pal1s without a nature of its own; such a 
machine gains purposiveness only when the mind bestow finality upon it, and 
"turns a purely mcchanical assemblagc into a "'hole, teleologically 
related to all of the bod\'. "(6) 
As a result, the body is both divisible and indivisible; if on the one hand it 
participates in the indivisibility of the mind, on the other hand the indivisible mind 
participates in extension without being itself an extended substance. In sum, Descartes 
accurately describes the effects of the union of body and mind, but he admits that this 
union is unintelligible in itself -- an unintelligibility that provides a reason to celebrate 
God for having created this union, and to exonerate Him for having made man fallible. 
Instead, Sadra conceives the idea of a real unity on the basis of the seWs being, 
lived in diverse experiences, though without these experiences being able to introduce 
a principle of dissociation into this unity. \Vhen the vicissitudes of this union -- e.g., 
the mind acting on the body and vice versa, or the mind trying to cut itself loose from 
the body -- are invoked to illustrate fully lived experiences, they are usually of the 
order of the "as if' because they presuppose dualism. Of course, Sadra speaks of the 
mind: certain moral, theological and mystical codes push him to; however in using a 
term such this, he seems to abstract from his theory only to describe his conclusions 
and to make his theory understandable in his contemporary ofTicial philosophical 
lahguage and terminology. 
Taking the human reality 111 an existential kinetic movement (al-Harakat al-
Juhariyyah) on the basis of his theory of Being, Sadra sees that the body in its 
existential movement pursues the completion of its existence ana continues its 
completion (kama!), until it is fl'ee fl'om its materiality under specific conditions and 
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becomes an immaterial being- that, in the case of human being, leads to what is called 
'human soul' or' mind'.(7) In spite of the fact that the mind is not material, it has 
material source in body. For Sadra, the mind not only is not separated from the 
body, but rather it itself is nothing but a material being made superior by the 
existential movement. This does not, however, mean for him that the mind is a 
product of the body and one of its effects; never. It is a product of the existential 
movement which does not proceed from matter itself. By this meaning he considers 
that the body is the' near side' of the unique reality appearing to us in our everyday 
experience. The 'other side', traditionally called mind or mind, generated by the 
ontetic purification of the body's being, is the dept of that reality. 
On the basis of Sadraean theory of body whenever I say "my body," I prevent 
myself from considering it a~ an~' body \vhatsoever, as a Cartesian machine. And I 
should not think, either, of a body linked with a mind, but of an animated body; nor of 
a mind linked with a body, but of a corporeal mind -- as we find in Merleau-Ponty's 
theory. According to Sadra this is because the body is the genetic origin of the mind. 
At the beginning, there is only the body, such holds Sadra tS) Then, getting deepened 
through its existential kinetic mO\'ement, the body, like a flower, opens and its depth 
comes out and embraces its existentially genetic origin, i.e., the body, as a foam. The 
mind is depth of the body. In other words, according to Sadra/IJ the body and the 
mind are two terms to describe two aspects of one and the same existentially unique 
reality at which we look t1-om two different standpoints. 
Sadra has, indeed, discussed his sophisticated theory of body in detail and 
written pages upon pages to demonstrate it. However, since we have confined 
ourselves in preseni research to the Illuminative theory of the unitary consciousness to 
see its contribution, to some limited extent, to the basic problem of modern 
philosophy, we are not to engage ourselves in the details of his theory of body. 
Instead, as depicting the scope of the unitary consciousness, which equals the 'being' 
of the self in the Sadraean perspective, we see the relation of this unitary 
c~nsciousness with the body. In this latter case, he seems to detect the body in the 
unitary consciousness, and not simply to join one to the other in Cartesian fashion. 
To do this task, Sadra detects body-consciousness as an existential mode of the 
unitary consciousness. I / O) It appears ti'om what Sadra tells LIS that I do not know my 
body, in its existential state, as an object; rather, I am aware of it as my 'self; I 
discover it in my unitary consciousness as my experience of my presence -- my being. 
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Sadra does not plan to find the body as if it were already there, existing independently 
of the mind, and ready for a kind of pact with it. Then he does not deduce the body: 
either in the Car1esian sense of the word, according to which it is subordinated to 
consciousness both in the order of being and in the order of knowing (for if the body 
has a meaning it is to be always already there, thanks to causes, not our 
understandings), or in the Kantian sense of deduction, since the body is unjustifiable~ 
it is neither a right nor a possession. According to Sadra, I do not possess a body, in 
the way that I own a cloth; instead, my unitary consciousness, my existential 
experience of my being teaches me that r am my body. r do say that I have bad eyes 
as I say that I have a stomach-ache; but in holding my body at a distance in this 
manner, I aftlrm that I am more than a body, not that I am not a body. \Ve must, then, 
find the body in the unitary consciollsness, and conceive of the unitary consciousness 
as a body. 
Sadra starts from this fact that the unitary consciousness bears witness to the 
body by the very fact that the body is present to it. At first, the unitary consciousness 
is existentially conscious of body. In this level, for Sadra there is not a question of the 
body-as-subject: we are on the plane of the unitary consciousness, not of reflective 
knowledge. As Sadra teaches that corporeality (rather than the multiple and divisible 
body) is immediately my first living experience in the plane of the unitary 
consciousness. A child, for example, is consciolls of all his body, of his body as 
whole, before exploring and recognising the diversity of its parts: consciousness of the 
body is prior to the reflective distinction between external and internal perception, and 
does not result from a co-ordination or interpretation of sensation. The body is given 
as a primary unity which is the expression of a corporeal being, not as the result of a 
synthesis or as the conclusion of a judgement of finality. (1/) 
In elaborating tbis identity, Sadra begins with the unitary consciousness, and 
first of all discovers the selfin it.II':1 \Ve have already seen this when we discussed his 
doctrine that the unitary consciousness implies the 'being' of the self (Ch. 4), and that 
only the self absorbed in and presented before Being can become a unitary 
conscIousness. Now so far as he wants to take body-consciousness as the unitary 
conSCIOusness, it seems, Sadra tries to verify it in another way. In the following 
discussion we try to bring out his hidden and sophisticated argument in comparison 
with modern trends when applicable to make clear what he may want to say. 
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We can put this 'another' way as a trying to answer this modern question: Why 
IS the Cogito in the first person? It is evident that when I say "I think," I am 
abstracting, in Sadraean manner, from my unitary consciousness. It transfers us from 
the order of being to the order of concept, from the ontetic field to the eidetic field. 
What then the' I' signifies is that this 'I think' implies a unitary consciousness which is 
self-consciousness: when I say' I think', I think that I think. This consciousness exists 
for the self as a presence to self However, the self may not be interpreted here as a 
verbal or logical condition for the unitary consciollsness, and then, on this basis as the 
condition, for the objectivity of my representations. Rather, we have seen that the 
Illuminative theories of Sadra avoid thus interpreting the self. The self, as Sadra said 
to us, has another kind of being: a non-formal and non-logical being which is also 
non-substantial. This being, Sadra already said, is like that belonging to a pure 
relation or preposition (eh 3) Never being reflective, this being is an existential 
experience of no-mind: "the pure nihilating movement of reflection" as says Sartre 
along with whom Sadra maintains that the unitary consciousness makes itself realised 
through this movement. 
For Sadra self-consciousness implies a relation, that is a presence, to the self, a 
unitary consciousness. The unitary consciousness manifests its interiority in this rela-
tion, for it turns back onto itself only insofar as it is turned toward Being in the 
process of its existential experience: It is self-consciousness as the unitary 
consciousness. It is also a consciousness of self as self, so that the self, the unitary 
consciousness, performs a double function here: as the pronoun of consciousness and 
as a pronominal absolute. Actually, from Sadraean perspective, at the level of the 
unitary conscioLlsness, the pre-reflective Cogilo, there is no self-knowledge 
transforming the self into a knO\,vn object, only an allusion to the self that can later be 
made explicit by underlining pronoun "(". Hence the selfis no longer consciousness of 
itself or its movement in this reflective sense, but the unitary consciousness effecting 
this movement. It is in this sense "empty" (fol/i). In such a process there is no 
symmetrical intentionality, as we see in reflective knowledge, belonging to that which 
I 
intends the object, for the unitary consciousness does not intend or posit the subject; it 
experiences and lives it. The unitary conscioLlsness is not so present to Being that it is 
not at the same time conscious that this presence is its own presence. The "I" is thus 
immanent in the unitary consciousness. For Sadra, the self in its non-subjectivistic 
sense cannot be an illusion, since it is immediately present to itself. Nor is it -- like the 
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.Kantian "I think" -- a simple character of successive psychological or logical 
consciousness, since it is given as a self which is the unitary consciousness, and as an 
active principle that makes the experience of Being possible (see: Ch. 4). The self is 
the unitary consciousness as that which experiences Being. According to Sadra, to be 
conscious does not signify to have consciousness like a possession. To be conscious is 
not to possess a quality but to perform an act. The unitary consciousness is the act 
and performance rather than the possession of the subject -- an act and performance 
determining his being. 
This unitary consciollsness is active, and therefore ascertained and realised. 
When Sadra asserts that '1' can exist only in an individual self and that the 
experiencing individual is given in all existential experience, he pursues his analysis of 
the unitary consciollsness yet fllrthel~. In fact, the self that is the unitary consciousness 
<'\. 
which achieves its fundamental selfllo"Od (as with some reservations, Sartre would also 
say), is a singular self In every experience, the unitary consciousness is unique and 
irreplaceable. If the Cartesian S/lI11, one may then say, accompanies even the 
pre-reflective Cogito, this is because the self posits itself as an absolute by force of its 
unitary consciousness. 
Taken thus, the self in the sense of the unitary consciousness is not the object of 
observations and inductions which belong to the eidetic field. In other words, to the 
extent that it does not give rise to a reflection -- which always risks impurity --
conferring properties and prerogatives on it, this self can claim neither the being of an 
object nor that of a subject which would somehow remain motionless in its being as 
the unitary consGious~ess. "It has only the precarious and absolute being of the unitary 
.' '.-
consciousness. This being, however, seems from a reflective point of view, as non-
being or empty simply because it is not accessible for the reflective knowledge. The 
unitary consciousness denies itself as an in-itself precisely because it. is in-itself in spite 
of itself, or at least because it is always menaced by the in-itself as if by its own 
shadow. In fact, Sadra specifies that if the unitary consciousness is negation, it is not 
only the indeterminate negation of the self in general. but the determinate negation of 
I· 
a determinate in-itself, i.e .• of a particular Uoz'i) self In refusing its particularity 
. (joz'iyyal), the unitary consciousness admits that it is particular~ it has to have a 
certain perspective. a certain mode of being and a certain portion of existential 
experience of Being. This particularity is not at present made explicit by means of 
empirical, objective determinations; but it is expressed by a sort of the experience of a 
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living relation with a being that proposes or conceals itself, in the feeling of effort or 
relaxation and the like. When I say "1" before any reflection on this' 1', Sadra believes, 
I experience myself as someone, not as just anyone or as an abstract universal. My 
presence to Being or to beings with which 1 am in an ontetic touch is a singular 
presence, not an anonymous and neutral one, although it may imply different degrees 
of plenitude or depth -- for example, according to whether I think conceptually or feel 
affectively. Now, the body, Sadra argues, constitutes this singularity (Iashakhkhos) 
and provides this plenitude. \Ve should not say that the body continually reminds me 
of its presence, or that it supports or betrays me, embarrasses or stimulates me~ for 
then I obj.ectify it (though its very nature invites such objectification), and I substitute 
an artificial relation with my body for my spontaneous relation with Being. The body 
is not present to me as Being is, since it is my presence to Being; 1 am not conscious 
of my body as I am conscious of a being with which I am in ontetic touch because I 
am my body. This is why Sadra speaks of the consciousness of the body as the 
'continuous' beginning stage of the unitary consciousness. Body-consciousness (or in 
Sartrian special phrase: 'consciousness (on body') expresses the fact that the body is 
not an object for the unitary consciollsness, but it is the unitary consciousness itself. 
By this manner as we see Sadra has found the body in the unitary consciousness, 
though not as object; rather, as the unitary consciousness itself so far as it is singular 
(motashakhkhe .... '). (131 
We can easily see similarities between the path followed by Sadra and that 
followed by Sartre:(J-!1 In a similar (but not necessarily the same) manner, Sartre also 
tries to take away any distinction between non-reflective consciousness and body. In 
this relation he says: 
"being for itself must b~ wholly body or wholl\' conSClOlisness~ it 
cannot united with the body. "(/51 
Sartre also points out the singularity of the for-itself when he recalls the Platonic 
doctrine according to which the body individualises the mind and represents "the 
inaividualisation of my engagement in the world "(161 But in coming into the world 
and becoming engaged in it, we are captured and compromised by it. The body is in 
fact, writes Sartte: 
"the in-itself "hich is surpassed by nihilating for-itself and which 
. ' "( 1"'1 
reapprehends the for-itself III the very surpassing. 
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However, taking Sartrian language, reapprehending the for-itself means from 
Sadraean standpoint that the for-itself is also an in-itself; although not in the sense that 
man would be the God that is a being wholly and simultaneously for-itself and in-
itself. Instead, the alliance between for-itself and in-itself is established on the plane of 
finitude and as if it were an imperfection. Sartre, however, insists on another aspect of 
the for-itself: its double contingency: 
"on the one hand, while it is necessary that I exist in the form of being-
there,still it is altogether contingent that I exist in the first place, for I 
am not the foundation of my being; on the other hand, while it is 
necessary that I be engaged in this or that point of vicw,it is contingent 
that it should be precisely in 'one to the exclusion of others. \Ve have 
called this twofold contingency embracing the necessity the facticity of 
the for-itself."( 18) . 
Therefore the body is the ntcticity of the for-itself: and this IS of crucial 
importance. 
Nevel1heless, in spite of this,and without deducing it, Sal1re arrives at the body 
in two ways,in both of them he is expressly opposed to Descartes The first consists 
in investigating the basic relation between the for-itself and the in-itself. The in-itself 
here is the world, not what r am myself; consequently, the body ,even though not 
exterior to the subject,. remains idealised to a certain extent; it 'designates' my 
situation, it 'is defined' as my contingency, it 'represents' my individualisation. All of 
these verbs express the ontological function of the body, not its being; Sartre says: 
"the body manifests my contingency ... it is only this contingency."(19) 
Then he defines being in terms of function. Secondly, the study of the body is 
part of the study of the tor-others. The for-itself is here opposed to the for-others, 
rather than to the in-itself and the for-others determines what is or is not in-itself. The 
body then is in-itself only for others, while by itself, for the consciousness that 
experiences it or rather is it, it is for-itself. The body ceases to appear as the object it 
is for others when I experience it, instead of thinking about it and assuming the 
perspective of others. 
In spite the similarities one may feel between Sartre and Sadra in this case, 
however, there remains one important distinction in particular: Sartre does not tell us 
. about the being of body; on contrary, Sadra has tLllly discLissed the being of the body. 
Though we would not fall in such a detailed discussion which is bey'ond our present 
research, we may however consider his discllssion on the being of the body insofar as 
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it is identical with the unitary consciousness: as we have seen (eh.4), the self of self-
consciousness designates, for Sadra, both the movement of the unitary consciousness 
and its nature; movement denying its nature as being accessible for reflective 
knowledge and yet affirming it in the very denial as the primordial and existential 
current experience of Being: displaying the non-being of a being. The body is, 
according to Sadra, both surpassed and posited in this process. But we must not think 
that it undergoes this treatment passively,as if the unitary consciousness is exterior to 
it. The body is surpassed and posited because it is identified with the unitary 
consciousness; this is the very nature. It is not sLlrpassed by the unitary consciousness 
as if by its other simply because, Sadra aflirms, the body-consciousness is the 
continuous beginning of the unitary consciousness. To put this in a comparative way, 
it surpasses itself by effecting the nihilating movement that SaI1re attributes to the 
for-itself. 
Sadra brings forth here a clarification of the seeming opposition of the unitary 
consciousness and body: he notices that we would ever remember the two orders or 
fields already mentioned one of which is of concept and the other is of being. When 
we are talking of the identity of the unitary consciousness and body-consciousness we 
are in the second order not in the first one. In the first order, because we reflectively 
distinguish between the body and the mind we remain with the illusion of a dualism; 
but, in fact, it is not the case if we look from the second order on which the body is 
not only on trial with itself, but also with Being. Surpassing itself t,oward Being, 
Sadra holds, it exists only in acting, in a living existential experience -- that is, in the 
unitary conscioLlsness-- and it becomes identified with, and as, the latter. The body, 
from this Sadraean standpoint, is here no longer an object. but an' acting self, a 
performative 'I'. On this, in all activity. the body is not experienced as a body, but as 
the unitary consciousness. This means for him that the body ,does not possess 
, , 
conceptual existence; it has the existence of the in-itself The body is both for-itself 
and in-itself This is why is Sadra led to say that I am body as the unitary 
consciousness. or as Suhrawardi said, my consciousness of my body is by presence. 
/-
The fact that this body is part of my existential presence means for Suhrawardi that it 
, exists for the unitary consciousness; However, Sadra seems to hold that this does not 
prevent the body from being the unitary consciousness. For Sadra, the unitary 
consciousness and body are two perspectives on or two languages about one and the 
same really. 
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The unitary consciousness, as we have seen, is, according to Sadra, that of a 
process; It is a living and current experience through which, and because I am a being-
toward-perfection (altalih Ii (II kamal), I am always the negation of what I am; this 
negation is entirely spontaneous, and is made explicit only when I reflect; I am my 
body on the condition of not being it, since I say 'I'. Yet it occurs all the time and is 
, , 
my very existence. 
By this line of reasoning, Sadra comes to an interesting conclusion: the for-itself 
(Ii Ilafseh) and the in-itself (fl JI(f/\·eh) are not two modalities of being brought 
together and reconciled in me: I am a for-itself -- i.e., both presence and opposition to 
myself -- but not only in and through my relation with the in-itself, which is what I 
deny in myself and which yet is myself. It is this unity of the for-itself and in-itself in 
me that constitutes my being. 
6. 3. Our Awareness (~l Sensations lind Feelings: 
Following the above line of reasoning, the Illuminative philosophy presents an 
existential interpretation of the sensations and feelings by considering them as the 
examples of the unitary consciousness. In this respect Suhrawardi writes: 
"One of the things that supports our opinion that we do have some 
kind of apprehensions {idrakal} which need not take a fonn of 
representation (sllrah) other than the presence of the reality {dhat} of 
the thing apprehended (l11l1drak). is when a man is in pain from a cut 
or from damage to one of his organs. He than has a feeling of this 
damage. But this feding or ~pprehension is' never in such a way that 
that damage leaves ill the same, organ 'of the body or in another a form 
of.representation of itself b~sidcs the reality of itself. Rather, the, thing· 
app~~hend~d is but that damage itself. This is what is. truly sensible 
and it counts in itself for pain, not a representation of it, caused by 
itself. This proves that there are among things apprehended by us, 
some things such that in being apprehended it is sufficient that their 
reality be received in the Illind or in any agent which is present in the 
mind. "(JOI 
In this passage we can find two straightforward points dealing with the matter at 
/. 
issue, namely, the empirical exemplification of the unitary consciousness. The first is 
. what Suhrawardi has indicated by his words ·'thal we do have some kinds of 
apprehensions 141hich need 1101 take allY form of represt!l1Iatioll." Mediation and 
intervention by a representation for the attainment of knowledge is needed and carried 
out by the intentional act of mind if, and only if, the reality of the object is initially 
131 
"absent" from the mind of the subject. This is exactly the case when an external object 
is apprehended. But as regards those objects that are already "present" for an'!', and 
that with which this '1' is in an ontetic touch, it seems absurd to "represent" what is in 
itself "present"; it is more or less like knowing something that has already been 
known. 
The second point constitutes his main argument, which is an empirical analysis 
of the experience of pain. The experience of pain is one of several examples that 
Illuminative philosophy offers us for the explanation of its theory. One's empirical 
awareness of his sensations and feelings, sLich as pain, emerges through the unitary 
consciousness and not by reflective knowledge. The Illuminative philosophy holds 
that this sort of awareness is privileged with the highest degree of sense certainty in 
that when I am aware that I am in pain it makes no sense to say at the same time that I 
doubt whether I am in pain. But this certainty nevertheless does not account for the 
property of the truth or falsehood of my awareness of pain. This is so, it is argued, 
because the logical theory of truth must be given in such a way that the judgement or 
expression, while making sense, can alternatively admit of the opposite qualities, truth 
or falsity. 
This condition is perfectly satisfied primarily by reflective knowledge, and 
derivatively by descriptive statements and expressions that are designed to express 
this kind of knowledge. Why this logical alternation, truth or falsity, does not apply to 
the unitary consciousness, but does apply to reflective knowledge is a question of 
which the Illuminative philosophy is fully aware. We have already mentioned this 
point among the characteristics of the unitary consciousness (see eh. 5). However, as 
it is said, an empirical illustr~ltion for the unitary consciousness is given by the 
example of our pain experience. This means that the bare presence of the existential 
status of pain in our mind is a suHicient and complete condition for being acquainted 
with pain without the mediation of a formal "representation" of the pain experience in 
the mind. 
Here this question seerns to be raised: From what thing are we really suffering in 
a case of pain experience - from a cut in our finger, a fracture in our leg, etc., or from, 
in Suhrawardi's own language, a representation or in Russell's words, a sense-datum 
of that cut or fracture? Suhrawardi believes it would be absurd to put the blame upon 
the sense-data or the representation and appearance of the pain experience, while the 
reality of the pain is absolutely present in us or in some of the powers of the suffering 
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subject, which are all present in and for us. This is simply a physiological fact that 
one's feeling of a cut in one's finger, for example, is undoubtedly one's acquaintance 
with the cut in the finger itself: not with the representation or the sense-data of the 
cut. A cut in my finger is hardly like my table that I am seeing and touching, etc. In 
that experience it is quite understandable to say that in front of my table I am 
acquainted with the sense-data that make up the appearance of my table its colour, 
shape, etc. But in the "presence" of the reality of a fracture in my leg, how can it 
make sense to say that I am acquainted with the sense-data that make up the 
appearance of my broken leg~ its colour, shape, hardness, smoothness, etc.? Does this 
really account for my pain? No, it certainly does not~ the Illuminative philosophy 
answers. Of course, I can see and touch my deformed broken leg from the outside and 
get acquainted with the sense-data that make up the appearance of my leg, as my 
doctor does, but this sort of acquaintance is no longer the same as I have already had 
with my pain itself. It is therefore another kind of acquaintance, with which the 
Illuminative philosophy is not concerned while speaking of the reality of sensations 
and feelings. It talks about the acquaintance with our feeling and our pain, not with 
the sense-data, or representation of the deformation of our leg which serves as an 
external physical object, and goes with the reflective knowledge. 
Therefore, having established this empirical example, the Illuminative philosophy 
maintains, that Ollr apprehension or knowledge of sensations and feelings is not 
attained by any representation or sense-data. It is only through an existential 
unification called, in the system of the aforementioned philosophers, "presence", 
existential experience or as we called it the unitary consciousness, that this category 
. of awareness comes into being in which the reality of a thing known is existentially 
present before the self -- who is in an olllelic tOllch with the reality of that thing --
without any representation or sense-data of that thing -- as indicated by the 
characteristic of self-objectivity~ that is, the unitary consciousness concerns, begets 
and catches the reality of beings without having or using their representation. This 
means that oLir consciOllsness of sensations and feelings expresses only another aspect 
l-
of our being. 
The Illuminative analysis does not posit any relation or association of our 
unitary consciousness with a thing or bring out any sense of "representation" for our 
real instantiation of feelin(Ts and sensations. While we are experiencing pain or 
~ 
pleasure, our actual object of acquaintance and awareness, with which we are truly 
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acquainted, belongs to the order of heJIIK· It has nothing to do, of course at the 
moment of experience, with the order of "conception" and representational 
"apprehension. " 
Representations, on the other hand, are designed to preserve these two 
fundamental aspects of reflection which are incompatible with the unitary 
consciousness. They function (a) to maintain the reflection or kind of association they 
have with their external objective references, and (b) as belonging to the order of 
conception not to the order of being and instantiation. By their nature they cannot 
associate themselves with the order of heillK because they are representations of 
objects. These are sufficient reasons for Illuminative philosopher not to be satisfied 
with the representative theory of sensation and feeling, and part company with its 
consequences. 
Here it is necessary to remind ourselves of the fact that the Illuminative 
description of empirical cases of the unitary consciousness is always qualified by the 
phrase "at the time of immediately experiencing our sensation and feeling." This is 
essential for indicating that we are dealing with a case of the unitary consciousness if 
we are in the act of experiencing our sensation not in the act of "reflecting" lIpon our 
experience. Therefore it is concluded in the Illuminative philosophy that our 
consciousness of sensations and feelings is not by reflection, because it is a case of the 
unitary consciousness and then bears the very meaning of "presence" the nature of 
which pertains to the order of heillK as distinct from the order of conception and 
perception. If we reflect lIpon ollr sensation, say by relating Ollr episode of pain or 
pleasure last night, or even at the \'cry present moment of experience, to a friend or a 
doctor, we try to conceptllalise ollr feeling and bring it from its order of being into a 
sort of representation which is of the order of conception. By doing this we move 
from the existential realm of the unitary consciollsness to the conceptual state of 
reflective knowledge. This is, according to Illuminative philosophy, what reflection is 
like, becallse whenever there is room for representation there is possibility for 
rejlection, and what this reflection necessitates is notl1ing other than a knowledge 
which may, in turn, be either true or false. 
It may be added here that despite the fact that reflective knowledge provides us 
with a representation and conception or its external object and serves as an intentional 
act of knowing, initiating in LIS the whole range of intentionality, the mode of the 
unitary consciollsness operates in a completely different way. It brings about, and 
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gives rise to, the real ill.'i/allliatioll of the o hje c;I, which is the oC/l/al reality oj the 
object. Instead of objectifying its intentional form of object by virtue of 
conceptualisation, it rather brings to the light of our acquaintance the reality [i.e., 
being] of the object itself In this manner, it makes us identify, under certain 
conditions, with the ontological reality of the object. They are bound together in an 
existential unification, in an ontetic touch. If I say, for instance, "I know I am in 
pain," it means nothing but "I am in pain." The word "to know" therefore plays 
nothing more than an emphatical role for a cel1ain state of heillg. This is, however, 
what is meant by "non-representational consciousness." 
In this context, it may be interesting to refer here to Wittgenstein whose position 
on the same issue seems close to the Illuminative position: 
"In \\'hat scnsc ~lIl' Ill~ scnsations private? \Vell, onh" I can know 
\\'I1l,thcr I am rC<llIy in pain; another person can only surmise it. In one 
\\'ay this is \\Tong, in another nonsense. If \\c are using the word "to 
know" as it IS normally used (and ho\\ else arc \\1': to use it?), then 
other people very often know when] am in pain. - Y cs <III the same not 
with the certainty with which know it myself' It cannot be said of me 
at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it 
supposed to mean - except perhaps that I am in pain,?"(.?lJ 
Arriving at the point of saying, even though with a sense of uncertainty, "that I 
know 1 am in pain ... is ... to mean that I (fill in pain," \Vittgenstein seems to realise, in 
agreement with the Illuminative theory, that our acquaintance with our sensations 
need not be achieved by an intentional form of knowledge and not by the ordinary 
(subjectivistic) sense of knowledge. I.?.?) It is thus really the case that for any sensation 
and feeling such as pain or pleasure to be known by the agent, the being of that 
sensation and feeling must be present in the presence of that agent in such a way that 
the ontological and epistemological differences between them become absolutely 
non-existent. This is because the ontological and epistemological status of a present 
object and that of the agent in which the object is presented are in fact one and the 
same. When ontological and epistemological aspects are united, it is not surprising 
(and for Wittgenstein as well, it seems, there should be no room for doubt or 
I 
hesitation) that "to know" I am in pain must definitely mean that "I am" in painJ.?3) 
Wittgenstein accurately reached the conclusion that "I know I am in pain" is, in 
his words, "to mean perhaps that, 'I am in pain'." On the face of it, this statement 
amounts, linguistically speaking, to saying that "knowing" in this context is either 
redundant or synonymous with the word "being" which is understood by the next 
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phrase "I am in .... " Thus interpreted. the sentence:"I know I am in pain, can really 
mean only: "I am in pain" scoring Ollt the phrase "I know." 
If this is truly the case, the sentence will no longer stand for the "reflection" or 
"introspection" of my feeling pain, but rather is. as it were. a typical expression of the 
empirical instantiation of the unitary consciousness insofar as it means that I really am 
in pain. In that case, my pain, as the object of my acquaintance. is "instantiated," and 
not represented. in my mind in a form of "existential unification." 
Wittgenstein also seems to agree with the iIIuminationists that the matter would 
be quite different in essence if this statement were given as the formal expression of 
my "reflection" lIpon my pain experience. In a case of introspection like this, I reflect 
upon what I have been already acquainted with. And through this reflection I 
conceptllalise my pain in such a way that, b~'. being objectified in mind. the concept of 
pain-experience functions as the represen.tation of the objective reference. which is, in 
this case. the reality of my pain experience. 
It may, then, be said that Wittgenstein has approached the issue with an upshot 
close to the Illuminative theory. As we have already seen, according to the 
Illuminative theory, as soon as we get into the intentional act of conceptualisation and 
representation the problem of reflective knowledge comes into view. We have been 
driven from the order of being to the order of thought. 
It is customary in matters concerned with description that I conceptualise 
further knowledge about my pain. in order to assure both myself and my doctor that I 
am in sllch and such a state or pain, 'especially when two states of pain have some ',: 
. similarities. By introspection ot: and ref-lection on, my experience, I place it into its 
determinate species of pain experience in general for the sake of clarity arid 
unambiguous explanation. As soon as this reflection is made my knowledge of pain 
falls into the category of reflective knowledge. That is. when we are in the experience 
of pain we are already acquainted with pain in terms of the unitary consciousness; but 
when we are furthermore testing our experience by reflecting on it, we then have a 
c9rresponding acquaintance with the original instantiation, which forms our typical 
reflective knowledge. 
By now it may be clear that every sort of our consciousness and knowledge, 
according to the Illuminative theory, is merely a mode of the unitary consciousness __ 
whether to be body-consciousness or sensation or feeling. In the next chapter we will 
continue to see how this theory applies to our reflective, representational knowledge. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
The Unitary Consciousness And The Reflective Knowledge 
As yet we have presented in some detail the specific application of the 
Illuminative theory of the unitary consciousness, so as to illustrate this Illuminative 
theory in the different stages of our private states. Now in this chapter we would 
continue to see how it is applied to the reflective (eidetic) field of knowledge. We will 
start with the old but seriously unsolved problem of subject-object relationship. We 
do so, because this dichotomy has been for centuries, perhaps, the most important 
characteristic of the reflective knowledge. After primary considerations we will 
proceed to the Illuminative attitude toward a theory of object to see the Illuminative 
suggestion for the subject-object relationshij): then we will consider the relation of the 
unitary consciousness with retlectivekliowledge by which our knowledge, according 
to the Illuminative theory, is already rooted in existence. 
7. 1. primary considerations: 
Turning to the analysis of reflective knO\vledge itself, among various distinctions 
which have so far been m(lde regarding the notion of human knowledge, the 
distinction between' subject' and 'object' is a ·widely accepted one. The question of 
the subject-object relationship has, nevertheless, been one of the serious problems in 
philosophical thought. This problem ha,s found its most dangerous form in modern 
western subjectivism. 
Descartes' methodological doubt ends up in an underlying subject, a wordless 
self who is a separate substance as res cogilo11S distinguished from the world as res 
extensa. As asked even by his contemporary critics/lJ a simple question raises here: 
How does the subject, res cogilalls, correctly know the object, t~e res extensa? This 
q~estion is roughly applied to the subjestivistic epistemology and there is no way to 
escape from its maze if we remain in the subjectivistic standpoint. Kant, for example, 
begins his philosophy with a sharp subject-object dichotomy, resulting in the 
problematic distinction between phenomena (objects as they appear to the subject) 
and noumena (objects as they exist in themselves); He finally maintained that the latter 
can not be grasped by our mind; what the mind knows is only the former. Kant's 
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drawing of the question perhaps is its best logical formulation in language of the 
subjectivism. This, however, leads LIS, as Hegel reminds us, to an ultimate skepticism, 
never knowing whether one really knows the things as they are or not. Hegel himself 
tries to interpret the Kantian "transcendental" to dissolve the problem of subject-
object relationship to the benefit of a monism. He introduces the notion of "spirit" 
which is neither subject nor object. This avoidance of the subject-object relationship 
allows Hegel to claim access to the absolute knowledge. 
In the phenomenological tradition we can also see a similar confrontation 
between Husserl and Heidegger. Inspired by Cal1esian method, Husserl starts from 
Kantian position claiming that, contrary to Kant, we can know objects-in-themselves. 
His theory of cognition, hO\\'e\'l.~r, is not a theory of object. By this theOIY of 
cognition, he claims that we knO\\' objects as they are in-themselves; we know them as 
they are in themselves because they are constituted in our consciousness. Objects are 
only for OLlr consciousness in so nlr as we constitute them, then the object we know 
are the object-in-themselves.r.:) To justify this thesis, he uses the notion of"reason",{3} 
partly in the Hegelian sense, to indicate that we know objects-in-themselves. Reason 
is characterised as "source of necessity" (Spinoza and Hegel) and it is apriori 
condition of possible experience. Obviously, the Kantian notion of understanding is 
here replaced by reason (again Hegel). Identified with Eidetic intuition, reason 
contrasts with the individual intuition. Reason carries v/ith it the demand for necessity 
by which Husser! intends that the constitution of objects for consciousness proceeds 
in such a manner that any alternative constitution is impossible. Thus taken, reason 
implies that consciousness of objects is both intuition of the things-in-themselves and 
the constitution of objects by reason. Then, we know objects-in-themselves. Hussed, 
also, appeals to "intersubjectivity" to assure us that we know things-in-themselves in 
the same manner as the others do. In other words, by this thesis, he wants to prove 
that the world and its objects exist not only for me but also for any possible knower. 
Saying so, Husser! presupposes two points: first, constitution is one and the same for 
hyman beings; and second, what constitution produces is necessarily objects-in-
themselves. 
It is considered by the phenomenologists like Heidegger that this line of 
reasoning leads us nowhere; and perhaps this is why Husser! accepts the label of 
idealism and solipsism. How can we be sure whether the object constituted in 
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consciousness are objects-in-themselves, especially if we Ignore, to borrow Fink's 
phrase, the "ontological problem"') 
Like Hegel who protests against Kant but rebuilds anew his transcendentalism at 
the same time, Heidegger also protests against Husserl while redirecting his 
phenomenology. In so doing, he tries to detect the being of the subject and then to put 
the subjectivistic standpoint aside, ignoring the subject-object relationship. He 
maintains that this relation is only ontic, and then should be dismissed by philosophy 
whose discussion is ontology. In this respect, Heidegger's criticism against Husserl in 
particular is based on his e\ialuation of the HusserIian bracketing of world and 
existence. This bracketing leads, according to Heidegger, to commit oneself to 
skepticism from the olltset. \Vorld or Being, Heidegger holds, can not be doubted; 
rather, the ego or consciollsness, the Archimedian point of subjectivism is merely 
illusion. There is po subject distinguished from his world~ there is no meaning for the 
subject without his being. 
As we have already hinted (Ch. 2), Heidegger tries to redefine the task of 
phenomenological method to rescue it from the trap of subjectivism. Husser! suggests 
that the true of the phenomenological method lies in the distinction of subject-object. 
Heidegger, on contrary, maintains that the truth of this method is in the absence of 
this distinction the rejection of which can be defended by phenomenological inquiry 
(see above, Ch. 2). This inquiry will show, according to Heidegger, the fundamental 
mistake in traditional philosoph"y and in Husserl's philosophy in particular: The 
imaginary supposition of a 'worldless' transcendental self. As we have already seen 
(Ch. 4), Heidegger does not hesitate to reject such a notion of the self. Husserl had 
told us to go "back to the things themselves," and then begins himself by talking about 
a transcendental self which, by its very nature, cannot be defended by 
phenomenology. Since the transcendental self can not be subject to the 
phenomenological description, according to Heidegger, there is no experience which 
can justify talk about such a self or an ego or consciousness, and, because of the 
rigorous restrictions on phenomenological research, such talk cannot be initiated apart 
from its foundation in phenomenology. There is, therefore, no subject, no ego~ and an 
accurate, 'primitive' view of OLlr experience of the world cannot describe this 
experience as an experience of a transcendental self or ego. It cannot even say with 
Hume that there are experiences (or "thoughts" after Descartes), for this description 
leads us back to the notion of a "subject" that 'has' experiences. There is simply, 
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according to Heidegger's analysis. a "being-in-the-world". The Cogito of Descartes, 
the 'I Think' of Kant. and the 'pure ego' of Husserl, these are only exaggerated 
recognitions of a grammar which forces LIS to lise the expression '['. This is ol1ly a 
grammatical necessity, it does not refer us to any special substance or even to a 
unifying principle of consciollsness. It has no ontological significance whatsoever. 
"TI1C word 'I' is to b~ understood only in the sensc ofa non-committal 
formal indicator." (oil 
There is, therefore, no 'I' which can be substantially distinguished from the 
world in general, and there can be no bracketing or doubting of things 'outside or 
consciousness. Once we have given up the notion of the transcendental self or ego 
and its implications ("contents of consciOl,sness," the "external world"), traditional 
epistemological problems can not be raised. Heidegger argues that the transcendental 
self or ego 'discovered' in the CaJ1esian ('oK/to and ~lflirmed in Husserlian epoche is 
not a substantial self. but only a 'fermal indicator' that does not commit to postulating 
any entity called the self. The self is rather a conception impose on us by the other 
(Das man). What is there is only a fallen being -- a Dasein. 
Heidegger seems quite right in reconsidering the root of subject or, correctly 
speaking, in devaluating the subject to the profit of Being. It is also appreciated that 
the skepticism arising from subject-object dichotomy has been a constant source of 
philosophical perplexity in 'modern' western philosophy. However, it would not be 
understood from all these that we should dismiss the problem which is at the basis of 
our language and strllctLlfelises oLlr reflective knowledge. Reflection can be justified 
only by rediscovering this relationship in order to ground it in a fair manner. In 
following section we will try to see how the illuminative philosophy approaches this 
problem. 
7. 2. T"e 1I111I1lil111til'e Approach To Tile Problem: 
To give a solution. the Illuminative philosophy tells us that the subject-object 
relationship belongs to the field of reflection, that of eidetic consciousness (in 
Husserlian sense). It is because in the ontetic field. as already suggested, there is no 
room for this dichotomy~ because of the unitary consciousness, there is no object 
there, then no subject; no mind. no self (in the subjectivistic sense); there is only a 
.",-,~' '" 
'.~ '. '. 
140 
unitary consciousness identified with the being of the self as an emanative entity who 
absorbed in Being. No object, no subject; there is only a unified existent as 
consciousness. We ore this consciousness in the horizon of Being. We ordinarily have 
a continuos experience of this unitary consciousness. This state is not accessible for 
our reflective thought whose texture, according to the Illuminative philosophy, is 
eidetic (remember SaJ1re's non-reflective consciousness). This is because reflective 
thought is risen from this unitary consciousness or, correctly speaking, the unitary 
consciousness creates reflective thought Then the subject-object relationship, 
according to the Illuminative philosophy, is above all an ontetic relation. By this way 
the Illuminative philosophy does 110t dismiss the subject-object relationship; rather it 
sees the problematic of this relationship, as Heidegger also hinted, in neglecting the 
notion of Being. However. the Illuminative philosophy does not dismiss the problem 
for this reason (as Heidegger did). On contrary, it encounters this relationship aiming 
to solve it by finding an ontetic ground for it. In other words, the Illuminative 
philosophy accepts sllch a reiationship by assigning it to reflective thought. The 
problem is not then hidden in this relationship itself, but in dismissing its foundation. 
Therefore, if one can justi(v the generation of reflective thought fl"om an ontetic point 
of view, the relationship of subject-object remained subsequently confirmed without 
involving in subjectivism. \Ve \vould recall this point while speaking of the 
Illuminative solution. In the following discussion we first explain this in more detail by 
formulating Sadra's theory of object, then we depict the relation of reflective thought 
with the unitary consciousness. 
7. 3. Tile 1IIlll1lil1atii'e TheOlT q( ()/~ie(;{ 
In the analysis of the theory of reflective knowledge the term "subject," Sadra 
says,(5) signifies the mind that performs the act of reflective knowledge by knowing 
something, just as the term "object" means the thing or the proposition kno~n by that 
subject. But, since in a proposition known there is always something involved, 
p~rticular or universal, it is true then to say that the object of reflective knowledge is 
always what we cal1 the thing known. It is also observed that the relation called 
"knowing" is constituted by the mind (as the subject) associated with the thing (as the 
object)~ the subject and the object, then, can be cal1ed the constituents of the unity of 
reflective knowledge. Thus, in the unity of reflective knowledge the terms "subject" 
141 
and "object" are two essentialities of this unity. The relation of subject-object is 
explained here in the language of Aristotelian causality.(bi Here we briefly present this 
explanation: 
Being In its essence intentional, the act of reflective knowing is always 
motivated, determined, and constituted by its object. The object therefore has a share 
together with the subject in the organisation and determination of the act of reflective 
knowing, but differs from the subject by having the unique role in motivating the act 
of reflective knowing Thus, whereas the main characteristic of the object is to 
motivate the action of the subject, the subject on the other hand, can not take part in 
the procedure of motivating its own intentional act, for the simple reason that one is 
ever present to himself and cannot be the object of himself. In other words, the mind 
is designed to serve as the ellicient cause for the intentional act of reflectively 
knowing something and the object serves as the final cause for the actuation of such 
, . 
an action. The etlicient cause is not supposed to be absolutely identified with the final 
cause in the Aristotelian system of causation. Thus, a subject cannot be identical with 
object. Putting the subject-object relationship in this Aristotelian system of causation, 
one can further infer another characteristic distinction between the knowing subject as 
an efficient cause and the thing known as a final cause for the act of reflective 
knowledge. While the efficient caLise is defined as the acting agent, bringing about the 
act of reflective knowing, the final cause functions in two different ways depending on 
its external and internal existence. The external existence of the object being 
independent and absent from the mind can only motivate the intellectual activity of the 
subject from outside and not be identified with it. But the 1l.1ental existence of the 
same object being present in the mind is the caLise of the subject's causality. That is to 
say, the knowing subject as the eftlcient cause is in its turn caused and actuated by the 
mental image of the object in the operation of the act of ref1ective knowledge. For it is 
the idea of the object that first effects the potential causation of the subject by 
bringing it fj-om the state of potentiality to the state of being an actual agent. Had 
th,ere not been the idea of the object present in the mind of the knowing subject, the 
. . 
potential subject would never come to the act of reflective knowing at all. Thus, in 
this sequence of causation the idea of the object comes first and is regarded as the 
prime cause or the calise of causation in the system of causality. And the objective 
reality of the same thing constitutes the last and final cause of the immanent act of 
reflective knowledge. In this sense, one thing can stand at the same time for the first 
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and the final cause when viewed from different perspectives. While its mental 
representation is the first and the prime cause of knowing, its objective reality is the 
last and the final one. 
7. 3. 1. The meanil1g (4' Of?jectivily: 
In accordance with the above analysis, it is suggested by the Illuminative 
philosophy a twofold meaning of "objectivity" which characterises a single entity as 
both immanent and transitive objects. For these two fundamentally different senses of 
'object', Sadra, uses the terms "essential," "actual intelligibles," and "accidental 
intelligibles," in the case of discursive knowledge, as well as the words "essential" 
, 
"actual sensibles", and "accidental sensibles" in the case of empirical knowledge. He 
says: 
"The forms of things arc of t\\'o kinds, one is the material form the 
existence of \\'hich is associ:1tcd \\'ith matter and position and is 
spatio-tempo;·.:11. \Vith respect to its material condition placcd beyond 
ollr mental pO\\'er, this kind of form cannot possibly be "actually [and 
immanentlyl intelligible," nor for that matter "actually land 
immanently] sensible" except by "accidcnt". And the other is a form 
which 'is free and separated from matter, from position, and from space' 
and location. The separatioll is by a complete abstraction, like an 
"actual intclligibk," or by incomplete abstraction such as "actual 
imaginabks" and "actual sensible objects."(-) 
In this passage there are apparently two fundamentally important dichotomies 
involved. The one is the "actual" or '"essential" intelligible object versus the 
"accidental" or "material" object The next is the actual "imaginable" or "sensible~' 
object distinguished fi'om the "accidental" or "material" one. In both dichotomies, the 
first range of object is characterised by "actuality" and "essentiality," and the second 
by "materiality" and "accidentality." An object is truly said to be "essentially and 
actually intelligible" only if it is existentially identified with, and present in, the mind as 
being a constituent of the mental phenomenon of the act of knowing. It is truly said to 
be "actually sensible" or "actually imaginable" when it becomes part of our sensation 
or imagination in act. But when the object lies existentially beyond our intellect or 
beyond sense-perception and imagination, then it has an exterior relation of 
"correspondence" with its representation in Ollr mind. It will be very much an aspect 
of chance and accidentality that characterises the appearance of the material object 
represented in our mind at the time we imagine it or sense it in a sense-perception. 
This means there is no logical certainty that the correspondence relation must hold. 
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That is because there is always room for the logical possibility that S's knowledge of 
P does not turn out to be true. Since the correspondence of the mental object to the 
material object is accidental and probable, the Illuminative theory explains, the 
material object should be called the "accidental object." Perhaps accidentality here 
may mean the "probability" that scientific truth always involves. (81 
We have, accordingly, "essential intelligible" as well as "essential sensible" both 
of which are to be called "immanent" and "present" object." Likewise, we have 
"accidental intelligible object" as well as "accidental sensible object," both of which 
are called "transitive" and "absent" object. 
Perhaps it might be interesting to see that the Sadraean distinction has a similar 
{not necessarily complete) relative in Husserl's phenomenology. Husserl distinguishes 
between 'immanent' and 'transcendent' objects.!')) The 'immanent' is . 
,.'- . 
"What forms an ilitrinsic component of an act, as opposed to. ",hat is 
intended as lying bcyond the act (transccndcnt or intentional 
object). "(101 
These two objects belong to the flux of consciousness: 
"In cvcr~· consciollsncss \\'c find an 'immancnt contcnt', with the 
, contcnt we call 'appearancc'; this is either appearance ofthc individual 
(of an extcrnal lcmpor;\I bcing), or appearance of the non-
temporal."( 11) 
Like Husser! who assigns these objects to the reflective consciollsness,(l2) Sadra 
also allows this double objectivity in the field of the reflective knowledge. However 
this does not mean that these two authors are on the same line. Unlike Husser! whose 
phenomenology implies that "all objects are mine" (see, above, 1. 3 . b), Sadra does 
not maintain that the 'transitive' object can be constituted by reflective consciousness. 
Sadra sets out(3) that of these two major kinds of objects, the immanent object 
alone is constituted through the reflective knowledge. The similarity between these 
authors is only here; the immanent object, according to both of them, constituted by 
our eidetic reflective consciousness on which the knower, known and the knowing , 
I 
are united. Just as in Husser!' s theory, the immanent object, for Sadra, comes first and 
. counts for a mental representation of the thing known. This is the mere idea of the 
object manifested by the subject in the subject itself. This mental representation 
stimulates the intellectual power of the subject by driving it into the act of knowing, 
From this stand-point the idea of the object has priority over all the other causes in 
I·U 
question, because it takes effect before the other causes can do so. The transitive 
object on the other hand, comes last because it is the prospective reality of that ideal 
object. Since the transitive object is not present in the mind of the agent, it naturally 
lies beyond the frame of the mind, as well as beyond the intellectual existence of the 
immanent object. 
All this is the case if one interprets the intentional epistemic act of reflective 
knowing as a mental sequence of natural events analogous to a set of external events 
dominated by the law of causation. When, however, an act of reflective knowing 
occurs, there is a complex unity in which "knowing" is the uniting relation and the 
subject and object are arranged in a cel1ain order such that the "sense" of the act of 
reflective knowing governs over the whole in a kind of unification. In this structure 
both of the two terms, i.e., the subject and the object, function as bricks not as 
cement. The cement is the uniting relation itself, i.e., knowing. 
This three-fold theory of reflective knowledge, namely, the "subject" as the 
knower and the "object" as the thing known, and the relation as "knowing" accounts 
for the whole constitution of the intentional act of reflective knowledge r1 '/) Just as the 
complex whole of the relation is characterised by being immanent and intentional, so 
also each and every part of it has the character of immanence and intentionality. Thus, 
from this Illuminative point of view it follows that, like Husserlian phenomenology, 
there must be an immanent object essential to the very structure of our reflective 
knowledge, though, contrary to Husserl, apar1 from this there is also an object that 
lies supposedly independently outside of our mind and has no identical relationship 
with our reflective knowledge; rather, we are in an ontetic touch with it through the 
unitary consciousness. The ininlanent object and the mind are bound together and are 
never separate in their phenomenological status. Reflective knowledge, then, is 
primarily a relation between mind and objects, and exists only when that relation 
exists. No object, then no judgement; no judgement, then no reflective knowledge. 
The distinction between "immanative object" and "transitive object" does not 
fl1erely serve to show how these two kinds of objects are bound together, providing a 
communion between the external and internal worlds. In addition, the distinction 
. enables us to understand that in our reflecting knowledge of the external world there 
is always an "essentiality" combined with a sense of "probability" in the relation 
between these two kinds of objects. The "essentiality" is that of the immanative 
objects, and is understood by the very definition of the notion of reflective knowledge. 
1 ... 5 
The "probability" is that of the transitive object. They both have to join together in 
order to make up our reflective knowledge of external objects. Probability here means 
that those transitive objects mayor may not truly correspond to the immanent objects. 
Probability however characterises our phenomenal, reflective knowledge. 
7. 3. 2. A Characteristic (~f Re./lec.:til'e Kllo\l'led~e: 
The double sense of objectivity, however, is the essential feature of our 
phenomenal, reflective knowledge, or In Kantian terminology, "discursive 
knowledge," whether it is perceptual or conceptual, empirical or transcendental. That 
which the mind immanently possesses, i.e., representation, is the necessary immanent 
object, such as our conception of Julius Caesar, etc., but not necessarily an external 
object such as Julius Caesar himself: etc. In the case of sense perception, for example, 
if I perceive a physical object, say my television set, there are two objective entities to 
be distinguished from each other. There is on the one hand an external object existing 
independently outside of my mind, the reality of which belongs to the reality of the 
external world, and has nothing to do with the constitution of this episode of my 
perceiving. This is the transitive object which is the physical reality my television set 
itself regardless of my perception of it. Corresponding to this, there is also an object 
which is present in, and identical \-vith, the existence, of my perceiving power. This is 
the immanent object that constitutes the essence of my immanent act of perceiving, 
the reality of which belongs to the reality of my perception. 
The relation of knowing or perceiving, it is said in the Illuminative philosophy, 
with reoard to the external object is "accidentaf' and with regard to the internal object 
~ . 
"essentiaL" The fonner relation is accidental because, Sadra says/15) the external 
object as an independent existence lies outside of my mental power and exterior to it. 
It is only matter of the co-accidentality of the existence of our mind along with its 
knowledge and the existence of external object that brings them together in the unity 
of the act of reflective knowing. But in the very definition of reflective knowledge as 
such, the internal object is necessary and essential, because insofar as the relation of 
I 
knowing concerned it is impossible to have an act of this without having, or even with 
. a doubt of havino an internal obiect. But there is no absurdity in having an act of this 
~, J 
kind, while having no external object in the external world. It is concluded by Sadra 
that the internal object is constitutively given in essence of the notion of reflective 
knowledge as sLlch, but the external object is accidental lying outside of the 
" 
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conception of reflective knowledge in the extramental world and serving as the final 
cause in the factual case of our reflective knowledge of an external object. 
A serious consideration is introduced by Sadra here concerning the conformity 
of subject-object. The interpreted Aristotelian conception of "causation" does not 
necessarily establish a theory of "conformity" as opposed to the theory of 
"correspondence," a conformity in the sense of identity of the thing as an external 
object with the thing as a mental entity appearing to us. Taking an external object as 
the independent reality of the final cause, and its mental image as the internal one, 
there is no possibility of any kind of identity of one of these two entirely different 
types of existence with the other. Thus no matter how strongly this Aristotelian notion 
of causality has to be interpreted, it can never bring us 'a sense of conformity which 
ends in some kind of ,i,dentity between things in themselves and things as known to us. 
The meaning of ",Gp.(t~spondence" therefore; is, inevitably taken as a negation o.f ,the 
. . .. ~ .... . : . , 
" idea of identity, ."nd thus the notion of "conformity," no matter to what it may be 
attributed, can only be Gonstrued as something closer to correspondence than to 
identity. 
By this, one should notice, Sadra is not challenging the focal point of the 
renowned Aristotelian thesis of "identity" of the understanding and the thing 
understood: the intellect and what is understood are identical. On the contrary, we see 
him trying to i'nterpret it as if he equips it so that it can stand up to Kant's criticism of 
the idea of "conformity" in the sense of the identity. Tn this regard Kant says: 
"If,. then,' on the supposition that our empirical knowledge "conforms" 
. to ·objects as things in themselves we find that the unconditioned 
caimot be thought without contradiction, and that when~ on the other 
hand, we suppose that our representation ofthings, as they are given to 
LIS, does not conform to these things as they are in themselves, but that 
these objects, as appear anccs, conform to our mode of representation, 
the contradiction vanishcs."(l6J . 
It seems obvious that the whole weight of this Kantian argument hinges upon 
the point that, should things in themselves ever be conformed to, i.e., identified with, 
things as they are given to us, it would be a flat contradiction. Putting this into our 
terminology, it can be rephrased in this way: If the transitive indepen~ent external 
object becomes, in the case of knowledge, existentially identical with the immanent 
object totally dependent on Ollr mind, it is a precise contradiction. One answer to this 
contradiction would be: tirstly, the conformity between external and internal objects 
. , 
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should not be understood as any form of existential identity, rather as a 
correspondence relation of the immanent object to the transitive object; secondly, the 
Aristotelian thesis of identity possibly, calls for a strong sense of the existential 
identity of the act of understanding with the immanent object essentially understood, 
and not with the transitive object understood only accidentally. 
Looking at the matter as a whole, the Illuminative theory reached the conclusion 
that even in our ordinary knO\vledge, which we call phenomenal, reflective 
knowledge, there are two senses of objectivity, one is the immanent object, and the 
other the transitive object. On the other hand, we will see that in our knowledge by 
presence there is only one sense of objectivity which is but the immanent object. 
7. 3. 3. The Absent And lhe Presell1: 
We must now di~~lIss' why in the Illuminative theory all physical objects w~i.ch.· 
are existentially indepeildent tl'om our mind are treated in that system as "absent 
objects" as opposed to "present objects."{!7i Considering the existence of physical 
objects as entirely independent tl'om and unaffected by our mental act of knowing, the 
point becomes clear that the nature of such an existence always lies beyond the 
radiance of our existential mentality and is never identical with it. This state of 
"independence", "unaffectedness" and "beyond ness" is expressed by Illuminative 
philosophy as the state of "absence," and objects belonging to this state as "absent 
objects." This deals with the word "absence." As for the word "presence," 
Illuminative philosophy. has, on the same basis, taken it to mean the condition of 
identification of the existence of the mind with the existence of its mental acts and 
mental entities .. Those entities presented under the condition of identity in the mind of 
the knowing subject are marked as "present objects." "Presence" therefore positively 
means something very close to the meaning of "identity" in existence with the mind, 
just as the word "absence" signifies the sense of difference in existence from the 
existence of the mind. Negatively, "present objects" are those' objects which are not 
absent from the existential radiance of the mind. 
/. 
From all this we are now able to understand how these circumstances justify 
. Illuminative philosophers, such as Sadra, in supposing that things belonging to the 
order of the external world are to be held as "absent" objects as opposed to "present" 
objects. These external objects are not, in a true sense, present to, and identified with, 
us in the order of thought, but their conceptions and representations are. He says: 
"~ treatise on the theory that the knowledge of these objects whose 
~xlstenc~s arc absent from liS is possible only through the 
II1terJnedlary of the representations of these objects in lIS."(l8J 
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In his OpIniOn, however, it would be absurd if the objective reality of these 
objects were ever present to our mind so that an external object became totally 
internal, and an independent existence fell from its order of being to the order of 
conception subsisting in the state of our mentality. But we can, nevertheless, says this 
philosopher, achieve communication with these absent objects only by virtue of 
having perceptual or con~eptual representations of them in our mind, the 
representations that belong originally to us and have been raised and set up by our 
intellectuar powerJI9J 
Let LIS slim lip discussion of the Illuminative distinction bet\\een immanent and 
transitive objects. Objects of ollr knowledge are to be understood as of two kinds: a) 
. immanent and essential objects, constituent of the act of the knowing subject, b) 
transitive, and accidental objects absent fJ-om the mind and extraneous to the act of 
knowledge. The relation of these two distinct objects is that of "correspondence" not 
of identity. 
The immanent object being fi'ee f)'om association with matter can be exemplified 
as sensible, imaginable and intelligible, depending on the degree of the abstract 
knowledge and our mental power of apprehension. In this project even an immanent 
sensible object in our empirical knowledge enjoys a primitive degree of abstraction 
and because it is free from matter. That is, it subsists not in matter but in mind. 
form of object, which is existentially independent of,. and separate from, the state of 
our mentality and has no susceptibility to any degree of abstraction. In the case of a 
material object, it is associated with matter, space, and time And in the instance of a· 
non-material object, if any, it stands by itself with no passive relation to matter, space, 
or time. These transitive objects can be communicated with only by initiating 
representations of the'm in our mind. These representations, therefore, being in the 
o~der of conception, are to be regarded as immanent objects proper, and those which 
have been represented by them, the existence of which has remained in the order of 
being, are to be held as transitive and accidental objects. 
Finally, one should notice that on the matter of immanent, essential objects, just 
characterised as being free from matter, the question as to whether they are free, 
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hence, "abstract", or essentially free, hence, "innate," can easily be decided. Although 
it does not principally concern us, we ha\'e already indicated that "abstraction" is not 
to be taken to mean another intentional act added to the act of knowing, perceiving or 
conceiving. Rather, it is nothing other than the act of knowing itself that, even in its 
primitive form, represents the pure form of the material object through 
sense-experience. Abstraction(':1)) therefore is not to be construed as the sum of 
perceiving the whole material object, then separating its form from the matter, and 
keeping the form in the mind and leaving the matter in the external world. The 
subjective power of knowing does not, and can not, import anything from the outside 
of itself It is rather the innate power of representation of the pure forms of things that 
makes the simple essence of our knowledge possible. On this Illuminative basis all 
kinds of our knowledge enjoy a proportionate degree of transcendentality. An 
empirical sense-perception, for instance, because of being a sense-representation of 
the pure forms of a physical object, cOllnts as an imperfect primitive form of 
transcendental object. The existent inl status of a sense perception can never be 
classified as a material object. It is rather an immaterial entity that represents the pure 
form of the material object. It stands for the form of that material object without 
having its external matter. 
7. 4. Reflective /(n(}H'ledKe: 
As yet, we have described the flluminative theory. of object which is essential to 
characterise the retlectin: knowledge. Now, in the rest of this chapter, we would have 
a closer look at the Illuminative approach to reflective knowledge and its relationship 
with the unitary consciousness to detect the existential nature of reflective knowledge 
as w~ll. 
The term 'reflective knowledge' is often used in philosophy to distinguish the 
subjective condition of experience. Locke, for example, defines reflective knowledge 
as the knowledge which the mind has of its own activity whereby these activities arise 
in' the understanding. For Kant, reflective knowledge is concerned with the 
determi'nation of the subjective c'onclitions under which we are able to attain concepts. 
I n phenomenology it is "the act by which consciOllsness turns inward, reversing its 
usual forward orientation".'·)/) In the Illuminative philosophy, reflective knowledge is, 
by definition, that class of knowledge \vhich enjoys both an internal object and a 
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separate external object, and which includes a correspondence relationship between 
one of these objects and the other. As a matter of fact, a combination of the internal 
and external objects along with the maximum degree of correspondence between them 
makes up the essentiality of this species of knowledge. Since "'correspondence" is 
indeed a dyadic relation by nature, it follows that whenever this relation holds there 
must be a conjunction between one object A and the other B. The relation cannot hold 
true if either conjunct is false. If there were no external object, there could be no 
representation of it. Then, there could be no possibility of correspondence relation 
f . 
between them. Therefore, there could be no possibility of that kind of knowledge at 
all. 
The correspondence, therefore, is the criterion of reflective knowledge in the 
Illuminative language. If there are two independent existences such that the existential 
circumstances of the one do rot bear upon,. or derive from the other, and 
consequently there is no causal connection and no constant conjunction between 
them, then it seems true to say that the one is "absolutely neutral" with respect to the 
other. Another way to put it is, each of these two given different beings is existentially 
distant from the other. Thus interpreted, they are existentially "absent" from, and not 
present to, or united with, each other. 
Here, as already indicated, the word "absence", quite otten used in the 
Illuminative philosophy, means that there is no logical, ontological, or even 
epistemological connection between the two existences which are supposed to be in 
two completely different circumstances of being. The expression "'absolutely neutral" 
is therefore a legitimate one for designating such a particular sense of "absence". 
A mental entity (representation) in contrast with an external object would 
appear, at first sight, to be two existences which are absolutely neutral to and absent 
from each other. This should mean that they are not bound together, either logically, 
or ontologically, or epistemologically. It appears all but certain that sLich a neutrality 
can never be removed altogether and changed to an absolute unity so that the two 
existences become at the same time in all respects one and the same. 
t 
One possibility is suggested by the Illuminative philosophy for these two diffe-
rent things to reflectively come together and be bound to each other through a kind of 
epistemic unification. This is phenomenal unification which is epistemic, not logical, 
nor ontological. An external object may have, besides its factual reality which belongs 
to the order of being, a phenomenal representation(J':J in our mind that pertains to the 
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order of conception. This does not mean for the Illuminative philosophy that an order 
of the external being comes and resides in our mind in such a way that it becomes 
considered as existentially united with oLir mind and listed as belonging to the order of 
conception. It can also be said that one of the main characteristics of the order of 
conception is that by being mental it subsists "in" us and is "produced" by our mind 
"within" the domain of ollr phenomenal act, whereas the order of being is 
characterised by existence, not "in" us but "in itself," and lying outside of us in the 
external world which is independent of the radiance of our mentality. 
We have just said that the only possible way supposed by the Illuminative 
philosophy towards the unification of the two initially neutral existences is an 
epistemic unification. But what is this unification like, and hmv does it take place? 
The answer to these questions the Illuminative philosophy otTers lies in the notion of 
"correspondence." The meaning of "correspondence" used here in this theory of 
reflective knowledge is, briefly considered, "resemblance" in content and "identity" in 
formJ':3) That is, the internal form is united with the external material form, but the 
mental existence is never identical with the external one The two different modes of 
existence therefore resemble each other by virtue of a formal unification. If this formal 
identity did not exist, there would be no possibility of any comlllunication between the 
human mind and the world of reality.(.:'..'1 
When here speaking of the notion of "correspondence" it should, of course, be 
noted that the Illuminative philosophy is not concerned with the question of the 
criteriology of logical statements that mllst be either true or false. In the Illuminative 
philosophy this question is regarded as a derivative of the primordial question: How 
can our reflective knowledge correspond to the world of reality? Or, in other words, 
how can we understand Ollr external world before we are able to speak and make 
sentences about it? This is the point that concerns LIS here the problem of 
"correspondence" is under consideration. But the question about the circumstances 
under which a oiven statement is true or false is another question, which should be 
.::;, 
treated in its proper place. 
It has already been pointed out that in the Illuminative theory, reflective 
knowledge is marked by being involved in a two-!old sense of objectivity. It has an 
internal object, as the essence of reflective knowledge as such requires, and it also has 
an external object which lies outside the order of conception and counts as the 
objective "reference" of that reflective knowledge. The former has been called by 
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Illuminative philosophy the present object, and the latter the absent object the reality 
of which exists in separation from the reality of the mind of knowing subjects. 
In this knowledge the internal object plays an intermediary representation-role in 
the achievement of the act of reflective knowing. That is to say, the internal object 
represents by means of conceptualisation of the reality of the external object before 
the mind of the knowing subject. To achieve this act of representation there must be a 
conformity in the sense of correspondence between the two kinds of objects. As 
representation, the internal object, and consequently the whole unity of the reflective 
knowledge, makes sense only if it has conformity and correspondence with the 
external object. Reflective knowledge therefore is that in which: 
a) There are two kinds of objects: one is internal and the other is external. That 
is, both internal object and external object l11ust already be in the o(der of the act. 
,Q) There is a correspondence relation between these two. objects. As we have 
se~nbefore, since the correspondence relation is accidental, that is, our reflective 
. knowledge mayor may not correspond with the external reality, the logical dualism of 
truth and falsity, or error, comes under consideration. If our internal object really 
does correspond to the external object, our knowledge of the external world holds 
true and is valid, but if the condition of cOlTespondency has not been obtained, the 
truth of our knowledge never comes about. This is because the opposition of truth 
and falsity is of a peculiar kind. It calls for a kind of relation, the applicability of which 
is symmetric, though the relation itself is not. This means that to whatever proposition 
or sentence the quality of "truth" is applicable, the quality of falsehood is by the same 
reason potentially applicable, and to whatever proposition or sentence the quality of 
falsehood is applicable, the quality of truth is on the same basis potentially applicable. 
In Illuminative philosophy, according to the appropriate principles, certain 
oppositions have been developed that one can not find in the traditional square of 
opposition. Among these, the opposition of what has been called "aptitude and 
privation" should be specified in connection with truth and falsity. The nature of this 
opposition, as it is elaborated, is that in that category of opposition there must be 
something in which there is "eligibility" for qualification by one or other of the 
opposite qualities. An example of this, mentioned by these philosophers, is an animate 
object that has "eligibility" for sight or blindness, susceptibility to which is lacking in 
the nature of inanimate objects. \Ve can say that a certain individual or species of 
animal is blind, because the generic nature of animality has aptitude for the quality of 
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sight. But we can never say that a certain instance or species of inanimate things, say a 
rock, is blind, because the generic term of these things does not suppose sightJ25) 
Thus, whatever object has by its nature "aptitude" for qualification by one of these 
opposite qualities has "aptitude" and susceptibility for being qualified by the other as 
well and vice versa. The opposition of truth and falsity is supposed to be of this kind. 
It applies only to those judgements and statements that are, through a correspondence 
relation, eligible for truth or falsity. But where the application of falsity does not make 
sense, neither does the application of truth. 
By virtue of the correspondence it contains through its objective reference, 
reflective knowledge possesses the "aptitude" for being true, therefore it may 
conceivably fail to meet this condition and as a result become false. But this aptitude 
does not hold in the unitary consciousness, for in this, since it has nothing to do with 
corry~pqndence, there is no possibility of its being false; thus it is not eligible for 
falsity (see, above, eh. 5). As the nature of this opposition stands, if there is no 
susceptibility to falsity, there is no meaning for truth either. Thus, the dualism of truth 
and falsehood only holds in an appropriate opposition in which the possibility of one 
opposite is the logical standard for the possibility of the other. The impossibility of 
one also counts as the criterion of the modal impossibility of the other. 
7.5. The Relation Between The Unitary COJ1SciOIlSl1es.'· And Reflective 
thought: 
Such is depicted reflective knowledge in the Illuminative theory considering it as 
separated from its source -- that is, from the unitary consciousness. 
Not thM is ,111 however. Reflective knowledge is existentially interpreted on the 
basis of the unitary consciousness as well. There is, as we have just seen, in the very 
analysis of the relation of "knowing" a complex lmity which constitutes the entirety of 
the nature of this relation. Although in its mental existence this unity is originally 
simple, nevertheless, its simplicity is broken down into a triple multiplicity so that it 
dm be analysed by reflection into the relation as "knowing," the subject as "knower," 
and the object as "known." This conceptual triplicity is derivable from reflection on 
the primordial simplicity of the constructive existence of the act of reflective knowing 
itself, the kind of act which is absolutely identical with the existence of the human 
mind itself.(.?6J 
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Moreover, one of the most famous theses of Sadra is the advocation of an 
existential unity between the knower, the known and the act of knowingJ27) There is 
no reason whatever why we should not be able in our retlection upon a simple and 
absolute unity to analyse this unity into different conceptual parts without this con-
ceptual complexity damaging the original simplicity of the unity. 
Take the mathematical central point in a circle as an example. It is 
mathematically assumed that the point is simple and therefore indivisible in the sense 
that it cannot be divided into various points at the centre. Yet we are taught that it is 
possible to divide it up into various "sides" and "directions" once we have con-
ceptually reflected upon it and def"ined it as "a point equally distant from all points on 
the circumference of the circle" Obviously, it is the same indivisible point that has 
~ee~ now divided into different ··sic\e.s" in accordance with the different points which 
ar~' ~.ssigned to it on the circumferenc.e.,;f~·~l\e' drcle. But we know that this kind of 
:.' ... : " . " , ... ~ .. 
.. ' '-
reflected mu]tipl,icity in the definition of the centre does not violate the simplicity of its 
mathematical status. 
The point of this analogy is that while the original structure of reflective 
knowledge is simple and indivisible, the conceptual analysis breaks it down into three 
interrelated components which are all characterised by being essential, present, and 
mental. 
Let us now consider the relation between reflective knowledge and the unitary 
consciousness, to depict the existential .. nature, of the former. more clearly. In t~e 
Illuminative philosophy there is an ,ilnmense drive to provide an appropriate technique 
which can .. help satisfy the need for an· ade'quate language of those complexities. 
. " . ~ 
peculiar to this system of thinking. >One of those all-important technical words' is 
"Illuminative relation" (al-l7e.\·h{ff.{fI-id(~rah al_ishraqyyah)(J8J which can be regarded' 
as the basic term for the Illuminative approaches to the problems of ontoiogy, 
cosmology, and human knowledge. 
Unlike the Aristotelian category of relation, this I11uminative relation is not of a 
kj,nd designed to run between one side of the relation and the other, binding' separate 
entities in a complex unity. It j's also not like the other categories of Aristotle, which 
. all have this in common that they belong to the order of conceptions and essentialities 
of beings. Neither is it meant to account for a copulative between one thing and 
another as the normal sense of relation requires. It is rather designed to be of the 
order of existence and reflects the very reality of the light overflowing from the 
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Supreme principle of lights. This relation specifically stands for the grades of the act 
of being rather than the capacities of potency. In other words, this sort of relation 
designates the existential status of Illuminative being proceeding from the first cause 
of beings. Like the reality of existence itself the Illuminative relation varies in degrees 
of intensity without separation and detachment from the source of illumination. 
On the hypothesis that in the absolute vacuum eternity there was nothing, 
including time and space, which exists except Being as such, this question arises: How 
and in what manner did Being did bring things into being, while there was nothing of 
any element of being to stal1 with? How can its relation with things be expressed? 
The answer suggested by the Illuminative philosophy is 'the Illuminative relation'. 
Obviously in the context of this hypothesis there is no alternative to the 
phraseology of the Illuminative relation \vhich clearly describes the sort of causation 
by illumination and emanation as distinct from causation by generation and 
corruption. Once we have succeeded in the conceptualisation of this form of 
causation, the relation between any calise and i~s immanent effect is subject to the 
overriding question of whether or not an immanent action itself is a mere Illuminative 
relation instead of being something in itself related to something else as its cause. This 
means that the Illuminative relation would be an existential relation by nature in which 
the relation itself and that which is related are one and the same. 
It is in the light of this' Illuminative relation' that the mam question as to 
whether the relation between ollr unitary consciollsness and our reflective knowledge 
is considered in the Illuminative philosophy To be more specific, the question is 
whether the human mind, regarded as the fIrst cause, antecedent to its own 
phenomenitl consequents, illuminates from the depth of its own presence knowledge 
the rays of its immanent act of reflective knowledge? Does the process of this 
phenomenal causation take place in the same manner in which the first cause of the 
universe sheds the light of existence on the world of reality? 
In answer to this question consider the following dialogue/:'91 
Q. : How can \ve ever have knowledge at all? 
A. : Think of yourself. If you do so, you will certainly find out what truly 
answers your question. 
Q. : But how? 
A. : ] f ] consider myself: I will find in all certainty that I am truly aware of 
myself in such a way that I can never miss myself. This state of self-certainty 
-
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convinces me that my awareness of myself does not mean anything but the awareness 
of "myself', "by" myself, not by anyone or anything else. If I were aware of myself 
"by" anyone or anything else, it would obviously mean that the awareness of myself 
belonged to another active power which is not myself. In this case there would be a 
knowing subject operating in myself in knowing myself. Thus it would not be myself 
that knows myself. But it has been assumed that it is the very performative "1" as the 
subject reality of myself who knows myself. (lO) 
From this point onward the argument proceeds in two different directions. One 
of these two ends up with the conclusion that in the case of self-knowledge the self as 
the performative subject and the, same self which is the object of which it is aware are 
absolutely identical. This is the very concept of self-objectivity which, as we saw, 
characterises the initial theory or the unitary consciousness which can here account for 
.r . , 
the self-supj~ctiylty of performatiye "1", The other line of argument'lea.ds to the 
. " ',' .. ~ ..... 
ultimate, pqint that in the event of any rej7eclive knowledge in which .the' knowing 
. subject. is an "invariable 1," a "performative I", ~nd the object known is an external 
object, the "I" already knows itself by presence and knows its object by 
correspondence. Only the latter extension of the argument is relevant to our present 
investigation. Since the argument is extremely' involved, we feel called upon to 
develop it so as to reach a satisfactory conclusion concerning the problem under 
consideration, i.e., the relation of the unitary consciousness and the reflective 
knowledge. 
In the case.that ~'l know P" a question arises: "I know an external object P, but 
do I, at the same time, knO\v myself?" If, I do, then form. of knowledge 
, . . 
unintrospectively is knowledge of P. On this, supposition it is imperative to ask this 
question: What is the nature and character of this underlying knowledge myself 
implied in the very case of my knowlec!ge of an external object P. 
Both of these questions follow fi'om the supposition that the "I" as the knowing 
subject does indeed know itself at the very moment that it experiences knowledge of 
Ill} external object P. Taking the alternative that the "I" does not really know itself . 
while knowing an external object P, there result some paradoxical questions from 
. various per~pectives. 
. UI k P" the word Uf' in 
From a logical standpoint, when I say, for mstance, now 
this statement represents, or refers to the knowing subject of the proposition. The 
knowing subject is that subject which has made up and held within itself this relation 
...... 
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to the object P. Just as the word ''I'' is a constituent term in the form of the sentence 
"I know P", so the mind of the agent as the knowing subject counts for an integral 
part of the knowledge on which the whole conception of the knowing relation is 
based. Thus a constitutive part of knowledge, the "I", is subsistently implied in the 
whole. Given as it is, it cannot be unknown to itself Ruling out the knowing subject 
from the complex whole of the relation of knowledge would completely break down 
the meaning of that relation, and as a result human knowledge could no longer remain 
meaningful. Thus, that which is an integral part of knowledge cannot remain 
unknown. 
Besides, the act of knowing is designated, intentional and immanent in contrast 
with the physical and transitive acts of human beings. Being an intentional act, the 
whole complex unity of the act of the knowing relationship is placed within the scope 
of the "inten.!ip.l~a:lity" which implies that each and every element of such. a relationship 
. ,t~ . ": ... 
is known lJythe knowing subject. As thus posited, the "I" as the knowing subject of 
such a form of knowledge mllst be known in its context. Subsequently, on this 
hypothesis, the subject term is known, just as the predicate is in all certainty known. A 
knowing "I" is known to itself by presence and acts like an active intellect to provide 
in itself the form of its object so that it can know it by correspondenc'e. 
Thus we can understand from all this that the unitary consciousness has creative 
priority over reflective knowledge. This is what Sadra underlinesJ311 He says that the 
self "has. the "po.wer to create the forms of the mental objects. "(3~) In point of fact 
:reflective knowledge always emerges from its rich and ever prese~t source which is 
the unitary C.0I1sCi.ousness, and which is absoliu"tely nothing' other than the very "being" , 
of the active a.nd. perfonnative" "'I". For if the' active "I" were not present in all of its 
intentional reflective knowledge, all human intentionality, such as believing, thinking, 
wanting and so on and so fOl1h, would become meaningless. That is, there would be 
no sense in saying "I believe so and so," "I want so and so," etc .. 
On this account, the relationship of the unitary consciousness to reflective 
knowledge is taken by the Illuminative philosophy in terms of illumination and 
t· 
emanation. This kind of relation is nothing other than a typically existential 
: relationship of which the Illuminative philosophy speaks in its terminology as an 
Illuminative relation. 
This also implies that reflective knowledge is existential and in final analysis this 
kind of knowledge is a mode of being(·w. This is because reflective knowledge is 
.' .. ' 
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grounded by and generated from the unitary consciousness~ that is to say, it is a 
determination (Ia 'ayyol1) of the unitary consciousness through which the former is 
constituted by the Illuminative relation. In this respect, the upshot of this discussion 
follows: " ... [the reflective] knowledge ... is being."(J-I) 
By such a thesis on the nature of the reflective knowledge, the Illuminative 
philosophy approves, with some reservations, its relevant efforts in the existential 
phenomenology to bestow an existential nature to the reflective knowledge. 
Heidegger whose aim is an 'ontological reflection', writes in the same case: "The 
whole correlation necessarily gets thought as 'somehow' being."(J5) He also reminds 
us of others like Scheler and Hartmann on this subject: 
"Following Scheler' s procedur~, N. Hal1mann has recently based his 
ontologically oriented epistl:lllology upon the thesis that· [reflective] 
knowing is 'relationship of being'. "(36) 
Neve"rtheIess. these authors do not found the relation between ontology and 
reflective knowledge as an Illuminative relation. Heidegger, for example, tries to 
found this relation in temporality of Dasein that, in his eyes, discloses the reflection as 
a grounded mode ofDasein's existence. Moreover, he does not engage himself to see 
how ontological·thought furnishes liS with objects which unavoidably concern us in 
our reflection. 
On contrary, Sadra has tried not only to discover in the unitary consciousness, 
so to speak, the mechanism of grounding reflective thought, but also to see how the 
former supplies objects for the latter. Concerning the second point, we may 
summarise his doctrine as follows: The unitary" consciousness existentially discovers 
the reality of beings with which it is in ontet·ic touch -- that is, in its living experience 
of Being; then the creative imagination (which is called by contemporary Sadraean 
philosopher Tabatabaii, the Convel1er (mohaddel) of the unitary consciousness),f37) 
translates those realities as objects of ollr subject. . 
7. 6. Final COl1sit!erations: 
I· 
This illustration may seem to oversimplify Sadra's position in this respect. In 
fact, he has discussed this issue in detail through demonstrating mental existence in 
first instance(J8), but he crucially reconsiders this issue when he tries to show how the 
. . . II t for episteme in its broad sense: It umtary conSCIOlisness dommates a aspec 0 u 
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grounds our episteme, because the efliciency of all epistemic faculties including the 
subjectivity of the subject, depends on it(39J. 
Not only this; the unitary consciousness, according to Sadra, guarantees the 
objectivity of objects as well; that is to say, since the reality of beings with which a 
unitary consciousness is in ontetic touch are existentially present before it, it then 
already is sure of , so to speak, the external reality of objects which concern the 
subject -- specially if we remember the non-erroneous character of the unitary 
consciousness (eh, 4). Therefore, we can conclude that apart from its other activity, 
the unitary consciousness grounds two things in respect to reflective thought: The 
subjectivity of the subject and the objectivity of the object. This may need a bit more 
description. 
As it appears from the previolls discussions, the unitary consciollsness is an 
existentially current experience of beings with which it is in ontetic touch. Through 
this, the unitary consciollsness discovers the reality of beings. In so doing, the unitary 
consciousness pushes, us to be not merely receptive in relation with the world; rather, 
we are creative and go Ollt to meet it, and always anticipate it. It is why there are 
things we do not learn; why we know them from the beginning, as if we had always 
been familiar with them, That is, as we have seen, the unitary consciousness implies 
coexistentiality. As we saw in this chapter, the unitary consciousness creates the 
object independently of the subject, even though the object is always an object for a 
subject. What the subject does possess is the aptitude for comprehending objects 
supplied for him by it and, once given, recognised by the subject. (41/ 
Once again we see as before that such a process of elaborating objects requires 
the pre-existence of. the unitary consCiousness. From the reflective standpoint, the 
unitary consciousness is what I already know, just as the slave boy in Plato's Meno 
already "knew" geometry -- though the slave boy does not know that he knows 
geometry. His knowledge is an existential experience in his everydayness that could 
remain veiled, concealed and latent. This implicit awareness appears as present in him 
without needing to be formulated and as a primordial certitude which is always 
I 
present in him. 
This means for Sadra, at least, that reflective knowledge is not, as subjectivism 
implies, groundless. Our reflection is always springs from, proceeds and acts in the 
context of our 'being' as the unitary consciousness that puts us in an ontetic touch 
with the reality of beings that are present for us by their actual beings. Then, on this, 
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we are not indeed deprived of the real worldJ.,tlJ Nor are we misled in grasping beings 
in the world, the things in themselves even in the plane of reflective thought simply 
because reflective thought is currently SuppoJ1ed by the unitary consciousness which 
picks up the real and inserts it into the reflective language (of course, this language, 
has its own nature one characteristic of which is that it is subject to error dependent 
on the weakness or strength of our epistemic faculties). This is, according to Sadraean 
theory, what prove with our non-reflectively commonsentially everydaness 
expenence. 
In this chapter, we have tried to sho\\', to some extent, the application of the 
theory of unitary consciollsness to reflective knowledge and its 'subject-object' -ive 
structure. In the following final chapter, we will try to summarise some other 
applications of this theory. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Conclusions 
Such was the Illuminative theory. In this chapter we will first briefly summarise 
the illuminative theory; and then set forth some immediate conclusions including (i) a 
refutation of a triple implication concerning the relation of the self and reality which 
follows from the subjectivistic gap;(ii) the agreement of the Illuminative theory with 
common sense; and (iii) a suggestion as to how one could read the authors of modern 
theory of the self such as Descartes in the illuminative context. Let us start with the 
summary. 
1. Based on the special method introduced above (Ch.2), an ontetic field was 
discovered. Through this field the ability of the ilIuminative philosophy to contribute 
to resolving the ontological crisis in modern theories of the self was examined. This 
was the overall objective of this research. In trying to detect the origin of the 
epistemology of the self in the ontetic field, we saw how the ontological gap III 
modern theories could be tilled by application of the illuminative ontetic principles 
(Ch.3) thereby reconstructing the dismissed "being" of the .self. The self is then 
considered as an emanative being who is absorbed and situated in Being. At this stage, 
as we saw, there is no subject. no mind (in Cartesian-Husserlian sense); the subject is 
only a self as unitary consciousness. (ChA-SYGlrthis basis the lIIuminative philosophy 
was also directed to answering some major problems which arise from modern 
subjectivism, including our conscioLlsness of private states anc! retlective(lSubject-
Objectlive) knowiedgeJIJ To be Sllre, commonsense suggests that the self is somehow 
a source of awareness of the body, feelings, thought and intentions which, by its 
nature, defines and embodies important values and goals. By identifying the self with 
the unitary consciousness, this Illuminative theory tries to show how the self, could be 
related to our awareness of private states (Ch.6), and also to reflective 
knowledge.(Ch.7) 
II. We saw how the illuminative theory could also justify our grasping of the 
reality of objects through appealing to their being in the ontetic field. Understood as 
unitary consciousness, the self acts in a twofold way: On one hand, thanks to being an 
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emanative entity situated in the context of Being, it has onletie tOllch with beings 
(objects-in-themselves for reflective thought) so that these beings are immediately 
present to the self. The self then has access to the reality of beings through ontetic 
touchP) On the other hand, the self creates and grounds reflective thought by an 
Illuminative relalion. It means that the self as unitary consciousness ascertains the 
correspondence between concepts or representations and their external objects. 
Thus understood, the theory eliminates the triple consequence of modem 
subjectivism as well: skepticism, solipsism and idealism. All these arise from 
presupposing a gap between a mental concept or representation and its external 
object, to which supposedly the subject has no access. If the subject has no access to 
external objects, then the subject is concerned with nothing but concepts and 
representations: an external world i::i presupposed only as a reference point for our 
concepts and representations. The L1L1! step in the triple consequence is los!ng the 
exter:nal world: how can we be ':'lIre of oLir knowledge of the external world 
(skepticism) while \ve have nothing but representations and concepts (idealism), then, 
the world as a whoie depends on LIS -- e\'erybody is ultimately a monad (solipsism)J3) 
The Illuminative theory avoids this triple trap simply because it maintains that 
the self does apprehend the external world, the reality of beings-in-themselves, 
through the ontetic t.ouch: the object-in-itself while absent in our reflective thought (in 
the eidetic field) nevertheless is present for the self by its being (in the ontetic field): I 
am already ontetically in touch with the pen with which I am writing, but not in an 
intentionally conscious manner of r~p:·;:sentative, reflective knowledge. Rather, I 
grasp its reality as it is in itself throug.h hybridisation of my being and the being of pen: 
in the sense that its being is present for my unitary consciousness, (i.e., fiJr my being). 
There is no room for the triple trap. The reality of pen is not totally absent for me, it 
is present by its being (be )tor( e) my being. This idea is supported by another 
Illuminative thesis explaining that the unitary consciousness is free from being 
mistaken; there is no error in the unitary consciousness because it is pure being. (see 
eh. 5) Then, when the unitary consciousness picks up the reality of a being (pen in 
t-
our example), it does not make error. However, error may take place at the level of 
reflection while conceptualising that reality: in fact, what comes first is 'Being' and 
the self is a fellow of it. We, selves, share a common site in reaching reality/I) What 
makes us different in our reOective interpretation of reality is our differences in the 
degrees of strength or weakness of faculties with which we translate that reality into 
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the language of reflective thought. Thus the unitary consciousness sets us free from 
the triple trap of subjectivism. I am not living only with my representations, but, 
already with their actual facts. 
III. The Illuminative theory of the unitary consciousness may also contribute to 
justify why some of modern philosophers like Descartes and Kant presupposed the 
prior ideas/principles beyond our reflective faculties. Though there is a basic 
difference between the Illuminative notion of "the unitary consciousness" and the 
theory of Cartesian "Innate ideas" or Kantian "A priori" Gust because the unitary 
consciousness is a living existential experience), it can show that such theories are 
right so far as they approve the necessity of being an other domain (which we called 
the ontetic field) beyond our reflective thoughtTo the extent that such theories could 
be deformalised and exisitentialised, the Illuminative theory accompanies and 
appreciates Cartesian or Kantian theories. 
IV. The Illuminative theory of unitary consciousness also uniquely allows us to 
give experiential significance to the characterisation of the self as something which 
can neither be characterised nor defined in terms of empirical qualities and their 
collections and relationships. \Vithout engaging in mysticism or in justification of the 
practical, mystical aspect of the Illuminative theory/5J we mention here that this point 
is supported by· a profound experience of unitary consciousness widely reported by 
Illuminative mystics who claimed to taste the high experience of 'no-mind', of 
identification of the. self and unitary consciousness, by abandoning reflective thought 
and picking up the 'presence' through meditative techniques, and whose mystical 
meditations claimed to cover all aspects of our experiences, including our external and 
internal perceptions.'61 I1luminationists rely on an empirical element as well as our 
ordinary commonsensical experiences (including our experiences of thinking). 
Furthermore, on the assumption that experience of the self is necessarily present 
int every experience, one can again show that experience of unitary consciousness is 
not only an excellent candidate for experience of the self but the only possible one. 
Only an experience without any qualities can accompany every other possible 
experience and the experience of unitary consciousness meets this requirement 
uniquely. This argument is conclusive, but another argument is worth noting. Unitary 
consciousness is experienced in a performative state; this experience has no parts or 
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components (indeed, even the manifolds of space and time, the very contexts in which 
parts can be distinguished, are not present in the experience). Therefore given our 
assumption that experience of one's self is present in this experience of unitary 
consciousness,(Ch.6) it must actually he this experience, as a whole, for the 
experience of this unitary consciousness has no part which can be assigned to or be 
specified as being the experience of the self. Thus we see not only that experience of 
unitary consciousness is the only possible candidate for fulfilling the criteria for 
experience of the self, as derived from Descartes and the above philosophers (see Ch. 
1) but also it is the only possible candidate for fulfilling the commonsense intuition 
that the self is somehow experienced as present in every experience. 
This last conclusion appears to raise a problem, however. For if the self is 
someho·w experienced as present in eve:-y experience, as common sense insists, and if 
the experienrc of the unitary consciousness is identified as the relev~nt ~xperience of 
the self, then the experience of the unitary consciousness mL.:st somehow be a 
component or aspect of every other experience. But this raises the question of why 
the unitary consciousness usually goes unnoticed, even 'vvhen specifically sought. The 
answer immediately suggests itself t!1at it goes unnoticed precisely because it is 
constant and present in all our experiences. Our attention tends to go to what is 
changing; what remains constant gradually recedes into the background. This in turn 
suggests that the T1iuminarive notion of self as constant and unchanging (see Ch. 5), 
present somehow in all of oLlr experiences, is a reflection of a vague yet widespread 
subliminal awareness of the unitary consciousness as pervading ali our experiences. If 
this analysis is correct, the fact tl1,1t the unitary consciousness usually comes to be 
noticed only when all the other contents of awareness cease to occupy our attention 
ceases to be puzzling and becomes what we expect. Finally, if this analysis is correct 
we would expect that the Illuminative experience of the unitary conscioLlsness renders 
it more noticeable and raises it from the existential level. 
The identification of the unitary consciousness with the self thus offers a simple 
e'5planation for the otherwise very problematic fact that common sense continues to 
insist that the self is somehow present in all experience, even when it is unable to 
isolate it, and even when intellectual analysis convinces us that it cannot be given in 
experience by any empirical quality, or even abstractly accounted for by any 
relationship or collection of sLlch qualities. For the self is present in all expenence, 
there to be noticed, as qualityless unitary consciousness. 
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V. It also seems that the Illuminative theory of the self can helpfully supply a 
means to unify apparently conflicting modern theories of self, and allow development 
of a theory of self capable of giving experiential realisation of the otherwise 
unfulfilable criteria derived from Descartes, Hume, Kant and HusserI (see, eh 1). In 
the rest of this chapter, we will see this point in more detail. 
Descartes claimed that he was able to locate the self, simple and abiding 
throughout our changing experiences. Philosophers such as Hume and Kant, however, 
insisted that they could not find any such self. Husseri remained in tension between 
Descartes on one hand and Hume and Kant on the other, and tried to reconcile them 
by suggesting the eidetic constitution. Nevertheless, Descartes' analysis seems to be 
faithful to common sense. The analysis of the unitary consciollsness makes this 
commonsense claim (and the appeal of Descartes' analysis) intelligible, and in a way 
that suggests that common sense is in fact correct. In the absence of this Illuminative 
consciousness, however, common sense and reflective analysis have often been in 
sharp conflict. Such a conflict can be found, for example, in Bertrand Russell's views 
on the self. 
The early Russell argued that "dualism of subject and object" is "a fundamental 
fact concerning cognition" and that "I am acquainted with myself. "(IJ Indeed, he 
seems to argue that there are precisely two things that we are aware of namely, the 
self and its present.fSJ So far Russell, like Descartes, clearly conforms to common 
sense. Later, however, Russell changed his mind saying that 
"Hul11e's inability to perceive himself was not peculiar, and I think 
most unprejudiced observers would agree with him. Even if by great 
exertion some rare person could catch a glimpse of himself, this would 
not suffice, for' I' is a term which we all know how to use."(9J 
Russell finally concluded that the concept of the self has to be a mere "logical 
.. II d' bl "(1OJ fiction," "schematically convenient, but not empmca y Iscovera e. 
Russell's rejection of his earlier commonsensical view was based on his inability 
to discover in experience anything that could either correspond to or clarify our 
ordinary notion of the self as simple and abiding. We have already seen how the 
Illuminative theory of the unitary consciousness is a good candidate 
experience of the self that Russell, like Hume before him, could not find. 
for this 
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VI. The Illuminative mystical expenence of the self, as claimed by the 
Illuminative mystics, seems also capable of removing the force of difficulties arise 
from some linguistic approach to the self. In history of Western philosophy, especially 
since Hobbes (Descartes' contemporary), we see some philosophers who comes to 
reject the notion of'!' simply through a grammatical analysis. The general point of 
such analyses is that verbs such as "think" require a grammatical subject naturally 
suggests that there is some "I" (in the tirst person case) who does the thinking. 
However,this "I" is merely a schematic convenience, required by ordinary grammar 
but not representing any real thing. For example, when we say "It is raining," we 
neither need nor want to postulate any separate "It" that does the raining. The same 
case holds good for the "I" (in "I think," etc.). Thus, if we cannot find anything that 
could properly correspond to the term "1," \"-'e should recognise that this "I" is nothing 
but a mere schematic convenience. 
Such an approach to 'I' also conflicts commonsense. Common sense rejects this 
approach, insisting that \-\le (or at least most of LIS) are in fact somehow aware of our 
selves throughout ollr experience, and that the "I" in "I think" is, unlike the "It" in "It 
is raining," definitely not at all superfluous. The analysis of the unitary consciousness 
seems capable of giving an expreciential sUpp0l1 to this claim of common sense, and 
removes such a grammatical approach. 
It is interesting in this context to note also Descartes' own response to such 
approach. Hobbes objected to Descal1es that since we have no inner perception 
corresponding to the idea of self or soul this idea could only be a mere product of 
inference. Descartes agreed that "there is no image of the soul fixed in the phantasy." 
But he insisted nevertheless that "there is what I call an idea," something that he was 
"directly aware of' and which was not "inferred by reason. "(1]) 
"For when we obscrvc that m; arc conscious beings (res cogilantes), 
this is a sort of primary notion, which is not the conclusion of any 
syllogism; and, moreover, "'hen somebody says: I c:"\pericnce (CogiIO), 
therefore I am or c:"\ist, he is not syllogistically deducing his c:"\istcnce 
from an c:"\pcriencc (cogi/atiol1e), but recognising it as something 
I- self-evident, in a simplc mental intuition."(J3) 
"1 experiencc (Cogi/o) therefore I am ... this knowledge is no pro~u~t 
of VOllr reasoning, no lesson that your masters have taught you; It IS 
• . ',.. "(/-1) 
somcthmg that YOllr 1l1111d sees, feels, handles. 
Descal1es' experiential language and explicit denial of reliance on reasomng 
here are thus both unmistakable -- even though, as he insists, the experience has 
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nothing of the imagination in it, for any such content would only "reduce the 
clearness of this knowledge. "(15) 
VII. It is easy to see why Descartes' experiential claims here have not generally 
had much effect. For in the absence of knowledge of the relevant experiences these 
claims appear problematic if not simply unintelligible. The Illuminative unitary 
consciousness, however, allows us to see how the experiential aspects of Descartes' 
Meditations can be read literally and intelligibly. V.,re can also note numerous close 
parallels between Descartes' explicit narrative experience and the Illuminative texts, 
parallels which indicate clearly that Descartes might helpfully be read here in this 
Illuminative fashion. Consider, for example, the following passages from Descartes' 
first three "Meditations":(l5 1'1J 
"[Meditation 1\ I will suppose that sky, air, earth colours, shapes, 
sounds and all external objects are mere delusive dreams ... I will 
consider mysel f as ha ving no hands, no eyes, no flesh, no blood, no 
senses."(/(j) 
"I Meditation 2/ Yesterday's meditation plunged me into doubts of 
such gravity that I cannot forget them, and yet do 110t see how to 
resolve them. I am bewildered, as though I had suddenly fallen into a 
deep sea, and could neither plant my foot on the bottom nor swim up 
to the top. Bu t I "'i 11 make an effort, and try once more the same path 
as I entered upon yesterday."(l7) 
The result of being lost in this unbounded sea of doubt was, as Descartes 
describes in the next two paragraphs of his text, his "discovery" of self, already 
analysed by us at some length. Descartes then begins his next "Meditation" with a 
further description of his method: . ': '. ;~~ 
"[Meditation 3] I will now shut my eyes, stop my ears, withdraw all 
nw senses' I will even blot out the images of corporeal objects from 
. , 
m\' consciollsness; ~r at least (since this is barely possible) I will 
ig;lOre them as vain illusions. I will discourse with myself alone and 
. . b' " (I ,'I} look more deeply II1tO myself. r am a conSCIOliS clIlg. . 
Descartes then came to recognise that he had an idea of unbounded, "infinite" 
consciousness,f19) that this idea is "supremely clear and distinct and representationally 
. . f If' "el) more real than any other"(]{)) and is "innate in me, Just as the Idea 0 myse IS. -
Descartes, calling this "infinite" consciousness "God," then concludes his third 
meditation with the following observations: 
",Meditation 31 I wish I no\\'1 to stay a little in the contemplation of 
God; to meditate within myself on his attributes; to behold, wonder at, 
adore the beauty of this IInmeasurable Light, so far as the eve of 111\' 
darkened understanding can bear it. .. ITJhis contemplati~n of th~ 
Divine Majesty. , . makes us ~'\\\'are that \\c can get from it the greatest 
joy of which we arc capable in this life."(.?.?) 
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Thus in his first three "Meditations" Descartes describes (a) generating a 
pervasive attitude of doubt, (b) withdrawing his attention from external objects, 
sensations, and sensory-oriented thought, (c) finding himself lost in a "sea" of doubt, 
(d) discovering his self as consciousness, independent of all imaginable content, (e) 
locating a completely unbounded level of such consciousness ("God") as the context 
and foundation of his own (finite) consciousness, and (f) finding that contemplation of 
this unbounded level prod.lIces incomparable joy. 
All six of these points correspond closely with the Illuminative literature. they 
are standard in the practice and performing of the Illuminative unitary consciousness 
which determines the self as pure presence to being, including even the description of 
what this school calls "the stage of raising doubt" (maC/am 0/ ho)'I'o/) from which all 
meditations startJ':3J And, more generally, the main features described in Descartes' 
account, namely, (i) reversing the direction of attention (away from the senses and 
sense-oriented thought), (ii) coming to inner experiences of unboundedness (a deep 
sea, non-picturable consciousness, and infinite non-picturable consciousness), and (iii) 
gaining an experience of exquisite joy and light in the latter unboundedness, are all 
standard components of the literature of transcendental experience, in the Illuminative 
school. 
The autobiographical nature of these passages IS, however, explicit. This 
interpretation provides the basis for an explanation of how Descartes might properly 
claim to have a "clear and distinct" intuition of self as unpicturable consciousness 
independent of all sense-oriented content and thought".:'-IJ even though other 
investigators such as Hume and Kant could not, (':5J For as we have seen, the 
Illuminative unitary consciousness, which uniquely can give clear significance to 
Descartes' concept of self, remains unnoticed unless one methodically and radically 
reorients the direction of one's attention. 
Descartes is llsually read by IllOSt of western philosophers in an intellectual 
context.(Put aside exceptions like Husser!) They do not even suggest that they have 
attempted to do what Descartes described, namely "withdraw" their senses from 
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. physical objects and "even blot out the images of corporeal objects" from their 
consciousness. They have, however, often taken the idea seriously enough to propose 
what may be called "thought-experiments" in which they attempt to imagine what it 
would be like to perform the process Descartes described, and then draw conclusions 
from the imagined result. While thought-experiments can be useful, their results are 
often far from unambiguous. Two thought-experiments articulated by noted 
philosophers on the topic in question will illustrate this difficulty_ The first was 
articulated by Avicenna (Ibn Sina, 980-1037 A. D. ), often regarded as the most 
influential of the Medieval Islamic/Persian philosophers. In his thought-experiment 
Avicenna asked us to imagine a man created suddenly, floating in empty space, with 
his various senses either inherently non-functional or having no objects on which to 
.operate. Such a person, according to A \'icenna, would never1heless still be conscious 
of his own existencetl(,) This line of reasoning, however, would not be at all 
acceptable to Hume. For in thought-experiments of his .O\\ln Hume argued repeatedly 
that if all his perceptions were removed he would be "insensible of' himself, and 
would "truly be said not to exist." \r\'ithout any perceptions or impressions, according 
to Hume, "I should be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive what is farther requisite 
to make me a perfect nonentity. "(l-) 
The fact that Hume and Avicenna corne to such different conclusions from what 
for our purposes are comparable thought-experiments indicates of course that they 
had very different intuitions about the nature of the self and the relation of self-
knowledge to the contents of ordinary experience. VarioLls responses to their different 
intuitions and conclusions are possible. Depending on one's own intuitions about the· 
topic, for example, one migbt attempt to account for the difference between the 
positions of Hume and Avicenna (and correlatively defend one's own position) by 
postulating that one or the other. thinker was influenced by hidden verbal and/or 
commonsensical assumptions. Alternatively, one might postulate that the two thinkers 
had different degrees of clarity of the experience of "the unitary consciousness" -- just 
a~ the theory of a 'transcendental self, in Cartesian, Kantian or HusserIian senses, is 
so as well. 
If we suppose here that it is possible to perform in reality (the 
phenomenologically relevant aspect of) the imagined thought-experiments, a less 
hypothetical analysis of this case is possible. For in Illuminative practices all the 
objective contents of experience can frequently fade out and disappear, entirely, 
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leaving the experience of the unitary consciousness (or in the Illuminative school 
mystical terminology, a pure presence to being which is the absolute openness of an 
absorbed self) by itself: devoid of all sensations and thought, and identifiable as the 
self. 
This experience, as already hinted, has allowed us to corroborate and/or falsify 
various aspects of modern theories of self. It is worth noting here that while the 
experience falsifies some of Hume's (and other later empiricists') major conclusions 
about the self, it does so by remaining faithful to Hume's basic empiricist 
methodology. Hume emphasised throughout his li"ea/ise that the orientation of his 
philosophical work was to attempt to apply the "experimental method" to questions 
of human nature and mind. \Ve can now, it appears, signiticantly advance this aspect 
. of Hume's empirically-oriented program by removing at least one important question 
from the realm of mere thought-experiment through performing the relevant 
experiment directly. Thus, although the Illuminative experience of the unitary 
conscIOusness corroborates aspects of Descartes, Husserl, Kant's, and other 
rationalistic theories of selC it does so in accord with empiricist experiential 
methodology (rather than by abstract a priori arguments). 
Thus understood, we may see how much the Illuminative experiential theory of 
the unitary consciousness can helpfully supply a context in which to unify the 
apparently conflicting theories of self in modern thought. 
I • 
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APPENDIX 
The Empirical Element In Sadra's Epistemology 
In this appendix we would briefly discuss the role of the empirical element in 
Sadra's epistemology in a quick comparison with modern ones. In the following 
presentation we intend to employ "epistemology" or "theory of knowledge" in a 
broad sense to include the examination of the fundamentals of every kind of 
knowledge leading to or generating from the being. Considered thus, "epistemology" 
would constitute a variety of modes of cognition and information. On the one hand, it 
includes an assumption-free base for human kno\Vledge~ on the other hand, it 
embraces revelation as a source of knowledge. 
What is the origin of kno\,v'ledge? The onglll of knowledge, according to 
Sadra,(J) is experience and its scope is nothing less than the comprehension of the 
being. The Illuminative philosophy is a presuppositionless one; at least this is the ideal. 
In this spirit, Sadra's examination of the origin and means of knowledge compels an 
artistic imagination of the individual, existential place of man in the ocean of being, 
and consequently aims to dislodge tradition from its very foundations. By so doing 
this school intended to give its theory of knowledge a radical beginning similar in this 
respect to Descartes, Hume, and Husser!' ThiS similarity was previously discussed at 
length. 
Sadra does not seem to endorse the Platonic theory that the mind comes imo the 
world already in possession or certain innate truths, a theory handed on to medievai 
thought by Augustine and accepted by Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz; like Locke, 
Sadra in general holds that there are no such things as innate moral, mathematical or 
logical principles by which the mind, already fOl1ified, begins its operation of thinking 
about the world. For instance, when we begin to comprehend nature, we do not 
disclose any moral sense or innate logical capacities. Only by observation and 
expenence are we able to employ logical and inductive reasoning and a moral or 
religious senseJ}J 
Indeed, it is possible to categorise Sadra' s theory of knowledge as a process 
epistemology. Our mind develops and acquires strength and complexity through the 
process of growth and interaction with the environment. There exists a parallelism 
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between the development of the mind and the exploration of the surroundings. The 
mind acquires its texture after experience stamps itself on mind through the gradual 
process of growth. The more images are fixed in the mind the more powerful and 
penetrating our thinking becomes. Thus, through the passage of time the mind 
acquired keenness and sophistication, and more insights into problems. 
The foregoing remarks are in perfect agreement with what John Locke charts in 
his Essay Concerning Humall Understanding. He says: 
"Follow a child from its birth and observe the alterations that time 
makes, and YOli shall find, as the mind by the senses comes more and 
. . 
more to be furnished with ideas, it comes to be more and more awake' , 
thinks more, the more it has matter to think on. After some time it 
begins to know objects ,,·hich being meet familiar with it have made 
lasting imprcssion."(3) 
This is, according to Sadra, exactly what happened to mind in its development: 
the richness of thought and the c(lpacity of this thought to deal with the environment 
are made possible by the "fixed images in his mind" of objects in our immediate 
perceptual field. By llsing the impressions of objects we are able to perceive 
relationships by comparing the images of such objects to one another. These images in 
our mind become the carriers of thought and the source of cur creative imagination in 
discovering the arts and the like. rvlind improves by degrees in terms of innovation and 
comprehension/I) The modern tenability of sllch a view as that of the Illuminative 
school and Locke in the field of psychogenesis is a truism nowadays and needs no 
argumentation . 
.... . : Also, unlike Plotinus, according -to Sadra, when the soul dwells in the body it 
does· not· have any.. previous knowledge of the intelligible world.· The soul does not 
entertain a pre-existence before bil1h: it is simply generated from the body when the 
body becomes prepared for itJ51 . Sadra d~~onstrates that the soul is the existential 
production of physical perfection of body and it springs from the substantial 
existential changing of human nature. This soul is the principle of life in the individual 
and does not innately possess fullness of thought in a Platonic, or even Kantian 
/. 
manner. 
Since we are, as it is presupposed, a creation of God, we must contain an 
element of divinity. This element constitutes a bridge to the knowledge of the Truth. 
However, this is not to say that man is innately knowledgeable, but instead that he is 
disposed to develop a mind and knowledge under the proper circumstances. 
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Therefore, the mind is initially a sheer power, a capacity to form ideas when it 
encounters experience. The fact that the soul is God-given simply means that God 
endows the individual with the instinct of life and being and nothing more, and to be 
sure, at least in Sadra's philosophy, it performs through our substantial existential 
movement of our bodily growth. 
Therefore, in a Lockean manner, Sadra's theory considers the mind as a tabula 
rasa/6) a blank sheet of paper with only the capacity of having water marks of any sort 
in its fiber given by the Being. 
All of our ideas are, without exception, derived from the traces of experience 
stamped on the infantile virgin surface of the mind. To repeat, our processes of 
thinking and comparison commences after the images of objects are fixed in our mind. 
Experience is therefore the out(Ollle of the interaction between the senses and the 
environment. 
According to Sadra,r";") our means of knowledge are the five senses through 
which the impressions of the external world are received. The basic sense which all 
animals possess is touch. It absorbs primarily the properties common to all bodies, the 
textures hard or soft, rough or smooth. The other senses perform more specialised 
functions; they suck from objects the qualities to which they are sensititive. Also the 
senses interact and aid one another in the process of knowing. Although localised in 
different organs of the body, they point to the one and the same object and yield not 
five different worlds but a configuration of one world. 
The five senses are the means which t he animal spirit employs to actualise 
perception Thus the sense organs cannot function without the animal spirit and their 
being is totally dependent upon it. But the seat of the animal spirit is the heart which 
diffuses sensitivity and nutrition to th~ brain and liver; and although perceptions are 
effected by the help" of sense organs our tll11her awareness of the whole perceptible 
field cannot be located in them. The eye sees but it cannot be aware of its seeing; nor 
is our awareness that we are seeing or hearing, a seeing that we see, or a hearing that 
~e hear. 
The consciousness of Ollr seeings and hearings which results from sights and 
sounds cannot be located in Ollr eyes and ears in so far as they are exercising their 
specific functions of vision and hearing. According to Sadra, this consciousness 
physiologically speaking has its focal point in the brain. The animal spirit reaches the 
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brain from the heart. The nerves conduct the animal Spirit from the cavities of the 
brain to the sense organs. 
Similarly, the sense organs relay the sensible qualities of external objects to the 
nerves, and these in turn pass them to the brain. 
Thus, Sadra emphasises the role of the brain in the different processes of 
knowledge and places the sense organs at its service. It also contends that the brain 
comprises different faculties. These are specialised in different performances to secure 
the accomplishment of the cognitive process. The act of perceiving, discerning 
colours, and the awareness of the smells and tastes as qualities of objects, take place 
in different areas of the brain. Even pleasure and pain, repulsion and attraction, owe 
their sources to brain processes. l'vloreover, imagination arises when the animal spirit 
comn-mnds the brain to visualise sensible objects or remember them after their actual 
presence ceases. Consequently. thought and all its constituent categories are 
contingent upon the material functions of the brain. Should ,1 disruption occur in a 
certain brain compartment, the corresponding function of the disrupted compartment 
comes to a halt. 
All knowledge, unaided, stems from experience resuiting from the confrontation 
of the senses with the independent universe. Perception is not in direct contact with its 
object. It is an outcome of the integrating processes of the brain; the sense organs are 
its medium; and the qualities of the surrounding objects are sucked through a straw as 
it \vere: the air through the ears, the luminous medium through the eyes, odour 
through smell, flavours through taste, and solidity, softness and roughness through 
touch; in the words of Locke: 
"Knowledge extends as far as the testimony of our senses, employed 
about particular objects that do affect them, and no further. ... I think 
it is not possible for any man to imagine any other qll~lities in bodies 
howsoe"er constituted, \\hereby they can be taken notice of, besides 
sounds, tastes, smells, visible and tangible qualities ... the idea of 
solidit\' is received bv tOllch ... and indeed hard and soft an: names 
that \~'e give to thil~gs only in rclation to the constitution of our 
bodies."(81 
Not only is touch restricted to the acquisition of the qualities of the material 
objects, but like the Illuminative theory, Locke maintains that the remaining senses 
provide liS with other qualities: sOllnds through hearing, colours through seeing, 
flavours through taste, and odollr through smellJ91 
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One can discern a fUll her resemblance between the initiator of modem 
empiricism and Sadra. Genuine knowledge, contends Sadra, is not of particulars. The 
qualities of objects furnished by the senses are retained and rememberedJlO) This 
persistence of the sensible qualities aids the mind in discerning their similarities and 
differences, and to compare their elements in an order not immediately given in sense 
data, and to abstract from them what is ordinarily called general ideas. The general 
idea is an essence or an abstract common quality of the members of the class in 
question. This is, for example, what Sadra says on this issue: 
"For that understanding which we, and stich as we mean is nothing 
else but that rational faculty which examines the individuals of sensory 
particulars, and from them abstract a universal notion."(11 J 
According to him this power of abstraction is not possessed by the animals but 
confined only to man. 
Locke seems to be in agreement \\~ith Sadra. Locke also attributed to the mind 
the power to combine, add, and compare the different sense data imprinted on itJl2) 
This sense data is a presupposition of reflection or thinking~ abstract ideas are made 
out of the examination of the sense data and the formation of internal or intellectual 
general models: 
"The mind makes the particular ideas received from particular objects 
to become general. .. this is called ABSTRACTION, whereby ideas 
taken from particular beings become representatives of all of the same 
kind: and their names general names, applicable to whatever exists 
confonnable to sllch abstract idcas."(l3J . 
Like Sadra, Locke also maintains that the synthetic act of forming abstractions is 
predicable of rational beings and not of bmtes. (J-IJ 
Therefore, on the basis of the preceding comparison between Sadra and Locke, 
one can infer that for both of them knowledge originates in· experience. Their 
empiricism is corroborated by the preceding exposition of his ideas and his substantial 
agreement with the basic views of Locke. However, empiricism, as a school of 
epistemology, is of many brands and s~ades nowadays. It suffices to say that the 
Illuminative school anticipated its essential teaching. These are in total harmony with 
the school's existential outlook as well. 
Moreover, our comparison of Sadra and Locke reveals that none of Locke's 
epistemological determinations. with regard to their essence and general outlook, is 
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philosophically new. He may have acquired the springboard for his empiricism from 
the medievals in the same manner as Brentano, and after him Husserl, did with the 
notion of "intentionality of consciollsness." \Vhile the impact of IslamiclPersian 
philosophy on the medieval west had its definite philosophic repercussions, one 
cannot decide with any degree of confidence that these had an influence on Locke 
himself. 
Perhaps we should emphasise here that our comparison of Locke and Sadra was not 
intended in any way to smear the important philosophic differences between the two. 
For one thing, Sadra was a metaphysician-mystic, whereas Locke was somehow 
contemptuous of metaphysics, felt uncomfortable with the proofs for the existence of 
God, and was never a mystic. 
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30. Ibid. , p. 259 .. BlIt by the timc his Ji-eatise was ready for publication he fclt constrained to add 
an "Appcndix" stating that he no\\' fclt that this account \\'CIS \'cry dcfcctivc. He rccapitulated those 
earlier arguments which he still felt to bc corrcct. and then c.\prcsscd his inability to adequately 
account for our naturally assumcd idcntit~, of self by means of collections and rclations. 
31. Ibid. , p. 634. 
32. Ihid. , p. 635. 
33. Ibid. , p. 633. 
34. Ibid. , p. 635. 
35 The rcfercnce to his carlicr theor~. already clc:lr from thc contcnt of thc tcxt. is made explicit in 
his footnote to the passage qllotcd abO\'e. Ihid. . p. 635. 
36. Hume. of course. went much funhcr. anclofTereel a variety of additional arguments calling into 
question ollr natural assumptions about causality, the nature of physical objects as independent of 
perceptions, etc. Neither these further illfercnccs. nor the assumptions underlying them, need 
concern us here howcver. 
37. Ibid. . p. 634. 
38./bid, pp. 635-6. 
39. Suppose (i) it is possiblc to defille oncsclf in tcrms of somc collection of perceptions, and some 
relation R spcci(\'ing the conditions \\'hich possiblc perceptions IIlust fulfil in order to be a member of 
this collection. (ii) If R specifics :lny conditions at all (that is. if R is non-vacuous) there must be 
possible perccptions P which do not fulfill thcse conditions. (iii) But sincc R (supposedly) defines 
011eself. it is logically impossible for one to ha\'c thc perception P. (i\') But. as we sa\\' above, there is 
no possible perception P which one cannot concci\'c or the logical possibility of having oneself. (v) 
Therefore R cannot be significantly dcfined. for it cannot propcrly exclude any logically possible 
perception, and it therefore cannot bc used to dcfinc oncself. 
The argument can also be formulatcd as [ollo\\'s: (i) Suppose R defines (non-vacuously) those 
perceptions that can bc OIlC'S o\\'n. (ii) ThcIl therc exists SOlllC possible perception P which R 
excludes. (iii) Since P is a possible pcrccption onc (logically) could hm'e it. (i\') But then one would 
be ha\'ing a perccption that was not onc's own (by (i) and (ii». This is absurd. and our supposition 
that thcre can be some (non-vacuous) rclation R capable of defining one's self by specifying the 
collcction perceptions proper to it is 1~lIse. 
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40. Many candid<ltes for such relatiolls ha\'e been suggested. including HUl11c's contiguity and 
resemblance, and various sorts of memory-relations. Sec. for example. William James, The 
Principles ofl\vcl1OIogy. Vol. I (Nc\\' York. Dover Publications. Inc .. 1(50) Chapter X, and Paul 
Grice, "Personal Identity." Mind. Vol. I. No. 2{)(). Oct. 19~ I. 
41. we should note again that this analysis says nothing at all about whether. given the laws of the 
universe we actually live in. such experiences arc possible in actual fact. Its purpose is only to display 
the relation of relations (R) and their excluded perccptions (p) to our basic concepts of self. and it 
concerns itsclf only with logical and not \\'ith factual possibility. 
we can also note that contcmporary linguistic philosophers often argue that we cannot in fact even 
imagine cxpcriencing independently of association with our body, and thcy ofTer sophisticated 
linguistic argumcnts to support this claim. HO\\'e"cr on all ordinary usage of thc "imaginc" (and its 
cognates in other languages throughout history) this claim is simply false. 
42. Ibid. , p. 636. 
43. Immanuel Kant. IJrolegolllena to any I:II/llre .I/etaphysics (Indianapolis & Ncw York. Library of 
Liberal Arts, Bobbs-Merrill Co .. Inc .. 195()) p. X. 
44. Immanucl Kallt Critique of Purc Reason. translated by Norman Kemp Smith, Macmillan & Co. 
Ltd. , New York; 9G4, pp. 42-~. One point may be mentionecl herc: The transcendentalisation of the 
self is officially risen by Kant and took up by his followers in post-kantian period. For a short study 
see: Solomon R. Coo ('on/inelllal fillilosopliy since 1750: The Nise .·Ind TIll! Fall Of The Self Oxford 
1990, Parts One Ane! Nine. 45. Ihid . pp. 22-}. 42. etc. 
46. Ibid. , p. 152. 
47. Ibid.. p. 155. 
48. Ibid. . pp. 197. 207. ctc. 
49. Ibid. , p 131. 
50. Ibid. , pp. I ~ 1-2. }}5. 
51. Ibid. , p. 141-2 
52. Ibid. , p. 1 }6. 
53. Ibid. pp. 152-3. 
54. Ibid. . pp. }29-30. 332-3. 153. etc. 
55. Ibid. , p. 331. 
56. Indeed, the t\\'o chapters on the self ill his Critiqlle q/IJ llre Reason. cOlllprising about one-tenth 
of the whole \'olume. were the on" ones. aside from the preface. thai Kant fell constrained 10 rewrite 
extensively for the second edition of the \\'ork. 
57. Ibid. p. 337. 
58. Ibid. pp. ~32-3. 
59. Ibid. , p. 131. 
60. Ibid. , p. 329. 
61. Ibid. , p. 15}. 
62. Ibid. , p. 154. 
63. " ... time is represented. strictly speaking. only in me. "lhid. , p. 3~2. Thus the self itself is 
somehow both outside or and independent of time as its container and precondition. Space is 
analysed in a similar fashion. 
64. Ibid. , p. 382. 
65. Ibid., p. 366 
66. Ibid., p. 337-~(). 369-70 
67. Ibid., p. 340 
68. Ibid.. p. 370 
69. Ibid., p. 327 
70. Ibid., p. 380. 
71. Ibid. , p. 382. 
72. Ibid. . p. 328. 
7'3. For a disclIssion on Husserl's Transcendental self/ego see: Kockclmans J. J. , Edmund Husser/'s 
Phenomenology, (I ndiana. 199~). pp. 2() I-X: See also: Solomon. Continental Nlilosopi1y. Part Nine. 
74. Cartesian Afeditafions. p. ~} 
75. Ibid. p. 83 
76. Ihid., p. G9 
77. Ibid., p. 21 
78. Ibid., p. 99 
79. Ibid. pp. 22-3 
80. See: Spigclberg. fJllC!lwlIH'l1ological .1 !ewell/enf. p. 125 
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81. Ideas, p. 
82. Ricoeur P. , Husserl, Ch. 3. 'Husscrl's Ideas II', p. 52 fT. 
83. see: Ibid., 'Kant and HusserJ". pp. 175 IT. 
84. Carlesian .Heelilaliorls, p. 
85. Ibid. parag. 30. p. G5 
86. See Ibid. Meditation 5. para .... 2 
87. see: Ibid., para. "'0-1: also para. X I-X 
88. Ibid., p. 86: For a discllssion 011 Transccndcnlal Idealism in Phcnomcnology see: Philips H., 
'Transcendcntal Idcalism' in Cml/hrh~{!.e colllpanion To Husserl; Also: Kockclmand. Op. Cit. pp, 
269 IT, 
89, Ibid., p. 30 
90, See: Ibid., mce\. 2, ... : Also: Ricocur. Husserl, p. 107 
91. Ibid. pp. 18-21 
92. treatise, p. 633 
93. A safe way to fill the gap should supply this need: This may bc c1carer through our following 
discussion in Ch.2-'" 
Chapter Two: 
1. Sec: Ibn Sina, JIan/iq al-.\IashreqYI'/JI. ·Introduction·.p .... 
2. Concerning Suhra\\'arcli n English see: Nasr s. H .. "I'lIree MlISlill1 ,';ages, CII. II; Nasr H. , 
'Suhrawardi' in MM. Sharir(cd), .1 lIistOJ:\' 0/ .I/IISlilll Philosophy; McCrackon and Tehrani, 
'Persian Philosophy', in Solomon R.C.. World I)/iilosophy. pp.I04-167 NCllon I. R. , Allah 
Transcendent. Ch. 6. Corbin H .. HisfO/:1' Of Islall/ie Philosophy, trans. L. Sherrard (London 1993), 
Ch. VII, pp. 205-220: Iqbal. Developll/ent O./.\Ietaphysics In Persia, (London 19(8) Ch. V; Fakhry 
M. , A HistolY q/ Islmllic Philosophy, (NJ 1\)70). Ch7. pp. 325-339. In French, see: three 
prolegomena orH. Corbin to Suhrawardi's Opera Metaphysica ef .1 (vslica, \". I. II. III (Tehran 1976-
7); Also, Corbin H .. 1:'rI Islallllranien. V. II. (Paris 1\)72): also Corbin H .. SlIhrm'ardi, I' Archange 
elllpoure, (Paris 197G). 
3. Concerning the notion of "Light" sec belO\\". eh. ], 3. I. For more discllssion on Illuminative 
nOlion of 'Light' in english sec: NCllon,()p. Cit.: also Corbin H., The .1 Ian ~f Ught.(London 1978) 
4. Concerning Sadra in English see: Nasr H. , Sadra aI-Din Shira::i: His Transcendent 
Theosophy(Tchran 1978): Also Morris J. \Y. 'An Introduction to the Philosophy of Sadra' in his 
translation of Sadra's n,e Wisdo/ll oj" the "lhrone. Fakhry M .. Op. Cit. , pp. 339-370; Fazlur 
Rahman, Philosophy of.HlIl/a Sadm (Albani 197(»: R<liaii M., Philosophy of.lIul/a Sadra and Its 
Epistelllologicallmplications: :licCrackol/ and Tehrani, Op. Cit., pp.175-1 SO. For more bibliography 
on Sadra in European languagcs scc: Nasr, Op. Cit. pp. lJlJ-IOO. 
5. AI Heklllat al-.I lula 'a/(vahfi al-.·/sj{tr (/1- :Iq/(\yah al-Arha 'ah. cd. by S. M. H. Tabatabaii, Tehran 
1983 (Hercafter .Is/{[r): for a description or this book in English see: Nasr. Op. Cit. , pp. 55-69 
6. Sce for c:\ample:· MutahhariM .. . \"/w,./i i .1/{[hSIlI I .\lul/zlIIl/eh. Tchran. 1\)86, V. 1lI, pp. 70 tI, 
note 1. 
7. We said 'c:\cert', becausc our clescription or the IIluminalivc method has not been discussed in this 
form of prcscntation and classification as yct. We try lo bring up thc novel aspect of this method that 
is hidden in the Illuminati\'c literature: thus. wc c:\ccrt it. Sce in this relation, ror c:\ample, Lahiji's 
Sharh i Gholshan iNa:: and Kashani's S/wrh i ,l/ana::il al-Saiirin. 
8. Farbcr M .. Basic Issues In I)hilosophy (NY, 19(8). p. 39 
9. Farber M. , Naturalism and Subjectil'islll, pp. 383-8'" 
10. For a description of thcse journeys in English sec: Nasr. Gp. Cif . . [t must mcntion here that the 
Illuminative philosophy though uses the method of rcduction howcver it is not a philosophy of 
reductionism. 
11. Since so far as I know the word 'ontctic' is used for first timc, the reason should. then, be 
ex'plained hcrc. As hintcd and will bc scen in detail. there is a reduction in thc Illuminative method 
to Being which in my best knowledge has no correspondence in modcrn philosophy. Since I could 
not find a proper word in Eng[ish to indicate the special scnse of lhis rcduction as supposed by the 
Illuminative philosophy, I darc to make this word, ·ontetic'. drivcd from thc Greek 'ontos' meaning 
pure being. in comparison with Husserl's 'eidctic', dri,'cd from thc Grcek 'cidos' mcaning pure 
essence [see: Ideas. pp. 59-61 and 55-(>71. I also use 'ometic', ncither 'ontic' nor 'ontologic', to 
avoid any confusion with Hcidcggcrian scnsc of thcse words. 
12. A.\far. V. l. p. 12 
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13. This beginning/e.\·.\· symbolised in their emphasis on 1'ml'bah meaning return and Tazkiyah 
meaning Purification. This is seriously recommcnded in the Illuminative philosophy to do Tawbah 
and Tazkiyah before starting any philosophising. Sec. for example. Suhrawardi's .\piritual IVill in the 
end of Hekll10t al-Ishra(j: also. S:lc1r:l's ;]cl\'ice in.·'h/nr's Introduction. 
14. Sadra. :\/alatyh al gh(~\'h, trans. M. Khajan. Tehran. 19RR. p. 139 
15. Sadra . . ·hfar. V. L p. II 
16. Sadra, AsIaI' V. III. p. 
17. Wcstern Orientalists and the previous writers arc perhaps to be excused for their failure to 
recognise the rele\'ance and modernity of this par1icular method of Illuminative school. Despite their 
erudition and exacting scholarship. scholars sllch as Gauthier, Corbin. and MacDonald failed to 
discern this method, possibly because of their predominant interest in history and culture and not in 
philosophy as such. 
18. Thcre are various techniques in the I1luminati\'c mysticism by which such a thing is possiblc. 
19. HUlllC, treatise, Book l: 'Of the Understanding', pp. ~5-81. 133-9,205-23 
20. See: This is ob\'ious specially if \\'e consider the practical. mystical aspect of this school. Thc 
phrase "Khal' al-.Na '1«\'11" uscd in their langll:lge indicates that \\'e should gives up in first instance 
our knowledge bracketing our ratio to rreshl~' restart. See for example. Lahiji's Sharh i Golshan i 
Raz and Kashani's SharI! .\/an(l7il a/-5;oiil"il/ 
21. Descartes, Meditatiolls. p. 17 
22. Ibid., pp. 23--t-t 
23. Phenomenological Movc/llent. p. 77: Sce :lIso: Pi,ce\'ic E .. III/sserl (lnd l'hel1olllenology, pp. 11-
21. 3~ fT. 
2-1-. Cartesian Meditations. p. 5-7 
25. See: Husser! E. . Ideo (lj' l'hellolllC'I/O/O,!!Y. Lecture 2: :lIso. Ham/llond M and others, 
Understanding Phenolll£>l1olog.l', (oxford. /9<) /j pp. I-l: alsc. Kockclman J. J .. I~.:dl/ll/nd Husserl's 
Phenomenology, PP. 11~-I27. !:17-1). 
26. See Below in this chapter 
27. Sce Sadra . . -/s{ar. V. III. PP. 
28. Ibid., pp. 62-3 
29 .. See. belo\\' and Appcndix 
30. See Sadra .Is{ar 'Introduction': This idc;d is commonly reminded through the Illuminative texts. 
3l. See A.ifar V. I pp. 
32. Farber, Basic Issues In Philosophy. Ne\\' York. 1965, p. 116 
33. Compare these t\\'o senses wilh Heicleggcr's first and third scnses of essence as described in: 
Grieved A., 'What did Hcideggcr I\1Cln by "Essence"' . .fol/mal (?/tlte British society lor 
phenomenologv, ". 19, 110. /, .fall. I').').\). pp. 64-89 
34. A.ifar, V. I. pp. 56-S. 243-5 
35. Ibid. , 262-326 
36. Ihid. , pp. 2-1-5 IT. 75 O' 
37. Ibid., 245-59: also V. III. pp. 275-77 
38. Ibid., Y. I. p. : V. II. pp. 35 iT 
39. Ibid., V. 1. Pl'. 265-7 
40. For a disCllssion on Husser! sec Kockelmans. Op. Cif. , pp. IIS-I27. 206-327; also see: 
Phenomenological.\lovell/errl, pp. 671.) IT. or course it must be mentioned herc that Sadra also leads 
to a Hermene~~tic science ofHighcr apprehension or mystical consciousncss (lrfan). however. it is not 
the same as Husser! 's Eidctic Science. 
41. Sadra. !\/Iafatyh, p. 139 
42. Ideas, p. 155 
43. See .Hafatyh. p. 2X7-21.) I also .. Isfar V. 
44. This can bc an c\'iclcnce for Husscrl's saying that phcnomenological mcthod has been used by 
pl~ilosopher before him. For a discllssion on this saying sec Gom'itch A. P.~vchologv and 
Phenomenology, p.173 
45. Husser\. Phenomenology in Enc~'c1opaedia Britannica. 
46. Spiegelbcrg, Phenomenological .\ /OI'(,II/{'lIt, p. 7 -t \), also pp. 93. 126 
47. Husser!. Phenomenology 
48. Ideas, pp 235-57. pp. 5()-7. 15(1-()7. That the phenomcnological tenelency lends itself to such a 
mystical interpretation is attested by the \\ork of Eclith Stein. Husser!' s studcnt. in On The Problem 
OI Empa fi1y I The Hague. 19641 and by the opinions of other specialists on the subject. Isee Farber m. 
,TheAilllso/IJ/1ilosophy. NY. IWI(I. p. II) 
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49. Ricoeur, lfusserI. p. 11)0: In this relation also see: Gorwitsch's 'Problem of Existence' in 
Phenomenology and P.,ychology.p.116 IT: also his Field O/Consciousness.part 6, pp.377 ff,also pp. 
~IT ' 
49+ 1) See Kockclmans. Op. Cil. . pp. 1]7-9 
50. Fink E .. "1' analyse illlentioncile et Ie problem de la pense speculative" in jJrohlellles Actuals de 
la Phenoll1en%gie. eel. by H. L. Van Berda. Brllssel 1952. p. 68: quoted in Farber. Nalura/ism and 
SubjectivislI1. p. 240 
51. Ideas para. 15 
52. Idea 0/ Phenolllen%gv. lecture 2 
53. Ideas, parag. 15 
53+ 1) For a discussion on the transccndental phenomenology and ontology see: Kockclmans, Gp. 
Cit .. pp. 246 IT. esp. 25-t-7. 2XI fr. Also see: Pi\·ce\·ic. Op. Cil . . pp. 102-111 
54. Farber, Natura/islII. p. 2-t0 
55. Heideggcr . Being and 'J'ill1e. p. 21: For a discussion on Hcideggc's project ofbcing scc: Frcde D., 
'The Question of Bcing: Hcideggcr's Project'. in 'l'l/(! Cambridge COll1panion To Heidegger, 
(Cambridgc 1993). ppA2-69: also see: Ros0!l. the Question ojBeing.Op.Cit .. 
56. 'Letter on Humanism' inl3asic Wrilings. cel. D. F. Krell (London 1993)p. 258 
57. Hcideggcr. Rasie Proh/e/lls 0/ Plwl/o/lwJ/%g.l'. p. 2() 
58. Ibid. p. 21 
59. Being and Tillie. 32 
60. Ibid. 
G 1. Ibid.. 34 
62. Ihid., 35 
63. Scc: Hcidcggcr M .. 'II/(' QuestioJl ()j" /Jeillg. trans. J. T. Wild and W. Kluback (New Hayen, 
1958) esp. pp. 7-l ff. 
64. Farbcr, Naturalism. pp. 240-1 
65. Being and Till1(,. p. 63 
66 .. Scc Husscrl's lIIorgina!.\. transcribcd by Husscr! Archi\'cs or Lou\·ain. quotcd by Farber, 
Natura/ism p. 36-t 
67. Sce: What is.\ /etopli.l'sics) in Hosie WritiJlgs. pp. R9-111 . 
68. Olafson maintains that in later Hcidcggcr's \\'orks. it is Being th(1t grounds the presence(i. e. , 
Dasein). Sec: his book IIeidegge/' (lnd the Phi/oso/)hy (~r\lind 
69. Being and Tillie. p. II) 
70. As/ar. V. I. Pan 1. eh. I.For a linguistic study of the word 'being' in Islamic Persian 
philosophies see: Shclwdi F .. :\/etC1/)liysics In Is/alllic Plli/osopli.l'. (New York 19X2): For Sadra pp. 
119-143. 
71. Heidegger. nasic: j)roh/ellls ojPllel1olll(!/w/ogy. '1 ntroduction' 
72. Asfar. V. I. Part I 
73:' As/ar. V.6 Compare Hcidcgger" Vcry being has a wa>-of-being"'13asic Proh/ellls 0/ 
Phenolllen%gv p. I R I 
74. Basic Proh/ellls o/Plleno/llen%gv p. I () 
75. Ibid. 'introduction' csp. II) IT. 
76. Ibid.. p. 23 
77. The similaritics bct\\een Heideggcr and Sadra do not pro\'c that their aims of returning to Being 
are the same: Sadra has a mystical aim in mind. but Heidcggcr scems not definitely to havc. On his 
relation to Mysticism scc: M acqurric 1. . fleidegger OIU/ Chrisl ianily. (London 11)9-l). pp. 1 17 -121 
78. As/ar, I, pp. 263 ff 
79. One can say herc that Hcideggcrian deconstruction is dcconstruction of subjcctivism; if so it is 
similar to Sadraean task to dcconstruction of subjccti\'ism: the difference is that Heidcgger acts 
through analysis of history of western thought but Sadra acts through analysis and rcjection of the 
e~sentialism which according to him is thc idcology if subjccti\'ism. 
80. Asfar. V. I. p. :, 7. Translations No .. XO.X l.X:' and X-l are Rahman's \\hose summarising of 
Sadra's discussion on intcl'llal compancnts or csscnce is uscd in this scction. Howevcr it must 
mention that Rahman is f;lr ('rom the contcxt of our approach towards Sadra's existential analysis of 
essence. 
8!. Ihid.. p. 103 
82. Sce: Ihid.. V. L 'Phcnomcnology of Mind' 
83. Ihid., Y. II. p. 35 
84. Ihid., p. 36 
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Chapter Three: 
1. See, Sabziwari H. ,.'>'harh al-.\/III1::/llI/ah. p. 12 
2. See: Suhrawardi. Qissal a/-G/l/lrhat a/-(lIwrhiymh. in Opera, V. II: Also sec: Corbin, A History 
of Islamic Phi/os()p/~I'. Op. Cil. 
3. Suhrawardi. I/e/illwf allshraq. pp I ()()-7 
4. Ibid., 107-R 
5. Ibid. , p. 108 
6. Ibid. , pp. 107-8 
7. Sadra ad-Din Shirazi. Kifah al-As/ar. Vol. I. p. -l5. 
8. Ibid., 327-80; also 17 L 143 IT 
9. Ibid., pp. 206-8. 219-21 
10. The problem of ontology anelthe mcaning and rcality of existencc has been treatcd so thoroughly 
and so systcmatically in this philosophy that thc whole arca of this philosophy is characterised by 
that sense of existcnce. op. cit. 
11. The vertical and horizontal li1lcs arc obtai1led frolll thc A"icennian principle of the "nobler 
possibility" (al-imkan al-ashraf) togethcr with Suhr;l\\"ardi' s principle of thc "more posterior 
possibility" (al-iabn al-akhass). f.:ilah ffikll/{/I a/-/slimq. pp. 154-157. 
12. "Undetachability" and "indistillguish;lbility" :lre othcr cxprcssions of implication, because a thing 
implied in another means it is lIllckt:lCh;lblc :111c1 indistinguishable from that other. Conversely, a 
thing undctachablc and indistinguishable rrolll :l11olher mcans it is implicd by and contained in that 
othcr. 
·13. A description of thc "llIumin:lIi\"c relation" \rill be gi\'cn in Chapter 5lbclo\\'1 where we speak of 
the relation betwcen the unitary consciollsness :lncl rcnccti\'c knowledge. Further explanation on this 
specific subjcct can be obtained in Sab/.iwari. Sharh Man/.ulllah. (1969 cd. ). p. 5'1 l. 
14. , Sadra ad-Din. Kilah a/-.· I sfi7r. Part I. Journey I. pp. 210-2()2. 
15. op. cit. , part 2, eh. I 
16. Ibid., p. 224-7 
17. Ibid., p. 20 l. 
18. (1) Possibility is thc ncgatioll of necessity:' X IS possiblc' = . X does not necessarily cxist or not 
exist. ' (}) Impossibility is thc negation of possibilit~': 'X is impossiblc' = 'X cannot possibly be. ' (3) 
The necessity or being exemplifies the ncg:lIion of the possibility of not bcing: 'X is a necessary 
being' = 'X cannOI possibl~ not be .. (-I) The necessity of not being excmplifies the negation of the 
possibility of bcing: 'X is necessarily non-cxistent' = 'x cannot possibly be .. (5) The nccessity of 
being implies the dcnial of the illlpossibility of being. on thc one hand. and identifies itself with the 
impossibility of not bcing. on the other. (6) The neccssity of not bcing implies the denial of the 
impossibility of not being. on the one hanel. and is identical with the impossibility of being on the 
other. 
19. Avicenna, Kitah a/-Isharat. ·Logic·. P;1J1 I. p. 21)5 
20. op. cit. , 2%. 
21. Op. cit. ,296-:WO. 
22. Sadra ad-Din Shirazi. /':i1ah (jl-.Is(ar. JOllrney I. Vol. I. pp. 2IS-220. 
23. Sllhrawardi. f.:ifah al-Ta/wihaf. p. -ll. pp. -l2--l~. 
24. As.far, v. I. pp. 215 ff esp. II X: see also Sabl.imlri 's note no. I 
25. Sartre 1. P. , Being and XOfhingness. p. :HlX 
26. Asfar, V. II. 'On dcfinition of Essencc': also ~ec: Etiennc Gilson, /3eing and 5;ollle Philosophers, 
(Toronto, 1952) pp. 7-l-I07. 
27. Sabziwari. Sha,.h .\lanzl/lllah. (I I)()I) cd. ). p. -l1O. 
28. Op. cit. , pp. -l08--l09. 
29. Sadra ad-Din Shirazi. Kila!> a/-.·ls/(1" Journey I Vol. I. p. -l7. 
Chapter FOll r: 
l. See: MudhaITar's 'Introduction' .to A.~ji1r. V. I. p. 6 
2. Asfar. v. 8, pl·t) 
3. Ibid. , I, p. 20 
4. Sadra, Sharh al 'UslIl a/ KaJi. p. ()O. It lllusT be mcntioncd herc that Sadra holds that the self 
access to and may possess all gradation of perfection that stand under his divine authority (God's 
Caliph) through gcncrating in an cxistcntial proccss of the substantive movcment. He has discussed 
all ontological. psychological and cpistemological aspects of this thesis in detail. (See for example: 
As/ar Vols. 8-9). Sincc wc arc in this study confined to the outetic aspcct ofthc self. wc only considcr 
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the self in its final humanistic state. I hal is what Sadra calls' Discursive self or thc logos of the self 
(a/-najS a/-natiqah) (see Ihid.. V. 8. 260 IT. ) thc nature of which is the unitary consciousness. 
5. As/ar, V. I, p. 197 
6. Ibid. 
7. Sadra, Kilah al-As/ar, Journey I. Part I. Vol. I. pp. 326-380. 'An Inquiry into Prepositional 
Existence. ' 
8. Being and Time, p. 78 
9. The official term used almost by Ihc illuminationists and Sadra is "al 'ilm al shuhudi (or aI 
hudhuri or al ishraqi)" (Ajfar. V. III . pp. 447 fl). Perhaps, the phrase, 'the unitar\' consciousness' 
is the best to convcy the meaning; ho\\·c\·cr. thc word 'consciousness' has its own difficulty because 
of its employment in the rcncctivc. eidctic ficld.(See for example Gonvitsch's Phenomenology and 
Psychologv,pp. 89-107, pp. 390-97) As wc \\'ill sec soon in this chapter. this word has no eidetic, 
reflective or intentional sense for ollr cmploymcnt of this word herc in the Illuminative context. 
10. Sadra, S11Owahid, p. 200 
11. Ibid., p. 172, 157-8 
12. As/ar, V. III, p. 297; see also p. 382) 
13. Ibid., pp. 278-9 
14. Ibid. , 280ff 
15. Sabziwari's note no. 2 in: Ihid . p. ·H)() 
16. As/or. V. III. p. 465-87 
17. Ihid. , p. 465 
18. Ibid. , p. 466 
19. See: Shawahid pp. 242 IT: also,,/sliw.V. III. p. 312 IT: also Sadra's treatisc on lllihad 01 'aaqiJ wa 
01 III 'aquul, in Rasa'il. 
20. As/or, V. II, pp. 339-43 
21. See: Gonvitch A. .. A Non-cgologicnl Conception of Consciousness' in Glynn S. (cd), Sarlre: An 
Investigation o/Sollle l\1ajor l11C'lII(!s • (A \'erbury 1987). 
22. A point should be remind here: Heideggcr unlike Sartre does not like to use the term 
'Consciousncss'. In explaining why he does so. sec: Olafson. Heidegger and the philosophy o/Mind, 
(New Haven. 1987)pp. I·t, 262 n. 20. For Sartre: Gom'itch A. . A ~Von-Egological Consciousness; 
For Heidegger's innuences on Sarlrc sec: Rockmorc. ffeidegger and French Philosophy(London 
1995) Ch. 3, pp. 40-58 
23. Like Sadra, Sartrc similarly denies the transccndcntalising thc self or the ego in its 'primitive' 
status, even in phenomenological analysis. For Sartre's theory of self, sec specially his book: 
Transcendence 0/ E:~o. trans. Williams (New York 1957). For more discussion see also: 'Sartre on 
the Transcendental Ego' in Glynn (cd. ). Sar(re, pp. 1-21: also: Solomon, Op. Cit . . Part 12~ 
Pivcevic, Op. Cif. , Ch. 12, p. i 23.ff. 
24. Sec Sartre. 'consciousness of self and knowledge of self in Readings in Existential 
Phenomenology, cd. N. La\\'renc~ ancl D. O'connor (NJ (967) pp. 113-142; Sec also: Danto A. C. , 
Sartre. (London 1991). Ch. 2, PI'. 35-70 . 
25. For Rorty sec his book: Philos(}pl~\' (lnd (lie lIIirror o/Nature. 70 IT: for Fuacoult and Derrida see: 
. Solomon .R. C. '. Op. Cit . . 'Supplement; The End Of The Self. Sce also: McNay 1.. Foucault.pp. 
133-63 
26. Being and Nothingness. p. ixi 
27. As/ar, v. 1. pp. 78-82 
28. Ibid., V. Ill. pp. 312 IT . 
29. See Horgby's article in: Durfee H.A. (cd.) . . :lna~l'tic: Philosophy and Phenolllenologv. (The Hague 
1976), pp.96-125 
30. Glock H-J., A lI'illgensfein's Diclionm:v,(Oxford 1996), The term: "Consciousness", pp.84-86 
31. ibid 
32. For Wittgenstein's "solipsisin." see: ibid pp.348-352 
33'. ibid p.84~ see also: ibid, pp.174-179 
34. Quoted in ibid. p.84 
35. ibid 
36. ibid 
37. Sec: Hanning 0 .. Wiltgenslein '-" I.ater Philosophy, (London 1989). Ch.2. pp.152 fT. 
38. Tractalus, 5.641, 
39. See: Genova 1.. f.I'illgenslein: .·1 II'ay qr Seeing. (New York 1995), Ch.2 'Don', Think, Look!' 
pp.SS-92; Also part three. pp.135 IT. Sec also below in this research. Ch,6 for a comparison on 
'Pain'. 
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40. As/ar. V.lII. pp. 
41. This understanding may be completed by saying some words about Sadraean semantic Our 
sema~tic reading of 'Sel~se' in Sadra.is based on. some of his ontetic principles. For example, Sadra 
~stabhshed f~r the firs.t tllne an.ontel~c mle readlllg lhat Being is all things and at the same time, it 
IS not any tlung. (Basil al-Haqtqat I\ul/ ~/-.. 's/~va' II'~ La.~Jsa Biha). Also he justified that Being is 
the truth and. thc .re~l,sense of o~Jects. and IS ludden behind every thing. (AI-Wujud 
M~kht~/IAll1hla!ah Ilt/FI. I\.ul/ al-.·Ishya ). Also, Sadra has demonstrated an ontctic univocity for 
Being In all of lis gradations. (See ""/.'1(11") 
44. Ibid. , V. 8, pp. 260 IT 
45. See Suhrawardi's Hayakel al .\'lIr 
46. As/ar, V. 8. p. 343 
47. Solomon. Continental Philosophy. 'Supplement'. 
48. Suhrawardi. Kitab at-Talwihat, p . .t l. 
49. Sadra ad-Din, Kitab al-.4.\/a,., Journey III. Part 1. Ch. II. Vol. I. 
50. Suhrawardi, Op. Cit. 
Challtcr Fh'c: 
1. A~/ar, journey L Pat1 3. p. 313 
2. See: Russell. The Proh/elll (~fPhil()sophy. Ch. XII. 'Truth and Falsehood' 
3. See Tabatabaii. 'U<;ul;" Fal.w{/o \'(1 Rm'eslt i Realisl/I, cd. M. Mutahhari. Anicle 4. Also In this 
respect we may mention another characteristic of the unitary consciousness expressed bySadra. This 
characteristiC is its freedom from the distinction between knowledge by "conception" and knowledge 
by "belief. .. The unitary consciousness is not subject to this distinction. but reflective knowledge is. 
Chronologically this distinction may be lirst made by Avicenna in his '"Logica" in order to 
disentangle the problem of "definition" from the problem of "demonstration". He says: "Every piece 
of knowledge and apprehension is either by conception (tasarwllr) or confirmation (tasdiq). 
Knowledge by "conception" is the primary knowledge that can be attained by definition or whatever 
functions as definition. This is as if by delinition we understand the essence of human being. 
Knowledge by "confirmation" on the other hand is that which can be acquired by way of "inference". 
This is as if we believe the proposition that "for the whole world there is a beginning. "(Ibn Sina, 
Ketab al-l'·./ijat. 'Logic', Ch. II) 
It seems that this may similarly be close to the distinction made by some modern logicians between 
"meaning" and "truth value". On the grounds of this distinction a word or a sentence can have 
perfectly good sense by definition without ha,·ing any truth value, To have only a meaningful word, 
phrase, or sentence we need not bring out any demonstration justi(ving the belief that it is true, All 
we have to do is to appeal to a verbal or logical definition of that word, phrase, or sentence, But to 
know a confinnative judgement we are logically obliged to rely upon a justification for the belief that 
the judgement is tme . 
. No mauer·how valid it may scenl. this distinction docs not have.ally applicability when the unitary 
consciousness is under consideration, This is· so because both, of these· two aitematives, i.e., 
concepti011 . and confirmation. are intrinsic characteristics of conceptualisation that belongs to the 
order of meaning and rcpresentat ion. not to the order of "bei ng" and the factual truth. But the alleged 
reality of the unitary consciollsness does not in\'olvc any sense of conceptualisation and 
representation. Therefore. the unitarycollsciousncss does not involve any sense of conception and 
confirmation. 
One ShOllld notice that by denying the dualism of truth and falsity to the unitary consciousness the 
Illuminative philosophy does not mcan that 110 senses of tmth are applicable to it. There is, however, 
another sense of tmth in thc linguistic technique of lIIuminativc philosophy, which we can call 
non-phenomenal. But it is, strictly speaking. equated with the notion of "being" -- just as Heidegger 
identifies them, In this system of philosophy. whcn one speak of the unitary consciousness, he would 
apply such an existential sense of truth to its rcality. But here the point is that the logical dualism of 
"truth" and "falsity" as well as the logical distinction betwcen "concept" and "belier' have no 
applicability in the domain of knowledge by prcsence. but rather both of them are appropriate 
properties of the reflective knowledge, 
4. As/or. V. I. pp. 264-8 
5. See As/or V. I. pp. 221·230 
6. Cartesian Meditation. p. 69 
7. Ibid., p. 157 
8. Ibid .• p. 22-3 
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9. A~far, V. 1, 'The Problem of K nowlcdge ' 
10. Hekmat al-Ishraq. sec. 2, p. 106 
11. phenomenological .Hol'ellleni. p. 125: See also above Ch. I 
12. As/ar, 'The Problem of Knowledge' 
13. Cf. above, Ch. I 
14. Critique, p. 194 (A 158) 
15. Ibid., 142. note a 
16. Ibid. ,p. 141(AI16) 
17. Ibid., p: 142, note a 
18. Ketab al Alutarihat, p. 485 
19. The word representation is quite often used in this researCh. However. a short note should be 
said on it so far as the Illuminati\'e terminology is concerned. In Illuminative philosophical 
language, the following words arc used synonymously to refer to the., mental image of an objective 
reference. (1) mithal: meaning analogue. (1) slIrah: meaning form. (J}al-w!!jud al-dhihni: meaning 
mental existence, (/}al-zuhur al-dhihni: meaning subjective appearance, (J)al-l1Iahiyat adh-dhihni: 
meaning subjective essence or object. (6) al-shahah: meaning mental image. The first two are much 
more frequent in this language than the others. All of them. especially the first two, are extremely 
ambiguous, and quite often homonymous. 
20. Suhrawardi. ffiklllal al-lshraq. p. I) J. panl. I) 5. 
21. By "phenomenalist'· theory we mean the phcnomenon of representation. We could (llso have said 
"representationalist" theory. In general. phenomenon and representation are interchangeable in our 
terminology· 
22. Sadra. A.~rttr. V. I. Part 3. PP. "65-6lJ 
23. Suhrawardi, Hekmat al-Ishraq. p. II) 
24. Op. Cit. ,PP. 1 J 1-12 
25. Suhrawardi, Talwihal. P. 72 
26. Suhrawardi. Hekmat al-Ishraq. p. ) 12 
27. Being and Nothingness. pp. 559-(jO 
28. Ibid. , p. 568 
29. Ibid. 
30. As/aI', V. 8, pp. 221-230 
31. Ibid., pp. II, 325-380 
Chaptel' Six: 
1. Ketab al-Aful.arihal. p. 485 
2 Mutarihat, p. 485 
3. Ibid., parag. 6-12, pp 485 
4 .. As/aI', V.S. pp. 343-380 
5. A1editations, 
6. Ibid . . 
7. As/aI', V. 8, p. 11,345-6 
8. Ibid., p. 347 
9. Ibid. , p. 345-7 
10. Ibid., pp. 155-20" 
11. Ibid., 325-330 
12. Ibid., p. 221 IT 
13. We have excerted this b\' reading Saelra's theory of Soul-Body in the context of his discussion of 
singularity (Tashakhkhus) (.4.~1n,.. v. 11, pp. 10-16) 
14. Compare our following ciisclission with the existential phenomenological approaches. See for 
example: Merleau-Ponty. Phenomenology of Perception. trans; C. Smith. (Londo~ 198.1), Pa~ I. ~h. 
31" also see: De Waelhens A. . 'The Phenomenology of Body, an Readmg m ExIstentIal 
• 
Phenomenology. pp. 149-167 
IS. Being and Nothingness. p. 305 
16. Ibid. p. 310 
17. lbid., p. 304 
18. Ibid .• p. 308 
19.1bid . • pp. 309-310 
20. Suhrawardi. Allliarihnl, p. 4R5 
21. Philosophicallnv(~.~liN.alion.\". P~m\g.24() 
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22. See: Hanning 0., Willgenslein's Laler Philosophy. pp.144-5. 157.158: 
23. On the same issue see As/aI', Journey 1. Part I. V.I 
Chapter Seven: 
1. Cf. Correspondences with Arnold 
2. Cartesian Aleditalions. pp. 65. parag. 30 
3. Ricoeur, Husserl, Pl'. 157-59,191 
4. Being and Time, pp. 151-2 
5. As/ar, V. I, 'The Phenomenology of Mind' 
6. We have already mentioned that it is a methodological habit for Sadra that start with explanation 
of philosophical problems from the standard. traditional, and official terminology, assumes, 
suppositions and even argumcntations: but ultimately he comes to his theories through 
interpretations, rejections or reductions of these problems in terms of his principles. One of those 
problems is that in question. He starts with causal explanation in the Aristotelian style. However, it 
would be noted that Sadraean intcrpretation of Causation is absolutely existential, properly on the 
basis of his theory of Being. (sec: Ibid. Also sec: Tabatabaii Nahayat al-Hekmah, Chapter 
concerning' the nature of Causal Relation'. 
7. Ibid., p. 112 
8. Ibid. 
9. See: Husserl. The Phenomenology (~r Internaltilll(!-Cot1.\"Cio/l.\"ne.\"s. Para. 8-10. pp. 44 IT., Para. 37, 
pp. 100 IT. 
10. Phenomenological 1\ lovell/enl, 746 
11. Phenomenology of Internal ti lIle-consciollsness. p. 100: Husserl sometimes speaks of the 
immanent object as 'appearance' and or the transcendent object as "the primary content of an 
immanent object"(lhid 0 p. 1(0). 
12. See: Ibid.. Para. 40. p. 110: See also: Gorwitsch's 'On The object Of Thought' in 
Phel1olllenologv and P,\:vchology, pp. 141 n°. 
13. See Sadra. As/ar. V. III. pp. 312 IT 
14. Ibid. 
15. Ibid. 
16. Kant's Critique of pure Reason. p. 
17. As/aI', 1. I. Part 10, V. Til. esp. pp. 280 IT. 
18. Ibid., p. 280 
19. sec, Ibid. • V. 3. p. 280 IT 
20. See: 'Appendix' 
21. See: Phenomenological AlovelJlent. p. 752: for a discussion on reOection in phenomenology see 
Naturalism and ,s'uhjeclivislII, Ch. II 
22. Alutarihat, p. 479 . 
23. This is the typical sense of phenomenology of mind inSadra 'so Philosophy: see: As/ar, Part 4, V. 
II . 
24. Sabziwari;A4anzl:tIllah. 'The Problem of Human Mental Existence'( 1969 e.d.·pp. 58-85) 
25. This kin'd'ofopposition is called ''adam ",a Illalakah'; See: Ibid.. p. 153 . 
26. See: Sadra. As/ar, V. HI, 'On the Knower, Known and Knowing': Also sec: his Treatise on The 
Unity O/The Knower and Known fTillered al- 'aqel wa ai-ilia 'quI} 
27. Ibid.s: also Sadra. 771e wisdom of the throne. trans. Morris. 
28. A1u.tarihal, pp. 487-89 
29. Ta/wii1al, p. 70 
30. Ibid., PI'. 71-80 
31. As/ar, V. Ill. pp. 280 IT: See eSI>. Sabziwari's note: Also sec Tabatabaii. 'Us,,1 i Falsa/a, Articles 
3-5. 
32. As/ar, V. I. P. 264 
31'. As/ar, V. III, pp. 292 1'1': 344 IT: Also .UaJnlyh. pp. 283-287 
34. Mafalyh, p. 286 
35. Being and Time, 252 
36. Jbid., p. 493. note ,,·vi. 
37. Tabatabaii, 'Uslil i Fa/saj(l. Articlc 5. p. 190: See Mutahhari's note no. ~. 
38. AS/ar, V. I, 'Phenomenology of Mind' ("'Ijud dhihni) 
39. Jbid., v. 111, 'Theory or Apprehension and Knowledgc' (Mabahilh al-'Aql wa al-'i1m)~ also see 
ibid .• V. 8. 
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~o: This does not indicate that the unitary consciousness is a priori in Kantian formal sense, nor does 
It Impl! such a theory of ~nnate h/~as in. Olrtesian ratiomllistic sense. As we have already seen, it is 
our bemg and thus supplies an eXlstentlCll background for interpreting those subjectivistic theories. 
(see also, As/aI', V. HI, pp. 443 IT. ) 
41. SeeAs/ar, V. 1, pp. 264-8 
42. Ibid. , pp. 388 ff 
Challter Eight: 
1. see above Ch. 1 
2. As/ar, V. HI, pp. 312ff. 
3. Our description of skepticism. solipsism and idealism depicts their general spirit as commonly 
understood in modern philosophy. There are, howe"er. different versions. expressions and 
fomlUlations for these terms depended on the peculiar angle from which the cases are seen 
4. Can we not understand this theory as a basis to interpret Lcibnizian Hannony, Husserlian 
Intersubjectivity, and Willgensteinian thesis of cOl11mon usage of the words in public language - all 
elaborated to escape from solipsism. skepticism and idealism -- in this Illuminative context? 
5. We have justified it elsewhere in our work To Be OJ' .\'01 To He: A Philosophical Approach To The 
Mystical Consciousness. 
6. As/aI', V. 8, pp. 22 I IT. 
7. Bertrand Russell, "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description," reprinted in 
Mysticism and Logic (New York. Norton & Co. . 1929.) p. 210: Also see his Problems 0/ 
Philosophy, Ch. 5 
8. ibid, p. 224. 
9. Bertrand Russell. "On the Nature of Acquaintancc." reprintcd in Logic & Knowledge, Essays 
1901-1950, R. C. March editor (London. Allen & Unwin. Ltd .. 1956) p. 164. 
10. Bertrand Russell, "On Propositions: what thcy are and how they mean. "in Logic and 
Knowledge, Essays 1901-1950. p. J05. see also. "On Acquaintancc." in the same volume, p. 276. 
11. Descartes' Philosophical Writings. pp. 131). 142. Do. 
12. Ibid. • p. 299. 
13. Ibid. , p. 30 I. from a letter to The Marquis of Newcastlc. 
14. bid. , P 301. 
15.1deditatiol1s, p. 65. 
15+ 1. It is interesting to see that Descartes is read in a SllPP0l1ivc and similar (not of course 
Illuminative) manner by M. Gucroult and M. Grene: Sce M. Grene. Descartes (Sussex 1985) esp. 
pp.3-23 
16. Afeditafiol1s. p.65 
17. Ibid. p. 66. 
18. Ibid. p. 76 . 
.19. For, according to DescCll1cs, awarencss of (himself as a) "finite" consciousness presumes 
awareness of ",infinite" consciousncss as its context and condition of intelligibility. For the concept of 
-'(finite" is only intelligible in its contrast with that of'·infinity. ,. ihid. p. 86. 
20. Ibid., pp. 85-7. Descartes' argl1ments herc are often complex. contain scholastic clements, and (to 
modem readers at least) often appear quite unconvincing. Our present concern. however, is only with 
the phenomenological significance of his statemcnts. and not the validity of his arguments or truth of 
his conclusions. 
-21. bid., p. 90. 
22. This can de found in all tradition:ll texts of the lIIuminati\'c mysticism. for example see: Bahr al-
'Alum, Resala i Sal'r va ,\'ulllk. ed. Hosaini (Tehran. 11)84). 
23. Ibid. , P 91. 
24. The above litenll reading of Descartes ill the context of lliuminati\'c school also makes a number 
ot his other claims much more understandablc. These include (I) his claim to have an idea of 
unbounded consciousness ("God"). (2) his claim that this idea and that of sclf are the two most "clear 
and distinct" Ideas that he has. and that they arc both innate. and (3) that he experienced "light" and 
great bliss in the contemphltion oT this "idca" of God. Thc fact that such a subjective mode of 
experience exist of course says nothing about tile objective truth of its contents. but the supposition 
that Descartes may have had this experience might make his insistence on his doctrine of clear and 
distinct Ideas somewhat easier to understand. 
25. Both Hume and Kant kept open CIt least the logical possibility of experience that could fulfil the 
otherwise rejected notion of self. Hume allows the possibility that someone else might be able to 
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conceive of a notion of self e~isting entirely \\'ithout perceptions. but adds: "I must confess I can 
reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is. that he may be in the right as well as I, and that 
wc are esscntially difTerent in this particular" (Tre:ltise. p. 252). Kant allows the logical possibility of 
experience of "nouIl1ena" such as the self completely independent of all pcrceptions. but he maintains 
that it is impossible for us as human beings not only to 111l\'c but even adequately to conceive of such 
experience. (Critique of Pure Reason. p. 157. See also pp. 90. 16-L 250. etc. ) 
26. Ibn Sina, al-Shifa' rDe Anillla}. V. L p. 2S 1. Copleston describes A\'icenna's thought-expcriment 
as follows: "Imagine a man suddenly created. \\'ho cannot see or hear. who is floating in space and 
whose members are so disposed that they cannot touch one another. On the supposition that he 
cannot exercise the senses and acquire the notion of being through sight or tOllch. will he thereby be 
unable to form the notion? No. because he will be conscious of and anirm his own e~istence. so that, 
even if he cannot acquire the notion of being through e~tcrnal e~perience. he will at least acquire it 
through self-consciollsness. "(A History of Philosophy. V. II. Pan I. p. 216. See also: Encyclopaedia 
of Philosophy. \'01. I. pp. 22R. 
27. Treatise. p. 252. See also pp. 63-l-S. 
Apt)cndix: 
1. Asfar, Y. III. pp . also. fhid.. V. IXpp. See also . . I/alalyh, pp. 
2. This idea can be found variollsly through his books. For e~aIl1ple see: 
3. Locke J. , £.\',1,'0.1'. V. I Ch. I. pp. 37-63 
4. Asfar, Y. 8, pp. 21 I IT 
5. Ibid. , pp. 3-l7 ff 
6. Ibid. , pp, 228 
7. Ibid. , pp. 115-20S 
8. Essay, Y. II. Book IV. Ch. Xl. p. 33-l 
9. Ibid. , Y. I. p. 295 
10. Asfar, V. R. pp. 205-221 
11. Ibid. , pp. 2]0: also see V. IIf 
12. Essay, Book II. Ch. Xl. pp. 200-206 
13. Ibid. , pp. 206-7 
14. Ibid. , pp. 207-8 
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